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In recent years, extreme right-wing and left-wing political parties and actors have gained popularity in many Western countries. What motivates people to vote for extreme right- or left-wing parties? In previous research, we showed that a collectively shared sense of doom and gloom about society can exist among citizens who, individually, experience high well-being. Previous research developed an operationalization of this collective societal discontent as an aspect of Zeitgeist, which can be compared to personal experiences (van der Bles, Postmes, & Meijer, 2015). In the present research, we investigated whether this Zeitgeist of societal discontent predicts voting for extreme parties. We conducted a field study during the 2015 Dutch provincial elections (N = 407). Results showed that collective societal discontent (Zeitgeist) predicted voting for extreme parties but that personal discontent did not. Results also showed that pessimistic Zeitgeist was associated with lower education levels and tabloid-style media consumption. These findings advance our understanding of the discontents that fuel extreme voting outcomes: Global and abstract (negative) beliefs about society are more consequential than concrete personal experiences.

In debates about migration in Western countries, citizens’ concerns about immigrant groups often go hand in hand with concerns about the decline of society as a whole. Societal discontent, however, is a distinct concept and may have its own relations with immigration attitudes, over and above the role of perceived immigrant threat. In a survey of a representative sample of Dutch people (N = 1239), we disentangled societal discontent from intergroup threat with respect to their relationship with different kinds of action intentions regarding refugees (both pro and anti) and intentions regarding the government. Unsurprisingly, societal discontent predicted support for anti-government protest (which was strikingly high). More importantly, societal discontent independently predicted both pro-refugee and anti-refugee action intentions, over and above intergroup threat. These associations were moderated by intergroup threat: only when refugees were experienced as a threat did discontent predict anti-refugee action intentions. On the other hand, societal discontent predicted more pro-refugee action intentions, but only when people experienced refugees as an enrichment. Thus, despite populist rhetoric, societal discontent is not always tied to anti-immigrant actions. This suggests that refugee sentiments and societal discontent are not exchangeable: societal discontent plays an important role in reactions to immigration.

Objective/Context: One of the effects of the internal war in Colombia was to hinder the expression of the social conflict and of the organizations that mobilize the popular sectors. The plebiscite to ratify the Peace Accord aimed at putting an end to the war was a politically polarized juncture channeled through the electoral process. The shift in the centrality of the issue of the internal war after the signing of the Accord opened the possibility of expression of the social conflict. However, in a country with weak social and political organizations to shape this conflict, it is expressed: 1) without politically aligned framings; 2) as a generalized discontent with the elites and a feeling of “tilted playing field”. Therefore, political polarization after the plebiscite is low. We develop this argument based on the analysis of voters’ positions in relation to the most important issues of the political agenda: Peace Agreement, redistributive agenda (taxes and welfare) and governmental management of the COVID pandemic, and gender agenda. Methodology: The article is based on 16 focus groups conducted between September and November 2021 in three regions of Colombia —Bogotá, Antioquia and the Caribbean— in which voters from the two main 2018 electoral options participated, with gender balance and variation in occupation and between middle and lower classes. Conclusion: The data show that there is no political polarization at the citizen level. Instead, a high level of discontent towards political and economic elites is observed, which may be at the basis of electoral support for Petro in 2022. Originality: The article offers an alternative look at the perception that many Colombians have that they live in a polarized society and contributes to the understanding of electoral support for an “anti-system” force in the 2022 election. Objetivo/contexto: uno de los efectos de la guerra interna en Colombia fue obstaculizar la expresión del conflicto social y de las organizaciones que movilizan a los sectores populares. El plebiscito por el acuerdo de paz que intentaba terminar con dicha guerra fue una coyuntura de polarización política canalizada por la vía electoral. El desplazamiento de la centralidad de la cuestión de la guerra interna a partir de la firma del acuerdo abrió la posibilidad de expresión del conflicto social. Sin embargo, en un país con débiles organizaciones sociales y políticas que ordenen este conflicto, este se expresa: 1) sin encuadres alineados políticamente; 2) como descontento generalizado con las élites y sentimiento de “cancha inclinada”. Por tanto, la polarización política luego de la coyuntura del plebiscito es baja. Desarrollamos este argumento a partir del análisis de las posiciones de los votantes en relación con los temas más importantes de la agenda política: acuerdo de paz, agenda redistributiva (impuestos y ayudas sociales) y gestión gubernamental durante la pandemia por COVID, y agenda de género. Metodología: el artículo se basa en dieciséis grupos focales realizados entre septiembre y noviembre de 2021 en tres regiones de Colombia (Bogotá, Antioquia y el Caribe), en los que participaron votantes de las dos opciones electorales principales de 2018, con equilibrio de género, con variación ocupacional, y entre clases medias y clases bajas. Conclusión: los datos muestran que no existe polarización política entre los ciudadanos. En cambio, se observa un alto nivel de descontento con las élites políticas y económicas. Originalidad: el artículo ofrece una mirada alternativa a la percepción que tienen muchos colombianos de que viven en una sociedad polarizada y contribuye a la comprensión de los apoyos electorales a una fuerza “antisistema” en la elección presidencial de 2022. Objetivo/Contexto: um dos efeitos da guerra interna na Colômbia foi dificultar a expressão do conflito social e das organizações que mobilizaram os setores populares. O plebiscito pelo Acordo de Paz que buscava pôr fim à guerra foi um momento de polarização política canalizada através do processo eleitoral. O deslocamento da centralidade da questão da guerra interna após a assinatura do Acordo abriu a possibilidade da expressão do conflito social. No entanto, em um país com organizações sociais e políticas fracas para organizar este conflito, ele se expressa: 1) sem estruturas politicamente alinhadas; 2) como descontentamento generalizado com as elites e um sentimento de “campo de jogo inclinado”. E, portanto, a polarização política após o plebiscito é baixa. Desenvolvemos este argumento analisando as posições dos eleitores em relação aos temas mais importantes da agenda política: o Acordo de Paz, a agenda redistributiva (impostos e ajuda social) e a gestão governamental durante a COVID, e a agenda de gênero. Metodologia: o artigo é baseado em 16 grupos focais realizados entre setembro e novembro de 2021 em três regiões da Colômbia - Bogotá, Antioquia e Caribe - envolvendo eleitores das duas principais opções eleitorais em 2018, com equilíbrio de gênero e com variação ocupacional e variação entre classes médias e baixas. Conclusão: os dados mostram que não há polarização política no nível dos cidadãos. Em vez disso, há um alto nível de descontentamento com as elites políticas e econômicas que podem estar na base do apoio eleitoral à Petro em 2022. Originalidade: o artigo oferece uma visão alternativa da percepção que muitos colombianos têm de que vivem em uma sociedade polarizada e contribui para a compreensão do apoio eleitoral a uma força “anti-establishment” na eleição de 2022.

This article explores Cuba’s efforts to develop the island as a vibrant medical tourism centre. The key topics which it addresses are a general overview of the medical tourism industry, background information on medical tourism in Cuba, and Cuban medical tourism’s challenges and prospects. The key challenges analysed are the US sanctions (seen as the primary obstacle to future development), Havana’s lack of extensive marketing experience (especially with respect to efforts in countries with highly competitive domestic economies), and possible discontent in Cuban society rooted in perceptions that tourists are receiving privileged treatment. The main advantages that Cuba enjoys in its developmental efforts are seen as the low-cost of its medical services (e.g. up to 90 per cent savings over identical private pay treatments in the US), the high priority that the island’s government is currently giving to medical tourism, and the repeal of the Roe v Wade decision by the US Supreme Court.

After the stunning victory of Pakatan Harapan (Alliance of Hope) over the incumbent Barisan Nasional (National Front) in May 2018’s 14th Malaysian General Election, 2019 was a year of political transition, with Pakatan governing, Barisan rising from its political grave, and the Malaysian people getting accustomed to a two-party coalition system. In a chaotic year of party-political and electoral fatigue, social discontent, and economic slowdown, Malaysia endured its domestic troubles to remain a stable country.

This article seeks to explain the causes of the growing popularity of the illiberal right, taking the Polish political party Law and Justice as an example. The adopted analytical approach combines insights derived from the work of Karl Polanyi and the tradition of historical institutionalism. The victory of Law and Justice in the 2015 Polish parliamentary elections is argued to constitute a critical juncture that initiated a fundamental break with the liberal order. Following Polanyi, we argue that the seeds of the recent anti-liberal counter-revolution can be found in the malfunctioning of the Polish economic order built during the period of transition. However, Law and Justice has managed to make use of the critical juncture arising from social discontent and has used it instrumentally to dismantle liberal constitutionalism and the rule of law.

The main objective of this paper was to analyze the arguments employed by residents of a municipality of the State of Mexico to justify some violent practices perpetrated by the State and that have been used as a strategy in recent years to address the issue of public insecurity. To this effect, a research work from the qualitative paradigm was carried out,using the semi- structured interview as the main tool. The argumentative discourse analysis revealed that the justification, rather than being based on a perception of widespread insecurity, paradoxically, haditssupport on social discontent with the authorities responsible for the administration and enforcement of justice. The most frequent arguments were: efficiency, defense, and proportional punishment. In each one of them, the social construction of offenders, the meaning system about \"the violent\", the concept of justice and the degree of damage perceived for the participant were present.

The present article examines the causes of deforestation in southwest China on the basis of listening to peasants' own descriptions of their role in illegal timber cutting. It finds that a sense of “relative deprivation” amongst China's rural poor has encouraged poor environmental management. Peasants justify illegal tree cutting by pointing to China's rapidly increasing inequalities, their lack of economic opportunity, and the absence of economic support from the (corrupt) government. These issues, combined with continuing institutional problems with forest management after decollectivization, convince peasants that ignoring environmental conservation edicts and cashing in on their trees is a good choice. This study identifies relative poverty and social discontent as major factors driving deforestation.

African Americans who identify as lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer (LGBTQ) are still invisible and still face oppression from both within and outside of the LGBTQ community. This chapter helps readers understand how cultural oppression promotes depression in same‐gender‐loving (SGL) Black men. It considers the concept of cultural dysthymia, which occurs when cultural institutional practices impose social discontent in a manner that fosters a condition called dysthymia. The author first shares a brief synopsis of theoretical concepts that have influenced his development as a practicing counselor. Then, he presents a case history and offers some ideas or methods for how to help Black SGLs work through a process of overcoming cultural dysthymia, primarily through the use of narrative counseling and cognitive‐behavioral concepts. Lastly, the author articulates and describes implications for counselors to improve practice in this area.

The following sections are included: Historical Roots of the Sense of Local Identity Formation of local identity (1960S–1980S): “Hong Kong Dream” discourse Rejoining the nation: psychological distance being institutionalised After handover: SAR government's efforts on national education and resistance Hostility to Mainlanders Tipping Point in 2012: Increased Influx of Mainlanders Influx of mainland mothers Influx of mainland visitors Key Feature of the Local Identity: “Market Mentality”? Outlook of China-Hong Kong Relations