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"theism"
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Neoclassical Theism as Inherently Dialogical
2022
The position usually called “process theism” is seldom called this by one of its most important defenders, Charles Hartshorne. The label he typically uses is “neoclassical theism”. It is important to notice that these two designations are not equivalent. To speak of process theism is to accentuate the differences between this metaphysical view and an opposing metaphysical stance, that of traditional or substantialist theism. By way of contrast, to speak of neoclassical theism is not to accentuate differences but rather the inclusion of one metaphysical tradition within another. That is, the neoclassical theism of Hartshorne (along with that of A.N. Whitehead, John Cobb, and David Ray Griffin, et al.) is both “neo” and “classical”. The compatibility between the best insights of classical theism and the best in neoclassical theism is evidenced in Hartshorne’s startling claim that he learned almost as much from St. Thomas Aquinas as he did from Whitehead! Although Hartshorne spent a good deal of his career pointing out that classical theism was shipwrecked on certain rocks of contradiction (neo), Thomas, more than anyone else, has provided us with an admirable chart showing the location of the rocks (classical). Three different topics will be emphasized in my defense of the thesis that “process theism” tends to be a polemical designation, in contrast to the more irenic “neoclassical theism”. The first of these is the contrast between monopolar and dipolar metaphysics. In the divine case, the neoclassical theist emphasizes the claim that, in partial contrast to the classical theistic God who does not in any way change, God always changes, and both of these words are important. The second topic is the commonplace in “process” thought that one of the most important passages in the history of metaphysical writing is in Plato’s Sophist (247e), where it is suggested that being is power or dynamis, specifically the power, however slight, both to affect other beings and to be affected by them. The third topic is Whiteheadian prehension, wherein a metaphysical thinker in the present can literally grasp and include the best insights from previous metaphysical traditions and partially transform them by bringing them into a larger whole.
Journal Article
Prolegomena to the Concept of God When Dealing with the Question: Is Ethics Without God Possible?
2025
This article examines the assumption that, in order to respond adequately to the question in the title, one must have the classical concept of God in mind. Classical theism is criticized and neoclassical/process theism is briefly defended. Specifically, the classical theistic attribute of omnipotence receives four criticisms. The hope is that these criticisms prepare the way for a more fruitful response to the question in the title than is possible when the classical concept of God is assumed.
Journal Article
The Logic of the Identity of Being and Goodness and a Moral Argument for Theism
2024
In section 1 of this paper, I consider the logical validity of four versions of Aquinas’ arguments to this conclusion that being and good are identical, as presented by Stump and Kretzmann. Subsequently, I formalize the arguments in order to make their validity logically explicit. In section 2, I show how the formal reality of the identity of being grounds moral arguments for theism. In section 3, I then consider the application of this formal reality, to a simplified contemporary “moral argument” for theism. I argue that Aquinas’ arguments for the identity of being and goodness should play a vital role in moral arguments for theism to militate against atheistic objections to them.
Journal Article
A Universe Designed for Life?
2025
Why are the laws of nature so special (“fine-tuned”) that the universe gives rise to intelligent creatures like ourselves, who can observe it and discover those laws? Is there really anything to explain, given that, if this were otherwise, we would not be here to pose the question? Can some better theory (a theory of everything?) do what is required by calculating the constants, so removing all free parameters from the equations? Alternatively, can the existence of a multiverse, a vast or infinite collection of universes, explain the specialness of this universe? Or, in the light of discoveries in modern cosmology, can we still speak of a divine mind behind the creation? These are the questions explored in this article.
Journal Article
Anti-Theists cannot have Theistic Faith
2024
A topic of recent interest involves the nature of theistic faith, and in particular, the boundaries of such faith. For example, philosophers have taken opposing positions on whether atheists and agnostics can have theistic faith. I consider a related question: whether anti-theists, who think God’s existence would be a bad thing, can have faith. I argue for a negative answer, although with several caveats.
Journal Article
The Difficulty with Demarcating Panentheism
2016
In certain theological circles today, panentheism is all the rage. One of the most notorious difficulties with panentheism lies in figuring out what panentheism actually is. There have been several attempts in recent literature to demarcate panentheism from classical theism, neo-classical theism, open theism, and pantheism. I shall argue that these attempts to demarcate panentheism from these other positions fail. Then I shall offer my own demarcation.
Journal Article
Can a Divinely Guided World Include Blind Chance?
2025
Compatibilism, or accommodationism, is the view that evolutionary theory and interventionist theism are compatible. According to compatibilists, God can guide the biosphere while allowing for chance events. A key challenge for compatibilists is to explain how blind and aimless chance events together can build a guided biosphere. This article aims to address this challenge. We discuss three candidate models designed to show the compatibility of chance and being guided: the Bartholomew-Bradley model, the van Inwagen model, and the Polkinghorne model. First, we argue that the Bartholomew-Bradley model fails to demonstrate the compatibility of blind chance and being guided; it only shows that chance is compatible with statistical orders. However, it is not clear that being regulated and supervised through statistical orders is the proper articulation of the world being divinely guided. Second, the van Inwagen model demonstrates that being guided is compatible with geometrically constrained chance but not mere chance. This model only shows that chance and being guided can be compatible if some form of constraint is present. And third, although the Polkinghorne model successfully shows the compatibility of chance and being guided, it faces its own challenges; it leaves some notions unexplained and controversy over naturalism untouched. A naturalist can use the core of this model without being convinced of the role of divine guidance.
Journal Article
CZY WSPÓŁCZESNE ROZUMIENIE PROBLEMU BOŻEJ UKRYTOŚCI PROWADZI DO ATEIZMU?
2023
The article discusses two excellent works on the hiddenness of God by Miłosz Hołda (Źródło i noc. Wprowadzenie do współczesnego absconditeizmu [The Spring and the Night: An Introduction into Contemporary Absconditheism]) and Marek Dobrzeniecki (Ukrytość i Wcielenie. Teistyczna odpowiedź na argument Johna L. Schellenberga za nieistnieniem Boga [Hiddenness and the Incarnation: A Theistic Response to John L. Schellenberg’s Argument for Divine Nonexistence]). They belong to the so-called friendly theists, who try to treat the thesis of God’s hiddenness as an important extension of the problems of classical theism. It seems, however, that they succumb to the illusion of conducting a dialogue with the so-called friendly atheists, who involve theists in such an interpretation of the thesis about the Divine hiddenness, which seems to be completely contrary to classical theism. The question then arises: whether the contemporary formulations of the problem of the Divine hiddenness are in any way compatible with Christian theism?
Journal Article