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The share of working-age Americans receiving disability benefits from the federal Disability Insurance (DI) program has increased significantly in recent decades, from 2.2 percent in the late 1970s to 3.6 percent in the years immediately preceding the 2007–2009 recession and 4.6 percent in 2013. With the federal Disability Insurance Trust Fund currently projected to be depleted in 2016, Congressional action of some sort is likely to occur within the next several years. It is therefore a good time to sort out the competing explanations for the increase in disability benefit receipt and to review some of the ideas that economists have put forth for reforming US disability programs.

We show how optimal household decisions regarding work, retirement, saving, portfolio allocations, and life insurance are shaped by the complex financial options embedded in U.S. Social Security rules and uncertain family transitions. Our life cycle model predicts sharp consumption drops on retirement, an age-62 peak in claiming rates, and earlier claiming by wives versus husbands and single women. Moreover, life insurance is mainly purchased on men's lives. Our model, which takes Social Security rules seriously, generates wealth and retirement outcomes that are more consistent with the data, in contrast to earlier and less realistic models.

The U.S. Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) program has grown dramatically over the last 20 years in size and expense. This growth poses significant risks to the finances of the DI program and the broader Social Security system, and raises troubling questions as to whether the program is being misused by claimants. This article first provides an overview of the Disability Insurance program, describing who qualifies for the program, how an individual applies for benefits and how the level of benefits is determined. Next, we summarize the factors responsible for the growth in the DI rolls and discuss how the characteristics of DI recipients have changed as a result. We then explore the extent of moral hazard in the DI program and the effectiveness of the screening process in distinguishing meritorious from nonmeritorious claims. Finally, we identify the challenges that the DI program creates for Social Security finances and Social Security reform, and discuss potential reforms to the DI program.

This paper provides an empirical analysis of the effects of employer-provided health insurance, Medicare, and Social Security on retirement behavior. Using data from the Health and Retirement Study, we estimate a dynamic programming model of retirement that accounts for both saving and uncertain medical expenses. Our results suggest that Medicare is important for understanding retirement behavior, and that uncertainty and saving are both important for understanding the labor supply responses to Medicare. Half the value placed by a typical worker on his employer-provided health insurance is the value of reduced medical expense risk. Raising the Medicare eligibility age from 65 to 67 leads individuals to work an additional 0.074 years over ages 60-69. In comparison, eliminating 2 years worth of Social Security benefits increases years of work by 0.076 years.

This article provides evidence that Social Security benefit claiming decisions are strongly affected by framing and are thus inconsistent with expected utility theory. Using a randomized experiment that controls for both observable and unobservable differences across individuals, we find that the use of a \"breakeven analysis\" encourages early claiming. Respondents are more likely to delay when later claiming is framed as a gain, and the claiming age is anchored at older ages. Additionally, the financially less literate, individuals with credit card debt, and those with lower earnings are more influenced by framing than others.

We use a US Social Security reform as a quasi-experiment to provide evidence on framing effects in retirement behavior. The reform increased the full retirement age (FRA) from 65 to 66 in two-month increments per year of birth. We find strong evidence that the spike in the benefit claiming hazard at 65 moved in lockstep along with the FRA. Results on self-reported retirement and exit from employment go in the same direction. The responsiveness to the new FRA is stronger for people with higher cognitive skills. We interpret the findings as evidence of reference dependence with loss aversion.

I study the role of social security in providing insurance when there is adverse selection in the annuity market. I calculate welfare gain from mandatory annuitization in the social security system relative to a laissez-faire benchmark, using a model in which individuals have private information about their mortality. I estimate large heterogeneity in mortality using the Health and Retirement Study. Despite that, I find small welfare gain from mandatory annuitization. Social security has a large effect on annuity prices because it crowds out demand by high-mortality individuals. Welfare gain would have been significantly larger in the absence of this effect.

In his Nobel Prize acceptance speech given in 1985, Franco Modigliani drew attention to the “annuitization puzzle”: that annuity contracts, other than pensions through group insurance, are extremely rare. Rational choice theory predicts that households will find annuities attractive at the onset of retirement because they address the risk of outliving one's income, but in fact, relatively few of those facing retirement choose to annuitize a substantial portion of their wealth. There is now a substantial literature on the behavioral economics of retirement saving, which has stressed that both behavioral and institutional factors play an important role in determining a household's saving accumulations. Self-control problems, inertia, and a lack of financial sophistication inhibit some households from providing an adequate retirement nest egg. However, interventions such as automatic enrollment and automatic escalation of saving over time as wages rise (the “save more tomorrow” plan) have shown success in overcoming these obstacles. We will show that the same behavioral and institutional factors that help explain savings behavior are also important in understanding 1) how families handle the process of decumulation once retirement commences and 2) why there seems to be so little demand to annuitize wealth at retirement.

In recent decades, the geographic origins of America's foreign-born population have become increasingly diverse. The sending countries of the U.S. foreign-born vary substantially in levels of health and economic development, and immigrants have arrived with distinct distributions of socioeconomic status, visa type, year of immigration, and age at immigration. We use high-quality linked Social Security and Medicare records to estimate life tables for the older U.S. population over the full range of birth regions. In 2000–2009, the foreign-born had a 2.4-year advantage in life expectancy at age 65 relative to the U.S.-born, with Asian-born subgroups displaying exceptionally high longevity. Foreign-born individuals who migrated more recently had lower mortality compared with those who migrated earlier. Nonetheless, we also find remarkable similarities in life expectancy among many foreign-born subgroups that were born in very different geographic and socioeconomic contexts (e.g., Central America, western/eastern Europe, and Africa).

This paper presents the results of a randomized field experiment that provided information about key Social Security features to older workers. The experiment was designed to examine whether it is possible to affect individual behavior using a relatively inexpensive informational intervention about the provisions of a public program and to explore the mechanisms underlying the behavior change. We find that our relatively mild intervention (sending an informational brochure and an invitation to a web-tutorial) increased labor force participation one year later by 4 percentage points relative to the control group mean of 74 percent.