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Despite efforts employed by the Colombian state to demobilize paramilitary groups and to tackle organized crime structures since 2003, Colombia today remains characterized by a repressive apparatus of social control by paramilitary successor groups in certain sectors of the population. Drawing on information from Colombia’s second-largest city – Medellín – and various rural areas of the Department of Antioquia, this work offers a characterization of the legacies of the paramilitary phenomenon, and its continuities and transformations in relation to one particular paramilitary confederation, theAutodefensas Unidas de Colombia(AUC). In many regions, the AUC gained territorial, economic, and social control by managing the illegal drug economy and perpetrating political violence against leftist parties and social organizations. Paramilitaries have thus exerted what we refer to asstatus quo-oriented violence. As we illustrate for the case of Medellín, mechanisms of territorial, economic, and social control, as well as the particular manifestations of violence related to these mechanisms, have been transferred to paramilitary successor groups. The findings are mainly based on the outcomes of qualitative field research carried out in Medellín in mid-2015.

The large-n literature on political violence has paid little attention to the distinction between insurgencies that control territory and those that do not. Territorial control has consequences for the lethality of the group, its pattern of recruitment and bargaining power. The main determinant of territorial control, we argue, is state capacity: while territorial insurgencies are more frequent in poor countries, nonterritorial ones tend to occur in countries with intermediate levels of development (rich countries are free of internal violence). The authors show that the relationship between development and nonterritorial violence is a concave one, using a panel for the period 1970—1997 that combines existing data sets on civil wars and the Global Terrorism Database 1. The authors also find that nonterritorial violence is more likely in democratic, old states. Population, rough terrain, and inequality have a similar impact on both types of conflict. The authors discuss to what extent territorial conflicts correspond to civil wars and nonterritorial ones to terrorism.

Territorial control is a central variable for civil war research – yet, we lack sufficiently detailed data to capture subnational dynamics and offer cross-country coverage. This article advances a new measurement strategy for territorial control in asymmetric civil wars. Territorial control is conceptualized as an unobserved latent variable that can be estimated via observed variation in rebel tactics. The strategy builds on a theoretical model of rebel tactics, by which rebels use terrorism less when they control a given area – preferring conventional tactics, which require higher levels of territorial control. The latent variable, territorial control, is estimated via a Hidden Markov Model (HMM). As an observable indicator for rebel tactics, I leverage geo-coded event data and a function of the relative frequency of terrorist attacks and conventional war acts, weighted by time and distance. The model yields estimates of territorial control for asymmetric civil wars at a resolution of 0.25 decimal degree minimum diameter hexagonal grid cells. Validation of estimates for the Colombian and Nigerian civil wars suggests HMMs as a fruitful avenue to estimate spatiotemporal variation in territorial control.

Research has highlighted the role of the state in sustaining authoritarian regimes. But how does state capacity support autocrats during elections? The author argues that one specific aspect of state capacity – control over territory through the state apparatus – helps autocrats ensure large majority electoral victories. High-capacity rulers can rely on local agents and institutions to subtly manipulate elections, for instance by controlling the media or inhibiting the work of domestic election monitors throughout the territory while staying clear of costly manipulation such as election violence. In cross-national analyses of authoritarian multiparty elections from 1946 to 2017, the study finds that state territorial control increases the likelihood of large victories. Furthermore, high levels of state control correlate with subtle strategies of manipulation, including media bias and restrictions on domestic monitors – strategies that are also positively associated with large victories. At the same time, state control is negatively associated with election violence.

Abstract This essay revisits the territoriality of the Qin empire by examining the spatial division underneath its commandery-county system. With the universal implementation of centralized administration, scholars usually believe that the Qin empire exerted strong control across its territories. But new Qin sources suggest otherwise. It is evident that the Qin regime devised multiple schemes to structure its empire into three concentric zones with asymmetrical political relations. The respective features and functions of these zones were consonant with those of the center, semiperiphery, and periphery in the \"core-periphery\" model. The regime's spatial strategy can be understood as a compromise made to accommodate the diverse landscape in different parts of its vast empire, especially in the newly conquered regions. This reminds us that despite having installed the unitary commandery-county system, the territorial control wielded by the Qin regime in its new territories was tenuous at best.

This study examined whether layering spatial partitions and symbolic identity cues can transform underdefined university lounges into supportive social environments. In a within-subjects experiment, 60 architecture students experienced three lounge configurations in random order: (A) baseline, (B) partitions presented via mixed reality (MR), and (C) partitions plus identity cues via MR. After each condition, participants rated perceived territorial characteristics (PTC; spatial comfort, openness, territorial control, and symbolic identity) and sense of community (SOC; need fulfillment, membership, influence, and emotional connection). Repeated-measures ANOVAs with sphericity corrections showed stepwise increases (A < B < C) for territorial outcomes—overall PTC, spatial comfort, territorial control, and symbolic identity (ηp2 ≈ 0.61–0.70, all p < 0.001). Openness remained high but was unchanged across conditions and unrelated to SOC (all p > 0.05). For community outcomes, improvements emerged only in Design C across the total score and all subdimensions (A = B < C; ηp2 ≈ 0.17–0.28; all p ≤ 0.01). MR presence did not differ between B and C (all p > 0.05), indicating that gains in C are attributable to territorial/identity cues rather than immersion. Design-wise correlation analyses revealed positive links between territorial control/symbolic identity and SOC indices (r ≈ 0.45–0.78). The findings support a complementary design framework: permeable partitions make boundaries salient, and symbolic identity cues add shared meaning, modestly strengthening community connection. MR serves as a context-embedded preoccupancy evaluation platform for capturing psychosocial responses to spatial design.

I study civilians' cooperation with an armed group in an irregular war. In the model, civilians differ in their valuation of siding with the armed group and make cooperation decisions without knowing others' motivations or cooperation choices. I find that a superior military force is not sufficient to bring high cooperation and that full cooperation can only be attained if military power is complemented by expectations of punishment for helping the enemy. The model challenges the idea that random violence aimed at punishing enemy cooperators is used when selectivity is difficult to implement, and it shows that indiscriminate reprisals induce lower levels of cooperation, even when enemy cooperators are less likely to be punished with selective methods. Finally, I find that communities that have a highly centralized process of decision making are expected to give their support to only one group of combatants and to be exposed to less violence.

The article looks at territorial control in a paramilitary fiefdom in Colombia, through the lens of a specific form of violence against civilians: disappearance. It finds that the outcomes and micro-dynamics governing disappearance can hardly be explained plausibly through some of the core ideas found in the literature of rebel governance. It explains why this is so, and proposes alternative conceptualizations.

El trabajo tiene como objetivo comparar la interacción estratégica de los actores armados a partir del uso de repertorios de violencia en el suroccidente colombiano entre 1997 y 2009. Los repertorios de violencia son demostraciones coercitivas de los mecanismos políticos de los actores armados con el ánimo de hacerse al control territorial. No obstante, los actores armados emplean la violencia de una manera estratégica en la que, por un lado, evalúan el grado de frecuencia y diversidad que deben aplicar en cada territorio para subvertir la resistencia del enemigo y, por otro, tienen en cuenta si el territorio en el que se encuentran es una zona de alta confluencia de agentes militares (centro) o si es una zona en la que el encuentro de dos o más actores es relativamente baja (periferia). Se puede concluir que a finales del siglo XX, las fuerzas en confrontación convergen en ciertos territorios que los hacen centrales en la dinámica de la guerra misma. No obstante, ese encuentro no dura por mucho tiempo debido a que la insurgencia es derrotada en los centros y tiene que replegarse a la periferia. El análisis está soportado bajo las perspectivas de la contención política y la teoría del lugar central. Se realiza una comparación de N pequeño por medio de matrices geográficas que permiten observar las variaciones temporales y espaciales de los actores armados.This paper attempts to compare the use of the violence repertories and the strategic interaction between the armed actors in the South west of Colombia between 1997 and 2009. The violence repertoires are coercive demonstrations of the armed actors; those actions have the purpose to gain sovereignty. Nevertheless, the armed actors employ the violence strategically because, on the one hand, they evaluate the frequency and the diversity that they have to use in each territory in order to defeat the enemy's resistance. On the other, the armed actors take into account the place where they are: if the territory has a high confluence of military agent (center) or not (periphery). The conclusion of this study is that at the end of the twenty century, the confrontation forces converged in certain territories which were central for the war dynamic. However, this encounter did not last since the guerrilla was defeated in those places and they had to withdraw to the periphery. The analysis is supported under the perspective of contention politics and the central place theory. The author implements a small-N comparative analysis that implemented geographical matrixes in order to take in account the temporal and spatial variation.

The Misicuni multipurpose hydraulic project was designed to transfer water from a neighboring watershed to the Cochabamba Valley in the center of Bolivia for domestic, hydropower, and agricultural use. The project involved the construction of a 120 m high large dam and a 19 km transfer tunnel, which negatively affected the rural indigenous host communities that were deprived of productive lands, houses, and livelihoods. This article critically analyzes the process to compensate for harmful effects, demonstrating the existence of divergent knowledge systems, interpretations, and valuing of what was affected and how the impacts had to be compensated. The analysis shows that the compensation was fundamentally a process of negotiation about the meaning and the contested commensuration that was implemented in a context of unequal power relations between state institutions and the indigenous population. This led to unfavorable arrangements for the affected communities. The article details the discussions about impacts, knowledge, and values of key elements of the compensation process and highlights how “compensation” was embedded in the wider struggle over territorial control and natural resource governance. The unreliability of the state institutions worsened the negative impacts for the rural communities because the negotiated outcomes were not always materialized.