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The format of pricing contracts varies substantially across business contexts, a major variable being whether a contract imposes a fixed fee payment. This paper examines how the use of the fixed fee in pricing contracts affects market outcomes of a manufacturer-retailer channel. Standard economic theories predict that channel efficiency increases with the introduction of the fixed fee and is invariant to its framing. We conduct a laboratory experiment to test these predictions. Surprisingly, the introduction of the fixed fee fails to increase channel efficiency. Moreover, the framing of the fixed fee does make a difference: an opaque frame as quantity discounts achieves higher channel efficiency than a salient frame as a two-part tariff, although these two contractual formats are theoretically equivalent. To account for these anomalies, we generalize the standard economic model by allowing the retailer's utilities to be reference dependent so that the up-front fixed fee payment is perceived as a loss and the subsequent retail profits as a gain. We embed this reference-dependent utility function in a quantal response equilibrium framework where the retailer is allowed to make decision mistakes due to computational complexity. The key prediction of this behavioral model is that channel efficiency decreases with loss aversion for sufficiently Nash-rational retailers. Consistent with this prediction, the estimated loss-aversion coefficient is 1.37 in the two-part tariff condition, significantly higher than 1.27 in the quantity discount condition. At the same time, loss aversion dominates contract complexity in explaining the data. Lastly, we conduct a follow-up experiment to confirm the central role of loss aversion as a behavioral driver. In one condition, the retailer becomes less loss averse when we temporally compress the fixed fee payment and the realization of retail profits, which supports the loss aversion theory. In the other condition, the retailer's contract acceptance rate does not decline when we reward the manufacturer a higher cash payment for each experimental point earned, which rules out the competing hypothesis that the retailer rejects contract offers due to fairness concerns.

It is common for a retailer to sell products from competing manufacturers. How then should the firms manage their contract negotiations? The supply chain coordination literature focuses either on a single manufacturer selling to a single retailer or one manufacturer selling to many (possibly competing) retailers. We find that some key conclusions from those market structures do not apply in our setting, where multiple manufacturers sell through a single retailer. We allow the manufacturers to compete for the retailer's business using one of three types of contracts: a wholesale-price contract, a quantity-discount contract, or a two-part tariff. It is well known that the latter two, more sophisticated contracts enable the manufacturer to coordinate the supply chain, thereby maximizing the profits available to the firms. More importantly, they allow the manufacturer to extract rents from the retailer, in theory allowing the manufacturer to leave the retailer with only her reservation profit. However, we show that in our market structure these two sophisticated contracts force the manufacturers to compete more aggressively relative to when they only offer wholesale-price contracts, and this may leave them worse off and the retailer substantially better off. In other words, although in a serial supply chain a retailer may have just cause to fear quantity discounts and two-part tariffs, a retailer may actually prefer those contracts when offered by competing manufacturers. We conclude that the properties a contractual form exhibits in a one-manufacturer supply chain may not carry over to the realistic setting in which multiple manufacturers must compete to sell their goods through the same retailer.

Welfare measures from travel cost models net out variable costs such as travel expenses specific to each trip. Costs that are fixed in the short run, such as expenses for equipment that is used over multiple trips, are typically ignored and implicitly netted out. The resulting net value of recreation trips, or consumer surplus, is appropriate for long-run analysis when consumers can fully adjust their expenditures. However, in cases where some costs are difficult to adjust in the short run, such as when boat owners do not sell their boats in response to the transient effects of an oil spill, traditional consumer surplus measures underestimate the total welfare change. We explain this underestimation and show how to correct for it by adjusting traditional consumer surplus estimates upward. We illustrate our procedure using a model of recreational boating developed to assess damages from the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. In that case, accounting for boating fixed costs resulted in a 50% increase in estimated value relative to estimates of consumer surplus alone.

Liberalisation of the British household electricity market, in which previously monopolised regional markets were exposed to large-scale entry, is used as a natural experiment on oligopolistic nonlinear pricing. Each oligopolist offered a single two-part electricity tariff, but inconsistent with current theory, the two-part tariffs were heterogeneous in ways that cannot be attributed to explanations such as asymmetric costs or variations in brand loyalty. Instead, the evidence suggests that firms deliberately differentiated their tariff structures, resulting in market segmentation according to consumers' usage.

In reverse supply chain (RSC) systems, disruptions in the collection process of used items may negatively influence the efficiency of RSC participators. Inspired by a real case study, this paper contributes to the RSC systems coordination literature by analyzing the effect of collection disruptions on the efficiency of an RSC system with dual collection channels using a coordination contract approach. Moreover, this study explores the effect of collection competition between two collection channels (collector channel and remanufacturer channel) on the acquisition prices offered to consumers as incentive schemes for returning the used items. This study determines the equilibrium solutions for selling prices of remanufactured products, acquisition prices, and transfer price under decentralization, centralization, and coordination settings. Additionally, this study incorporates the impact of collection disruptions into the remanufacturer’s and collector’s problem considering four scenarios. Furthermore, this study proposes a disruption-based two-part tariff contract to accomplish channel coordination in the RSC system with dual-collection channel under collection disruptions. Our finding reveals that the suggested coordinated scheme efficiently coordinates the disrupted RSC with dual collection channels even when under high possibility of collection disruptions. Moreover, our coordination plan is of environmental and economic benefits, as it can boost the return quantities and can increase RSC participators’ profits.

PurposeWith refineries contributing 68% of CO2 emissions from stationary combustion sources alone, smart technologies and the circular economy (CE) model for resource loop optimization can be a solution for carbon neutrality, especially within petroleum. Thus, this study aims to explore energy conservation by green technology improvement as a CE strategy for resource loop optimization and digital incorporation to maximize reprocessing lead ability rate and carbon-neutral benefits.Design/methodology/approachA game theory approach with Stackelberg equilibrium is considered under government cap-and-trade regulation to stimulate green technology improvement. The refinery acts as a Stackelberg leader and invests in green technology and the retailer as the Stackelberg follower, collects end-of-life lubricants against refund price and offers a two-part-tariff contract to the manufacturer having a significant role in smart technologies.FindingsFirst, green technology improvement is directly influenced by the reprocessing capability and refund price and digital technologies are significant to consider. Second, a two-part-tariff contract coordinates the supply chain for limited reprocessing capability by the retailer. Lastly, the government can effectively manipulate the development of green technology by changing the permit price depending on the intentions.Research limitations/implicationsThe primary limitation is this study has focused on the petroleum sector and data was referenced from the oil refineries of a single country.Practical implicationsOverall, this study provides empirical guidance for policymakers on how to leverage energy-efficient smart technologies for lubricant reprocessing, enabling resource optimization as part of a CE strategy in the petroleum industry and advancing sustainable development goals.Originality/valueThe suggested model responds to the contemporary literature related to CO2 emissions and CE initiatives across the petroleum sector with the extended role of smart technologies and government cap-and-trade regulations.

Compared to linear tariffs, two-part tariffs are generally perceived as being more efficient since double marginalization is avoided. We investigate the efficiency of two-part tariffs vs. linear tariffs when a vertically integrated firm sells its input also to an independent downstream firm selling a differentiated substitute product. We find that a linear tariff can generate higher consumer surplus and overall welfare than a two-part tariff when the independent downstream firm is rather powerful in negotiating the contract terms, and downstream competition is in prices (Bertrand competition). In that case, the integrated firm makes more profits under a linear tariff than under a two-part tariff. In contrast, under downstream Cournot competition two-part tariffs are always welfare-superior. Under linear demand, we find that, irrespective of the mode of downstream competition and the distribution of bargaining power, the preferred contract type of the integrated firm is always welfare-superior.

We present a model of vertical contracts between manufacturers and retailers with nonlinear pricing strategies. Using home-scan data on bottled water produced by manufacturers and sold by retail chains in France, we estimate a structural demand and supply model allowing for twopart tariff contracts between manufacturers and retailers. Using price-cost margins recovered from estimates of demand parameters, we select the best supply model by performing nonnested tests, and find that manufacturers use two-part tariff contracts with resale price maintenance. We then perform counterfactual policy simulations that restrict the use of these vertical contracts and assess welfare effects under alternative scenarios.

The present study examines a supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer. The manufacturer produces a product with a national brand (NB) and the retailer selling both the NB product and his own premium store brand (PSB) product. The manufacturer competes with the retailer through improving the quality by using innovation over time. It is assumed that both advertising and enhanced quality play positive roles in customers’ loyalty over time for the NB product. We propose four scenarios, including: (1) Decentralized (D), (2) Centralized (C), (3) Coordination with a revenue-sharing contract (RSH), and (4) Coordination with a two-part tariff contract (TPT). A Stackelberg differential game model is developed, and parametric analyses and managerial insights are provided based on a numerical example. Our results show that: (1) Introducing a PSB product alongside selling the NB product is profitable for the retailer, (2) In Scenario D and RSH, the manufacturer tries to increase the quality gap with the PSB product through innovation, (3) Customers’ loyalty leads to higher prices, levels of innovation, quality, and advertising for the NB product, (4) The TPT contract can lead to perfect coordination and yield higher profits for the manufacturer and the retailer.

Models of recreation behavior have typically ignored the role of fixed annual fees, such as the fee for a recreational license, in determining choice and welfare. We demonstrate how techniques from the literature on discrete-continuous choice and two-part tariffs can address a situation where fixed annual fees are essential to determining the choice of a recreation site. We explore how accounting for value captured by fixed fees can influence the way resource changes are assessed.