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BackgroundA 2022 survey in the USA found concerningly high prevalences of support for and personal willingness to engage in political violence, of beliefs associated with such violence, and of belief that civil war was likely in the near future. It is important to determine the durability of those findings.MethodsWave 2 of a nationally representative cohort survey was conducted May 18-June 8, 2023; the sample comprised all respondents to 2022’s Wave 1. Outcomes are expressed as weighted proportions; changes from 2022 to 2023 are for respondents who participated in both surveys, based on aggregated individual change scores.ResultsThe completion rate was 84.2%; there were 9385 respondents. After weighting, 50.7% (95% confidence interval (CI) 49.4%, 52.1%) were female; weighted mean (SD) age was 48.5 (25.9) years. About 1 in 20 respondents (5.7%, 95% CI 5.1%, 6.4%) agreed strongly/very strongly that “in the next few years, there will be civil war in the United States,” a 7.7% decrease.In 2023, fewer respondents considered violence to be usually/always justified to advance at least 1 of 17 specific political objectives [25.3% (95% CI 24.7%, 26.5%), a 6.8% decrease]. However, more respondents thought it very/extremely likely that within the next few years, in a situation where they consider political violence justified, “I will be armed with a gun” [9.0% (95% CI 8.3%, 9.8%), a 2.2% increase] and “I will shoot someone with a gun” [1.8% (95% CI 1.4%, 2.2%), a 0.6% increase]. Among respondents who considered violence usually/always justified to advance at least 1 political objective, about 1 in 20 also thought it very/extremely likely that they would threaten someone with a gun (5.4%, 95% CI 4.0%, 7.0%) or shoot someone (5.7%, 95% CI 4.3%, 7.1%) to advance such an objective.ConclusionsIn this cohort, support for political violence declined from 2022 to 2023, but predictions of firearm use in political violence increased. These findings can help guide prevention efforts, which are urgently needed.

BackgroundU.S. firearm sales surged during the COVID-19 pandemic, with many purchases by first-time firearm owners. The 2023 National Survey of Gun Policy sought to understand the public health implications of this surge by comparing the purchasing motivations and firearm policy views of pandemic-era first-time purchasers to prior gun owners.MethodsWe fielded a nationally representative public opinion survey of U.S. adults (n = 3096) from 1/4/23 to 2/6/23. We oversampled for gun owners and Black, Hispanic, and Asian Americans. Survey weights were applied to generate representative estimates. New gun owners were identified through affirmative responses to: “Have you bought any guns since January 1, 2020?” and “Did you buy your first gun after January 1, 2020?” Recent purchasers were additionally asked whether concerns of 1) political or 2) racial violence motivated their purchase. Purchase motivations and gun policy support were examined among new and prior gun owners (n = 1002) and compared using logistic regression and predictive probabilities.ResultsOverall, 11% of respondents reported purchasing a gun since 1/1/20, 35% for the first time. Among recent purchasers, larger proportions of Democrat, Black, Asian, and Hispanic respondents were new gun owners than Republican or white respondents. Compared to prior owners, odds were 4.5-times higher that new gun owners’ recent purchase was motivated by racial violence and 3.2-times higher for political violence.Majority support was found for protective gun policies, with few differences by purchase recency or motivations. The only policy for which support by new and prior gun owners differed significantly was the permit-to-purchase policy (76% v. 63%, respectively). Similarly, few significant differences in support were observed when stratifying by purchase motivation. Notably, both those who reported recent purchase motivations of racial violence and of political violence expressed significantly higher support for a “stand-your-ground” policy compared to those who did not report such motivations.ConclusionsRacial and political violence appear to be larger concerns among new gun owners, motivating purchasing among demographic groups with traditionally lower gun ownership rates. These findings suggest a need for safety assurances amid racial and political tensions and growing gun ownership. Gun owners’ support for such policies remains strong.

Background Too little is known about the distribution of risk for committing political violence, a serious concern for the United States. This study explores the association between affiliation with the “Make America Great Again” (MAGA) movement and support for and willingness to engage in political violence. Methods Findings are from Wave 3 of a nationally representative annual longitudinal survey of members of the Ipsos KnowledgePanel, conducted May 23-June 14, 2024. All KnowledgePanel members who responded to prior waves were invited to participate. Political party and MAGA affiliations were reported by respondents; the principal comparison is between MAGA Republicans and non-MAGA non-Republicans. Outcomes are expressed as weighted proportions and adjusted prevalence differences (aPDs, reported as percentage point (pp) differences), with p-values adjusted for the false discovery rate. Results The completion rate was 88.4%; there were 8896 respondents. MAGA Republicans were more likely than non-MAGA non-Republicans to endorse violence to effect sociopolitical change and to consider violence usually or always justified to advance at least 1 of 21 specific political objectives (MAGA Republicans, 55.9% (95% CI 52.3%, 59.4%); non-MAGA non-Republicans, 25.5% (95% CI 23.7%, 27.2%); aPD 30.1pp (95% CI 26.0pp, 34.2pp), q < 0.001). They were not more willing to commit political violence. Similarly, while MAGA Republicans more frequently predicted that they would be armed in a setting where they considered political violence justified, they were not more likely to shoot someone (very or extremely likely: MAGA Republicans, 2.1% (95% CI 0.8%, 3.4%); non-MAGA non-Republicans, 1.6% (95% CI 1.0%, 2.1%); aPD 1.5pp (95% CI -0.1pp, 3.0pp), q = 0.43). Prevalences for other Republicans generally fell between those for MAGA Republicans and non-MAGA non-Republicans. In secondary analyses, MAGA Republicans endorsed attributes associated with political violence—racism, hostile sexism, homonegativity, transphobia, xenophobia, and Islamophobia; support for the QAnon movement and Christian nationalism; conspiracism; trait aggression; and authoritarianism—more frequently than did non-MAGA non-Republicans. Conclusions In 2024, MAGA Republicans were more likely than others to endorse political violence and attributes associated with political violence. They were not more willing to commit political violence themselves; their endorsement may increase the risk that political violence will occur.

Covering a period from the late eighteenth century to today, this volume explores the phenomenon of urban violence in order to unveil general developments and historical specificities in a variety of Middle Eastern contexts. By situating incidents in particular processes and conflicts, the case studies seek to counter notions of a violent Middle East in order to foster a new understanding of violence beyond that of a meaningless and destructive social and political act. Contributions explore processes sparked by the transition from empires — Ottoman and Qajar, but also European — to the formation of nation states, and the resulting changes in cityscapes throughout the region.

Background In 2023, Wave 2 of an annual, nationally representative longitudinal survey found a concerning level of agreement that civil war was likely in the USA and, among those who agreed, widespread belief that civil war was needed. This study updates those findings to 2024 and explores respondents’ predicted involvement in such a conflict. Methods Findings are from Wave 3, conducted May 23-June 14, 2024; participants were members of Ipsos KnowledgePanel. All respondents to prior waves who remained in KnowledgePanel were invited to participate; to facilitate comparison with 2023 findings, this analysis is restricted to Wave 3 respondents who had responded to both Waves 1 and 2. Outcomes are expressed as weighted proportions and adjusted prevalence differences. Results The Wave 3 completion rate was 88.4% overall and 91.6% for respondents to Waves 1 and 2; there were 8185 respondents in the analytic sample. After weighting, half the sample was female (50.6%, 95% CI 49.1%, 52.1%); the weighted mean (SD) age was 50.8 (16.4) years. Few respondents agreed strongly or very strongly that “in the next few years, there will be civil war in the United States” (6.5%, 95% CI 5.7%, 7.3%) or that “the United States needs a civil war to set things right” (3.6%, 95% CI 3.0%, 4.2%). These prevalences were higher among subsets of respondents previously associated with increased support for and willingness to commit political violence. Of the small minority (3.7%, 95% CI 3.1%, 4.3%) who thought it very or extremely likely that they would be combatants, 44.5% (95% CI 36.5%, 52.6%) reported that they would convert to not likely if this were urged by family members; 23–31% were open to persuasion by friends, respected religious leaders, elected officials, and the media. Conclusions In mid-2024, the expectation that civil war was likely and the belief that it was needed were uncommon and were unchanged from 2023. Those expecting to participate as combatants reported openness to change in response to input from many sources. These findings can help guide prevention efforts.

Background Increased concerns of political violence in the US have drawn attention to sociopolitical movements across the political spectrum. The 2023 National Survey of Gun Policy sought to characterize approval of these movements and whether gun ownership was associated with this approval. Methods The National Survey of Gun Policy was fielded from 1/4/23 − 2/6/23 among a nationally representative sample of US adults ( N  = 3,096), including gun owners ( n  = 1,002). Respondents rated their level of approval for the militia, antifascist (Antifa), white supremacy, Christian nationalist, boogaloo, and anarchist movements. Logistic regression was used to compare differences in movement approval by gun ownership. Results Approval of each movement was relatively low, ranging from 4% for the boogaloo movement to 13% for the Christian nationalist movement. Proportions of respondents that reported lacking knowledge was highest for the boogaloo movement (64%) and lowest for the white supremacy movement (17%); these two movements had similar proportions of approval (4% and 5%, respectively). Significantly larger proportions of gun owners reported both knowledge and approval of any of the six movements compared to non-gun owners, but differences in approval by gun ownership were no longer significant when only comparing those with knowledge of the movements. Conclusions Results indicate low probabilities of knowledge and approval. Moreover, greater knowledge was not accompanied by greater approval (e.g., white supremacy). Gun ownership was associated with movement knowledge, but not with movement approval among those with knowledge. These findings suggest opportunities for more proactive public health messaging to appeal to majority groups to resist movements that may sow division.

BackgroundSurveys have found concerningly high levels of agreement that the United States will experience civil war soon. This study assesses variation in expectation of and perceived need for civil war with respondent sociopolitical characteristics, beliefs, firearm ownership, and willingness to engage in political violence.MethodsFindings are from Wave 2 of a nationally representative annual longitudinal survey of members of the Ipsos KnowledgePanel, conducted May 18–June 8, 2023. All respondents to 2022’s Wave 1 who remained in KnowledgePanel were invited to participate. Outcomes are expressed as weighted proportions and adjusted prevalence differences, with p-values adjusted for the false discovery rate and reported as q-values.ResultsThe completion rate was 84.2%; there were 9385 respondents. After weighting, half the sample was female (50.7%, 95% CI 49.4%, 52.1%); the weighted mean (± standard deviation) age was 48.5 (25.9) years. Approximately 1 respondent in 20 (5.7%, 95% CI 5.1%, 6.4%) agreed strongly or very strongly that “in the next few years, there will be civil war in the United States.” About 1 in 25 (3.8%, 95% CI 3.2%, 4.4%), and nearly 40% (38.4%, 95% CI 32.3%, 44.5%) of those who strongly or very strongly agreed that civil war was coming, also agreed strongly or very strongly that “the United States needs a civil war to set things right.” Expectation of and perceived need for civil war were higher among subsets of respondents who in Wave 1 were more willing than others to commit political violence, including MAGA Republicans, persons in strong agreement with racist beliefs or statements of the potential need for violence to effect social change, persons who strongly approved of specified extreme right-wing political organizations and movements, firearm owners who purchased firearms in 2020 or later, and firearm owners who carried firearms in public all or nearly all the time.ConclusionsIn 2023, the expectation that civil war was likely and the belief that it was needed were uncommon but were higher among subsets of the population that had previously been associated with greater willingness to commit political violence. These findings can help guide prevention efforts.

Background Political violence constitutes an increasing threat to individual and population-level health in the United States, with military service identified as a potential risk factor. The current study examines the association between military service, combat experience, and support for and willingness to engage in political violence and approval of extremist organizations and movements. Methods A nationally representative sample of 12,947 US adult members of the Ipsos KnowledgePanel completed the 2022 Life in America Survey. Outcomes are presented as weighted proportions and adjusted prevalence differences. The analytic sample comprised 2,255 respondents with military backgrounds; 1,105, including an augment of 415 respondents, reported combat experience. Results Military respondents were less likely than others to perceive the use of political violence “to keep our borders open” as usually or always justified (adjusted prevalence difference (aPD) -3.1%, 95% confidence interval (CI) -5.6, -0.7, q  = 0.049). By contrast, they demonstrated a greater willingness to “use force or violence on your own as an individual” (aPD 5.0%, 95% CI 2.5%, 7.5%, q  = .001) and to “organize a group of people who share your beliefs to use force or violence” (aPD 2.8%, 95% CI 0.7%, 4.8%, q  = .029) to advance a political objective. They were also more likely to report that it would be very or extremely likely that they would be armed with a gun (aPD 6.3%, 95% CI 3.5%, 9.2%, q  = .001) or carry a gun openly (aPD 6.5%, 95% CI 3.1%, 10.0%, q  = .001) in a situation where they thought force or violence was justified to advance an important political objective; however, there were no differences with respect to threatening or shooting someone with a gun. Additionally, military respondents were more likely to strongly or very strongly approve of the Oath Keepers (aPD 4.1%, 95% CI 0.7%, 7.6%, q  = .037). There were no significant differences by combat experience. Conclusions Given the modest number of differences among numerous comparisons, and the relatively small size of prevalence differences, it does not appear that military service and combat experience act as risk factors for support for and willingness to engage in political violence, or approval of extremist organizations and movements.

Women empowerment programs may reduce intimate partner violence (IPV) by improving autonomy, increasing bargaining power, and reducing socioeconomic stress. Yet, this might not happen if partners increase violence to either control the woman’s resources or assert their dominance. Data from South Kivu, DRC, are consistent with the view that IPV may be related to both control and socioeconomic stress: IPV is higher when women are the main household earner, more educated, and younger than their husband and when households experienced more socioeconomic shocks. Based on these findings, the effect of empowerment programs on IPV in this setting are theoretically ambiguous.

In this powerful, compassionate work, one of anthropology’s most distinguished ethnographers weaves together rich fieldwork with a compelling critical analysis in a book that will surely make a signal contribution to contemporary thinking about violence and how it affects everyday life. Veena Das examines case studies including the extreme violence of the Partition of India in 1947 and the massacre of Sikhs in 1984 after the assassination of then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. In a major departure from much anthropological inquiry, Das asks how this violence has entered \"the recesses of the ordinary\" instead of viewing it as an interruption of life to which we simply bear witness. Das engages with anthropological work on collective violence, rumor, sectarian conflict, new kinship, and state and bureaucracy as she embarks on a wide-ranging exploration of the relations among violence, gender, and subjectivity. Weaving anthropological and philosophical reflections on the ordinary into her analysis, Das points toward a new way of interpreting violence in societies and cultures around the globe. The book will be indispensable reading across disciplinary boundaries as we strive to better understand violence, especially as it is perpetrated against women.