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Published in 1994, Borderland by Patrick Quigley combines a historical narrative with an allegory of the lost innocence of youth and the land it is associated with. Although it is concerned with its protagonist’s maturation, the novel is primarily a toponarrative that revolves round both imaginative and actual borderscapes. The point that Quigley’s novel makes is that the two types of borderscapes (i.e., imaginative and actual ones) are indivisible, the latter borrowing sense and shape from the former, including the spiritual and cultural deposits that have accrued on the border over time. Central to this essay’s reading of the novel is its grounding in the genius loci category which ties the spirit (i.e., the genius) down to one particular location on the Irish border. The spirit – in this case a dead/buried giant emblematic of the imminent threat of violence – animates the entire place and thus becomes at least as important as the protagonist of Quigley’s novel. Borderland, powieść Patricka Quigleya z 1994 roku, łączy w sobie narrację historyczną z alegorią utraconej niewinności lat młodzieńczych i organicznie związanego z nią pogranicza. Mimo że w Borderland na plan pierwszy wysuwają się rozwój i dorastanie głównego bohatera, powieść jest przede wszystkim toponarracją, która skupia się zarówno na wyobrażonych, jak i rzeczywistych krajobrazach granicznych (ang. borderscapes). Powieść Quigleya pokazuje, że te dwa rodzaje krajobrazów granicznych są nierozłączne – ten drugi rodzaj krajobrazu (rzeczywisty) nabiera sensu i kształtu pod wpływem pierwszego (wyobrażonego), który eksponuje duchowe i kulturowe złoża nawarstwiające się z biegiem czasu na pograniczu. Przedstawiona w artykule interpretacja powieści Quigleya priorytetowo traktuje zakorzenienie utworu w kategorii genius loci, wiążącej ducha (tj. genius) z konkretnym miejscem na irlandzkiej granicy. Duch – w tym przypadku martwy/pogrzebany olbrzym symbolizujący bezpośrednie zagrożenie przemocą – ożywia cały krajobraz, a tym samym staje się co najmniej tak samo ważny jak główny bohater powieści.

While inter-religious conflict is not new to Nigeria, sectarian competition and conflict between Sunnis and Shias have infiltrated the country and potentially pose a threat to the country’s stability. This article does not seek to provide a solution to Nigeria’s sectarian conflict between Sunni Islam and Shia Islam, but rather to highlight the dangers it poses to the country through its impact and implications. Through a futurology design approach, the article provides dynamic snapshots of Sunni–Shia sectarian conflict from three dimensions: identity, alliance, and ideology. The article reveals that both Sunni and Shia Islam in Nigeria share a common ideology of establishing Nigeria as an Islamic state. However, they disagree on whose ideology it shall be founded upon owing to their sectarian affiliation with external actors, notably Saudi Arabia and Iran. The article concludes with prognostic reflections on the future political, religious, and social implications for Nigeria if this conflict remains unresolved.

Can civilians caught in civil wars reward and punish armed actors for their behavior? If so, do armed actors reap strategic benefits from treating civilians well and pay for treating them poorly? Using precise geo-coded data on violence in Iraq from 2004 through 2009, we show that both sides are punished for the collateral damage they inflict. Coalition killings of civilians predict higher levels of insurgent violence and insurgent killings predict less violence in subsequent periods. This symmetric reaction is tempered by preexisting political preferences; the anti-insurgent reaction is not present in Sunni areas, where the insurgency was most popular, and the anti-Coalition reaction is not present in mixed areas. Our findings have strong policy implications, provide support for the argument that information civilians share with government forces and their allies is a key constraint on insurgent violence, and suggest theories of intrastate violence must account for civilian agency.

The Deccan in the first half of the second millennium is marked by political and religious ferment. The Cōḻas, Gaṅgas, Rāṣṭrakūṭas, and Cāḷukyas are contesting its mundane territory, while the Śaivas, Jainas, and Vaiṣṇavas are contesting its spiritual geography. Unlike the interactions of the earthly rulers which spill real blood, the bloodshed of the spiritual gurus is merely metaphorical. But, the animosity driving their interactions is no less intense, for survival is at stake for them just as it is for their secular counterparts. In this essay, I explore the Jaina point of view in sectarian contestations between the twelfth and the fourteenth centuries through the texts of three Kannada authors: Dharmāṁṛtam of Nayasēna (1112CE), Samayaparīkṣe of Brahmaśiva (c.1200CE), and Dharmaparīkṣe of Vṛttavilāsa (c.1360CE). My objective is to identify the sectarian ‘other’ that these authors address, dispute with and vilify, and to explore the changing nature of this sectarian ‘other’ and the shifting attitudes of these authors towards their opponents.

The Abbasid era (334-656 AH / 945-1258 AD) witnessed a marked increase in religious and sectarian conflicts, resulting from the diversity of intellectual currents and the proliferation of various sects and groups. In response, the state employed exile as a punitive measure aimed at controlling unrest and managing sectarian tensions, particularly those arising from religious disputes. This punishment was imposed on individuals accused of opposing the official creed of the state or provoking sectarian discord. Such measures reflect the authority's efforts to maintain political and social stability, often at the expense of intellectual and religious freedoms for certain factions and beliefs.

The proliferation of sectarian conflicts amongIslamicsects during the Buyideraled to aspects that weakened the fabric of the Abbasid state, tinting the Islamic society with weakness and dispersion among various sects in general, and between Sunnis and Shias in particular. This heightened animosities and disturbances, serving as a major facet of conflicts during that era. I will attempt to shed light on the prominent aspects of this dimension.

Why did violence decline in Iraq in 2007? Many policymakers and scholars credit the \"surge,\" or the program of U.S. reinforcements and doctrinal changes that began in January 2007. Others cite the voluntary insurgent standdowns of the Sunni Awakening or say that the violence had simply run its course with the end of a wave of sectarian cleansing; still others credit an interaction between the surge and the Awakening. The difference matters for policy and scholarship, yet this debate has not moved from hypothesis to test. An assessment of the competing claims based on recently declassified data on violence at local levels and information gathered from seventy structured interviews with coalition participants finds little support for the cleansing or Awakening theses. Instead, a synergistic interaction between the surge and the Awakening was required for violence to drop as quickly and widely as it did: both were necessary; neither was sufficient. U.S. policy thus played an important role in reducing the violence in Iraq in 2007, but Iraq provides no evidence that similar methods will produce similar results elsewhere without local equivalents of the Sunni Awakening.

This paper explores the following question: How does individual religiosity and attachment to a religious community relate to sectarian political loyalties or interpersonal prejudices in a post-conflict, institutionally sectarianized society? The paper explores this question through dialectic, participatory methods with youth involved in community-based youth associations with a religious component. The paper investigates how religiously devout youth in Lebanon conceptualize the personal and communal elements of their religiosity in relation to sectarian politics. In this way, the paper contributes to a study of social sectarianism, in which scholars are striving to understand what individuals mean when they speak about sect, and how discussions surrounding sect mask more complex underlying social realities. Overall, these accounts suggest that personal and social religiosity both positively influence anti-sectarian political outlook among participants, while other factors, such as the institutional sectarianization of public life and a history of violent conflict maintain participants' default attachment to co-sectarian networks in terms of routine, economic security, and communal belonging.