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Using the panel component of the Michigan Survey of Consumers, we estimate a learning model of inflation expectations, allowing for heterogeneous use of private information and lifetime inflation experience. Life experience inflation has a significant impact on individual expectations, but only for 1-year-ahead inflation. Public information is substantially more relevant for longer horizon expectations. Even controlling for life experience inflation and public information, idiosyncratic information explains a nontrivial proportion of the inflation forecasts of agents. Women, ethnic minorities, and less educated agents have a higher degree of heterogeneity in their idiosyncratic information, and give less importance to recent movements in inflation.

We consider alternative combinations of nominal price and wage frictions in dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models fit to U.S. data. Since inflation was unanchored in the 1970s, we divide the data into early, middle, and late samples (1955–68, 1969–79, and 1983–2007, respectively). We find that prices are reoptimized more frequently and exhibit greater indexation to past inflation in the middle sample than in the other two samples, while wages are reoptimized with increasing frequency and display less evidence of indexation over time. Differences in price and wage setting across samples have important implications for the economy's response to key shocks.

This paper studies the joint dynamics of U.S. inflation and a term structure of average inflation predictions taken from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF). We estimate these joint dynamics by combining an unobserved components (UC) model of inflation and a sticky-information forecast mechanism. The UC model decomposes inflation into trend and gap components, and innovations to trend and gap inflation are affected by stochastic volatility. A novelty of our model is to allow for time-variation in inflation-gap persistence as well as in the frequency of forecast updating under sticky information. The model is estimated with sequential Monte Carlo methods that include a particle learning filter and a Rao-Blackwellized particle smoother. Based on data from 1968Q4 to 2018Q3, estimates show that (i) longer horizon average SPF inflation predictions inform estimates of trend inflation; (ii) inflation gap persistence is countercyclical before the Volcker disinflation and acyclical afterwards; (iii) by 1990 sticky-information inflation forecast updating is less frequent than it was earlier in the sample; and (iv) the drop in the frequency of the sticky-information forecast updating occurs at the same time persistent shocks become less important for explaining movements in inflation. Our findings support the view that stickiness in survey forecasts is not invariant to the inflation process.

This study examines asymmetry in loss functions of consumer’s perceived and expected consumer price index inflation in Japan. We find strong upward bias of perceived and one-year-ahead inflation expectations, and evidence against rationality under symmetric loss functions. We find considerable evidence of asymmetric loss in perceived and expected inflation and support for rationality upon assuming asymmetric loss functions. Strong biases in consumers’ perceived and expected inflation result from asymmetric loss rather than irrationality. Using epidemiology models, we find that expected inflation is strongly related to perceived inflation with no significant role for actual inflation. Moreover, consumers gradually incorporate central bank forecasts, but not professional forecasts, into their inflation expectations. This indicates that asymmetric loss in perceived inflation is important in forming inflation expectation. The central bank should take into consideration the asymmetric loss in consumers’ inflation expectations and the close relationship between the inflation expectations and perceived inflation in formulating monetary policy.

We study the interaction between dispersed and sticky information by assuming that firms receive private noisy signals about the state in an otherwise standard model of price setting with sticky information. We compute the unique equilibrium of the game induced by the firms’ pricing decisions and derive the resulting Phillips curve. The main effect of dispersion is to magnify the immediate impact of a given shock when the degree of stickiness is small. Its effect on persistence is minor: even when information is largely dispersed, a substantial amount of informational stickiness is needed to generate persistence in aggregate prices and inflation.

The Great Moderation is characterized as a period of stable macroeconomic conditions, especially with regard to inflation. Under the sticky information theory, this environment may provide a few incentives for agents to update information on inflation, thus, producing a new slope of the sticky information Phillips curve. We estimate the degree of information rigidity implied by the sticky information Phillips curve. Using threshold models, we identify two regimes of high and low inflation, finding that each identified regime is associated with a specific degree of information stickiness. This evidence is consistent with agents that update information faster when inflation is higher.

Sticky information models capture the sluggish response of aggregate prices to monetary shocks but fail to match the magnitude and frequency of price changes at the microlevel. This paper shows that accounting for the endogenous decision of when to acquire new information about different shocks can help overcome this shortcoming. In the calibrated model, prices change frequently and by large amounts in response to idiosyncratic shocks but sluggishly to monetary shocks. The paper also highlights that many predictions of the sticky information and rational inattention models are the same and thus robust to different specifications of information processing costs.

Those who solve more of a given type of problem tend to get better at it—which suggests that problems of any given type should be brought to specialists for a solution. However, in this paper we argue that agency-related costs and information transfer costs (\"sticky\" local information) will tend drive the locus of problem-solving in the opposite direction—away from problem-solving by specialist suppliers, and towards those who directly benefit from a solution and who have difficult-to-transfer local information about a particular application being solved, such as the direct users of a product or service. We examine the actual location of design activities in two fields in which custom products are produced by \"mass-customization\" methods: application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs) and computer telephony integration (CTI) systems. In both, we find that users rather than suppliers are the actual designers of the application-specific portion of the product types examined. We offer anecdotal evidence that the pattern of user-based customization we have documented in these two fields is in fact quite general, and we discuss implications for research and practice.

To solve a problem, needed information and problem-solving capabilities must be brought together. Often the information used in technical problem solving is costly to acquire, transfer, and use in a new location—is, in our terms, \"sticky.\" In this paper we explore the impact of information stickiness on the locus of innovation-related problem solving. We find, first, that when sticky information needed by problem solvers is held at one site only, problem solving will be carried out at that locus, other things being equal. Second, when more than one locus of sticky information is called upon by problem solvers, the locus of problem solving may iterate among these sites as problem solving proceeds. When the costs of such iteration are high, then, third, problems that draw upon multiple sites of sticky information will sometimes be \"task partitioned\" into subproblems that each draw on only one such locus, and/or, fourth, investments will be made to reduce the stickiness of information at some locations. Information stickiness appears to affect a number of issues of importance to researchers and practitioners. Among these are patterns in the diffusion of information, the specialization of firms, the locus of innovation, and the nature of problems selected by problem solvers.

We model agents' endogenous updating of information sets over time under changing macroeconomic conditions. Building on sticky information models, the degree of inattentiveness is endogenized by allowing agents to choose between a costly full-information predictor and a costless sticky-information predictor. This is modeled as a choice between discrete alternatives under rational inattention. Recursive simulation shows that the dynamic equilibrium paths of aggregate variables are highly persistent and match the moments of U.S. data better than a model with fixed sticky information or with sticky prices, especially with regard to higher moments and the degree of persistence. Predictors are chosen in line with the predictions from rational inattention models, as the aggregate degree of attentiveness increases with rising variance of the forecast variable. Moreover, the model can generate hump-shaped impulse responses of inflation to a monetary policy shock if the degree of inattentiveness is sufficiently high.