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The Water Conservation Functional Zone and Ecological Environmental Supporting Zone (the Capital Two Zones in China), Zhangjiakou (ZJK) City, situated in China, has played a key role in mitigating water scarcity pressure on Beijing via delivering sustainable and high-quality water yield, as well as water conservation services aimed at maintaining the ecological functions of the Capital Two Zones. However, the changing mechanism for both water yield and water conservation services instigated by the combined impacts of human activities and climate change remains poorly understood. In this study, we used the Integrated Valuation of Ecosystem Services and Trade-offs Tools (InVEST) model to analyze the changes in water yield and water conservation services, revealing the impacts of different land use scenarios. The results showed significant forest and impervious land area increment, while the water surface area decreased sharply from 1990 to 2020, with obvious urbanization expansion in ZJK during the period. Average annual water yield and water conservation from 1990 to 2020 were recorded at 48.98 mm and 2.35 mm, respectively. Precipitation emerged as the primary driver of water yield and conservation service changes, while the south of ZJK generally exhibited higher water yield and conservation service than the north of ZJK. Results also indicate that grassland had the highest water yield, with an average of 56.60 mm, followed by forest (55.66 mm) and shrub (55.07 mm). Further, the forest had the highest water conservation value (3.73 mm), followed by shrub (2.56 mm), and grassland (2.37 mm), respectively. The return of cropland to forest scenario had the most substantial decrease in water yield. Findings suggest that precipitation has a direct impact on water yield and conservation services via the amount of atmospheric water input, while land use alteration contributes to changes in regional-scale water.

Jeff Sahadeo reveals the complex and fascinating stories of migrant populations in Leningrad and Moscow.Voices from the Soviet Edgefocuses on the hundreds of thousands of Uzbeks, Tajiks, Georgians, Azerbaijanis, and others who arrived toward the end of the Soviet era, seeking opportunity at the privileged heart of the USSR. Through the extensive oral histories Sahadeo has collected, he shows how the energy of these migrants, denigrated as \"Blacks\" by some Russians, transformed their families' lives and created inter-republican networks, altering society and community in both the center and the periphery of life in the \"two capitals.\" Voices from the Soviet Edgeconnects Leningrad and Moscow to transnational trends of core-periphery movement and marks them as global cities. In examining Soviet concepts such as \"friendship of peoples\" alongside ethnic and national differences, Sahadeo shows how those ideas became racialized but could also be deployed to advance migrant aspirations. He exposes the Brezhnev era as a time of dynamism and opportunity, and Leningrad and Moscow not as isolated outposts of privilege but at the heart of any number of systems that linked the disparate regions of the USSR into a whole. In the 1980s, as the Soviet Union crumbled, migration increased. These later migrants were the forbears of contemporary Muslims from former Soviet spaces who now confront significant discrimination in European Russia. As Sahadeo demonstrates, the two cities benefited from 1980s' migration but also became communities where racism and exclusion coexisted with citizenship and Soviet identity.

We examine the concerns that new technologies will render labor redundant in a framework in which tasks previously performed by labor can be automated and new versions of existing tasks, in which labor has a comparative advantage, can be created. In a static version where capital is fixed and technology is exogenous, automation reduces employment and the labor share, and may even reduce wages, while the creation of new tasks has the opposite effects. Our full model endogenizes capital accumulation and the direction of research toward automation and the creation of new tasks. If the long-run rental rate of capital relative to the wage is sufficiently low, the long-run equilibrium involves automation of all tasks. Otherwise, there exists a stable balanced growth path in which the two types of innovations go hand-in-hand. Stability is a consequence of the fact that automation reduces the cost of producing using labor, and thus discourages further automation and encourages the creation of new tasks. In an extension with heterogeneous skills, we show that inequality increases during transitions driven both by faster automation and the introduction of new tasks, and characterize the conditions under which inequality stabilizes in the long run.

The production of goods and services is central to understanding economies. The textbook description of a firm, typically in agriculture or manufacturing, focuses on its physical “tangible” capital (machines), labor (workers), and the state of “know-how. ” Yet real-world firms, such as Apple, Microsoft, and Google, have almost no physical capital. Instead, their main capital assets are “intangible”: software, data, design, reputation, supply-chain expertise, and R&D. We discuss investment in these knowledge-based types of capital: How to measure it; how it affects macroeconomic data on investment, rates of return, and GDP; and how it relates to growth theory and practical growth accounting. We present estimates of productivity in the US and European economies in recent decades including intangibles and discuss why, despite relatively rapid growth in intangible capital and what seems to be a modern technological revolution, productivity growth has slowed since the global financial crisis.

In this article, I present three key facts about income and wealth inequality in the long run emerging from my book Capital in the Twenty-First Century and seek to sharpen and refocus the discussion about those trends. In particular, I clarify the role played by r > g in my analysis of wealth inequality. I also discuss some of the implications for optimal taxation, and the relation between capital-income ratios and capital shares.

The evidence for the United States points to balanced growth despite falling investment-good prices and a less-than-unitary elasticity of substitution between capital and labor. This is inconsistent with the Uzawa Growth Theorem. We extend Uzawïs theorem to show that the introduction of human capital accumulation in the standard way does not resolve the puzzle. However, balanced growth is possible if education is endogenous and capital is more complementary with schooling than with raw labor. We present a class of aggregate production functions for which a neoclassical growth model with capital-augmenting technological progress and endogenous schooling converges to a balanced growth path.

We put forward managerial capital, which is distinct from human capital, as a key missing form of capital in developing countries. We argue in this paper that lack of managerial capital has broad implications for firm growth as well as for the effectiveness of other input factors. Bruhn, Karlan, and Schoar (2010) examine whether lack of knowledge can be alleviated by providing consulting services to supplement the managerial skills. Early results show that the consulting services have a positive effect on firms' productivity.

In Capital in the Twenty-First Century, Thomas Piketty uses the market value of tradable assets to measure both productive capital and wealth. As a measure of wealth this is problematic because it ignores the value of human capital and transfer wealth, which have grown enormously over the last 300 years. Thus the constancy of the wealth/income ratio as portrayed in his data is an illusion. Further, the types of wealth that he does not measure are more equally distributed than tradable assets. The approach also incorrectly identifies capital gains due to reduced discount rates as increases in the capital stock.

I examine the role of human and physical capital for the creation of scientific knowledge. I address the endogeneity of human and physical capital with two exogenous shocks: the dismissal of scientists in Nazi Germany and World War II bombings. A 10% shock to human capital reduced output by 0.2 SD in the short run, and the reduction persisted in the long run. A 10% shock to physical capital reduced output by 0.05 SD in the short run, and the reduction did not persist. The dismissal of star scientists caused much larger reductions in output because they are key for attracting other successful scientists.

We present a model of nonbalanced growth based on differences in factor proportions and capital deepening. Capital deepening increases the relative output of the more capital‐intensive sector but simultaneously induces a reallocation of capital and labor away from that sector. Using a two‐sector general equilibrium model, we show that nonbalanced growth is consistent with an asymptotic equilibrium with a constant interest rate and capital share in national income. For plausible parameter values, the model generates dynamics consistent with U.S. data, in particular, faster growth of employment and slower growth of output in less capital‐intensive sectors, and aggregate behavior consistent with the Kaldor facts.