Explore the vast range of titles available.

The liver and pancreas are closely associated organs that share a common embryological origin. They display amphicrine properties and have similar exocrine organization with parenchymal cells, namely, hepatocytes and acinar cells, secreting bile and pancreatic juice into the duodenum via a converging network of bile ducts and pancreatic ducts. Here we compare and highlight the similarities of molecular mechanisms leading to liver and pancreatic cancer development. We suggest that unraveling tumor development in an organ may provide insight into our understanding of carcinogenesis in the other organ.

Technology has long been an essential consideration in public discussions of the environment, with the focus overwhelmingly on creating new tools and techniques. In more recent years, however, activists, researchers, and policymakers have increasingly turned to mobilizing older technologies in their pursuit of sustainability. In fascinating case studies ranging from the Early Modern secondhand trade to utopian visions of human-powered vehicles, the contributions gathered here explore the historical fortunes of two such technologies—bicycling and waste recycling—tracing their development over time and providing valuable context for the policy successes and failures of today.

This chapter contains sections titled: Bibliography

This chapter contains sections titled: The Textual Status of Hegel's “Historical Deduction” The Place of the “Historical Deduction” within the Argumentative Task of the Lectures' Introduction The Three “Common Ideas of Art” and the Emergence of the Standpoint of the “Historical Deduction” From Kant to Schiller to Schlegel: The Third Critique, the Culture of Reflectivity, and the Rise of the Concept of the Beautiful The Problem of History and the Narrative Structure of Hegel's Philosophy of Art

Rich nations have struggled with one of the most basic and important methods for controlling infectious diseases. Rich nations have struggled with one of the most basic and important methods for controlling infectious diseases.

As of June 8, 2020, the global reported number of COVID-19 cases had reached more than 7 million with over 400 000 deaths. The household transmissibility of the causative pathogen, severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), remains unclear. We aimed to estimate the secondary attack rate of SARS-CoV-2 among household and non-household close contacts in Guangzhou, China, using a statistical transmission model. In this retrospective cohort study, we used a comprehensive contact tracing dataset from the Guangzhou Center for Disease Control and Prevention to estimate the secondary attack rate of COVID-19 (defined as the probability that an infected individual will transmit the disease to a susceptible individual) among household and non-household contacts, using a statistical transmission model. We considered two alternative definitions of household contacts in the analysis: individuals who were either family members or close relatives, such as parents and parents-in-law, regardless of residential address, and individuals living at the same address regardless of relationship. We assessed the demographic determinants of transmissibility and the infectivity of COVID-19 cases during their incubation period. Between Jan 7, 2020, and Feb 18, 2020, we traced 195 unrelated close contact groups (215 primary cases, 134 secondary or tertiary cases, and 1964 uninfected close contacts). By identifying households from these groups, assuming a mean incubation period of 5 days, a maximum infectious period of 13 days, and no case isolation, the estimated secondary attack rate among household contacts was 12·4% (95% CI 9·8–15·4) when household contacts were defined on the basis of close relatives and 17·1% (13·3–21·8) when household contacts were defined on the basis of residential address. Compared with the oldest age group (≥60 years), the risk of household infection was lower in the youngest age group (<20 years; odds ratio [OR] 0·23 [95% CI 0·11–0·46]) and among adults aged 20–59 years (OR 0·64 [95% CI 0·43–0·97]). Our results suggest greater infectivity during the incubation period than during the symptomatic period, although differences were not statistically significant (OR 0·61 [95% CI 0·27–1·38]). The estimated local reproductive number (R) based on observed contact frequencies of primary cases was 0·5 (95% CI 0·41–0·62) in Guangzhou. The projected local R, had there been no isolation of cases or quarantine of their contacts, was 0·6 (95% CI 0·49–0·74) when household was defined on the basis of close relatives. SARS-CoV-2 is more transmissible in households than SARS-CoV and Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus. Older individuals (aged ≥60 years) are the most susceptible to household transmission of SARS-CoV-2. In addition to case finding and isolation, timely tracing and quarantine of close contacts should be implemented to prevent onward transmission during the viral incubation period. US National Institutes of Health, Science and Technology Plan Project of Guangzhou, Project for Key Medicine Discipline Construction of Guangzhou Municipality, Key Research and Development Program of China.

The swift global spread of COVID-19 prompted public health authorities to explore digital technologies to aid in contact tracing for infection control. Exposure notification, a mobile device–based technology that notifies individuals of potential exposure to COVID-19 without requiring personally identifiable information, has been broadly favored because of its relative ease of use, scalability, and protection of personal privacy. Although several exposure notification protocols were developed, a partnership between Google and Apple led to the development of the most widely implemented exposure notification protocol in the world, including in the United States. In this article, we first describe the development of the Google Apple Exposure Notification (GAEN) protocol, noting the value of the discourse among software developers and public health authorities concerning the protocol’s design and features. We track states’ deployment of GAEN mobile applications (apps) and population-level adoption rates, finding the nationwide rollout of GAEN apps to be more fragmented than anticipated. We then discuss how the limited data collected from these apps make assessments of their effectiveness challenging. Finally, we consider the importance of the federal government playing a greater role in GAEN’s early development, emphasize the power of public–private partnerships, and highlight the overriding importance of public messaging over technological details.

For the 2009 influenza A H1N1 pandemic, in most infected people these epidemiological quantities were short with a day or so to infectiousness and a few days of peak infectiousness to others.3 By contrast, for COVID-19, the serial interval is estimated at 4·4–7·5 days, which is more similar to SARS.4 First among the important unknowns about COVID-19 is the case fatality rate (CFR), which requires information on the denominator that defines the number infected. [...]the effect of seasons on transmission of COVID-19 is unknown;11 however, with an R0 of 2–3, the warm months of summer in the northern hemisphere might not necessarily reduce transmission below the value of unity as they do for influenza A, which typically has an R0 of around 1·1–1·5.12 Closely linked to these factors and their epidemiological determinants is the impact of different mitigation policies on the course of the COVID-19 epidemic. A key issue for epidemiologists is helping policy makers decide the main objectives of mitigation—eg, minimising morbidity and associated mortality, avoiding an epidemic peak that overwhelms health-care services, keeping the effects on the economy within manageable levels, and flattening the epidemic curve to wait for vaccine development and manufacture on scale and antiviral drug therapies. Avoiding large gatherings of people will reduce the number of super-spreading events; however, if prolonged contact is required for transmission, this measure might only reduce a small proportion of transmissions. [...]broader-scale social distancing is likely to be needed, as was put in place in China.

Most national response strategies include varying levels of contact tracing and self-isolation or quarantine; promotion of public health measures, including handwashing, respiratory etiquette, and social distancing; preparation of health systems for a surge of severely ill patients who require isolation, oxygen, and mechanical ventilation; strengthening health facility infection prevention and control, with special attention to nursing home facilities; and postponement or cancellation of large-scale public gatherings. [...]all countries should consider a combination of response measures: case and contact finding; containment or other measures that aim to delay the onset of patient surges where feasible; and measures such as public awareness, promotion of personal protective hygiene, preparation of health systems for a surge of severely ill patients, stronger infection prevention and control in health facilities, nursing homes, and long-term care facilities, and postponement or cancellation of large-scale public gatherings. [...]countries with no or a few first cases of COVID-19 should consider active surveillance for timely case finding; isolate, test, and trace every contact in containment; practise social distancing; and ready their health-care systems and populations for spread of infection.