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We explore the impact of corporate social responsibility (CSR) ratings on sell-side analysts' assessments of firms' future financial performance. We suggest that when analysts perceive CSR as an agency cost they produce pessimistic recommendations for firms with high CSR ratings. Moreover, we theorize that, over time, the emergence of a stakeholder focus shifts the analysts' perceptions of CSR. Using a large sample of publicly traded U.S. firms over 15 years, we confirm that, in the early 1990s, analysts issue more pessimistic recommendations for firms with high CSR ratings. However, analysts progressively assess these firms more optimistically over time. Furthermore, we find that analysts of highest status are the first to shift the relation between CSR ratings and investment recommendation optimism.

Our objective is to penetrate the \"black box\" of sell-side financial analysts by providing new insights into the inputs analysts use and the incentives they face. We survey 365 analysts and conduct 18 follow-up interviews covering a wide range of topics, including the inputs to analysts' earnings forecasts and stock recommendations, the value of their industry knowledge, the determinants of their compensation, the career benefits of Institutional Investor All-Star status, and the factors they consider indicative of high-quality earnings. One important finding is that private communication with management is a more useful input to analysts' earnings forecasts and stock recommendations than their own primary research, recent earnings performance, and recent 10-K and 10-Q reports. Another notable finding is that issuing earnings forecasts and stock recommendations that are well below the consensus often leads to an increase in analysts' credibility with their investing clients. We conduct cross-sectional analyses that highlight the impact of analyst and brokerage characteristics on analysts' inputs and incentives. Our findings are relevant to investors, managers, analysts, and academic researchers.

Companies' earnings conference calls are perceived to be venues for sell-side equity analysts to ask management questions. In this study, we examine another important conference call participant—the buy-side analyst—that has been underexplored in the literature due to data limitations. Using a large sample of transcripts, we identify 3,834 buy-side analysts from 701 institutional investment firms who participated (i.e., asked a question) in 13,332 conference calls to examine the determinants and implications of their participation. Buy-side analysts are more likely to participate when sell-side analyst coverage is low and dispersion in sell-side earnings forecasts is high, consistent with buy-side analysts participating when a company's information environment is poor. Institutional investors trade more of a company's stock in the quarters in which their buy-side analysts participate in the call. Finally, we find evidence that buy-side analyst participation is associated with company-level absolute changes in future stock price, trading volume, institutional ownership, and short interest.

This study analyzes the different tones used by the participants in earnings conference calls and the influence on the generation of abnormal stock returns. This study fills the research gap of the segregation of tone analysis by type of analyst and corporate administratives during earnings conference calls. The sample covered the period from 2010 to 2017, totaling 1165 earnings conference calls transcripts from 44 Brazilian companies listed in B3 - Brasil, Bolsa, Balcão. The main finding is that the transcribed tone and words based on the Loughran & McDonald (2011) dictionary, have significant predictive power over stock market reactions after earnings conference calls.

Purpose The purpose of this study is to gain an understanding of the different cognitive processes of buy-side and sell-side financial analysts and their use of investment beliefs and heuristics to mitigate risk and uncertainty when analyzing companies. Design/methodology/approach A mixed methods approach and a thematic analysis have been conducted based on 20 semistructured interviews with both buy-side and sell-side financial analysts. Using a think-aloud technique, the respondents formulated their thoughts aloud when analyzing a company and rated the importance of different financial and nonfinancial key measures along with their preferred analysis approaches, source preferences and information usage. Findings Buy-side and sell-side financial analysts share similar investment beliefs. Both perceive the stock market as irrational and unpredictable. Both groups also focus on companies’ nonfinancial information such as business models, ownership structure and governance while they distrust sustainability rankings. Buy-side analysts emphasized unpredictability and the limitations of expertise. Sell-side analysts focused on controlling corporate risks rather than reflecting on the limitations of the investment process to consider the systematic and inherent market risks. These differences are suggested to be explained by differences in scope and expertise – buy-side analysts being generalists and sell-side being specialists. Originality/value The present study is among the few that compares sell-side and buy-side financial analysts’ valuation processes by using semistructured interviews and a think-aloud approach. It shows that buy-side analysts share a skepticism toward sell-side analysts’ judgments and recommendations, and especially the credibility and validity of Environmental, Social and Governance issues (ESG) rankings. The study also reveals differences in cognitive approaches to valuation of companies.

We identify analysts’ information acquisition patterns by linking EDGAR (Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval) server activity to analysts’ brokerage houses. Analysts rely on EDGAR in 24% of their estimate updates with an average of eight filings viewed. We document that analysts’ attention to public information is driven by the demand for information and the analysts’ incentives and career concerns. We find that information acquisition via EDGAR is associated with a significant reduction in analysts’ forecasting error relative to their peers. This relationship is likewise present when we focus on the intensity of analyst research. Attention to public information further enables analysts to provide forecasts for more time periods and more financial metrics. Informed recommendation updates are associated with substantial and persistent abnormal returns, even when the analyst accesses historical filings. Analysts’ use of EDGAR is associated with longer and more informative analysis within recommendation reports. This paper was accepted by Shiva Rajgopal, accounting.

Taking advantage of a recently established dataset that records financial analysts’ firm visits, this study examines the factors that determine the number of buy-side and sell-side analyst firm visits in a given year and how investors respond to these visits. Both buy-side and sell-side analysts seem motivated to visit firms when they are considering buying or recommending that investors buy shares rather than when they are considering selling or when they are recommending that investors sell shares. However, there are still significant differences in the firms that buy-side and sell-side analysts choose to visit. Using a binomial count model, this study shows that buy-side analyst firm visits are heavily focused on industry leaders—firms with a high share of the total revenue in their given industry—while sell-side analyst firm visits are not. By looking at the response of investors to buy-side or sell-side analyst firm visits, a regression analysis uncovers evidence that investors trust buy-side analysts, responding to firm visits by buy-side analysts by purchasing more shares in the firm. Investors do not have the same level of confidence in sell-side analysts. Investors respond to firm visits by sell-side analysts by selling more shares in the firm. This phenomenon is even more significant for firms that are outperforming the market. The results suggest that there is a significant cost to the conflict of interest inherent in sell-side analysts’ research. These costs increase when analysts recommend outperforming firms to the public.

RESUMO Este estudo tem como objetivo analisar os diferentes tons transcritos utilizados pelos participantes nas teleconferências de resultados e sua influência na geração de retornos anormais das ações. Este estudo preenche uma lacuna de pesquisa que é a segregação da análise do tom por tipo de analista e de representantes corporativos durante a teleconferência de resultados. A amostra abrangeu o período de 2010 a 2017, totalizando 1.165 transcrições de teleconferências de resultados de 44 empresas brasileiras listadas na B3 – Brasil, Bolsa, Balcão. O principal achado é que o tom transcrito e as palavras utilizadas com base no dicionário de Loughran e McDonald (2011) têm poder de previsão significativo sobre as reações do mercado de ações após as teleconferências de resultados. RESUMEN Este estudio tiene como objetivo analizar los diferentes tonos transcritos utilizados por los participantes en las teleconferencias de resultados y su influencia en la generación de retornos anormales de acciones. Este estudio llena un vacío de investigación que es la segregación del análisis del tono por tipo de analista y representante corporativo durante la teleconferencia de resultados. La muestra abarcó el período comprendido entre 2010 y 2017, totalizando 1165 transcripciones de teleconferencias de resultados de 44 empresas brasileñas cotizadas en la B3 - Brasil, Bolsa, Balcão. El principal hallazgo es que el tono transcrito y las palabras usadas según el diccionario de Loughran y McDonald (2011) tienen un poder predictivo significativo sobre las reacciones del mercado de valores después de las teleconferencias de resultados. ABSTRACT This study analyzes the different tones used by the participants in earnings conference calls and the influence on the generation of abnormal stock returns. This study fills the research gap of the segregation of tone analysis by type of analyst and corporate administratives during earnings conference calls. The sample covered the period from 2010 to 2017, totaling 1165 earnings conference calls transcripts from 44 Brazilian companies listed in B3 - Brasil, Bolsa, Balcão. The main finding is that the transcribed tone and words based on the Loughran & McDonald (2011) dictionary, have significant predictive power over stock market reactions after earnings conference calls.

This paper provides early but broad empirical evidence on MiFID II, which requires investment firms to unbundle investment research from other costs they charge to clients. Employing difference-in-differences matched-sample research designs with firm fixed effects, we find a decrease in the number of sell-side analysts covering European firms after MiFID II implementation, particularly for firms that are less important to the sell-side. However, research quality improves; specifically, individual analyst forecasts are more accurate and stock recommendations garner greater market reactions. In addition, sell-side analysts seem to cater more to the buy-side after MiFID II by providing industry recommendations along with stock recommendations. Importantly, we predict and find evidence that buy-side investment firms turn to more in-house research after MiFID II implementation. Equally interesting, buy-side analysts increase their participation and engagement in earnings conference calls, compared to the control group. We find some evidence that stock-market liquidity decreases post MiFID II.

Purpose: This study examines the role of analysts as information intermediaries in detecting misreporting at the time it occurs, focusing on income-increasing misreporting cases identified by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Design/methodology/approach: Using a propensity-score matched sample and various econometric approaches, we analyze dynamic changes in analysts' earnings forecast bias for misreporting firms relative to non-misreporting counterfactuals with similar ex ante misreporting probabilities, particularly around the first year of misreporting. Findings: Our results indicate that analysts issue more conservative (i.e., less optimistic) earnings forecasts for misreporting firms than for non-misreporting counterfactuals. This suggests that analysts can discern manipulated earnings, supporting the rational forecasting view. Research limitations/implications: Despite our attempt to address potential endogeneity between corporate misreporting and analysts' earnings forecasts, causal inference remains subject to assumptions inherent in our econometric approaches. Nevertheless, the consistency and robustness of our findings across various methods reinforce the credibility of our conclusions. Our results suggest that analysts can identify misreporting early and issue preemptive warnings. Originality/value: This study provides novel evidence that analysts can discern overstated earnings at the time of misreporting. Its findings deepen our understanding of analysts' role as information intermediaries in financial markets.