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This full-scale study of Punjabi politics since Indian Independence in 1947 considers the major political problem confronting virtually every new nation: how to create a functioning political system in the face of divisive internal threats. Originally published in 1966. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

Throughout the Arab world, Islamist political movements are joining the electoral process. This change alarms some observers and excites other. In recent years, electoral opportunities have opened, and Islamist movements have seized them. But those opportunities, while real, have also been sharply circumscribed. Elections may be freer, but they are not fair. The opposition can run but it generally cannot win. Semiauthoritarian conditions prevail in much of the Arab world, even in the wake of the Arab Spring. How do Islamist movements change when they plunge into freer but unfair elections? How do their organizations (such as the Muslim Brotherhood) and structures evolve? What happens to their core ideological principles? And how might their increased involvement affect the political system? InWhen Victory Is Not an Option, Nathan J. Brown addresses these questions by focusing on Islamist movements in Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, and Palestine. He shows that uncertain benefits lead to uncertain changes. Islamists do adapt their organizations and their ideologies do bend-some. But leaders almost always preserve a line of retreat in case the political opening fizzles or fails to deliver what they wish. The result is a cat-and-mouse game between dominant regimes and wily movements. There are possibilities for more significant changes, but to date they remain only possibilities.

Social media platforms like Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter have become major objects of criticism for reasons such as privacy violations, anticompetitive practices, and interference in public elections. Some of these problems have been associated with algorithms, but the roles that algorithms play in the emergence of different harms have not yet been systematically explored. This article contributes to closing this research gap with an investigation of the link between algorithms and harms on social media platforms. Evidence of harms involving social media algorithms was collected from media reports and academic papers within a two-year timeframe from 2018 to 2019, covering Facebook, YouTube, Instagram, and Twitter. Harms with similar casual mechanisms were grouped together to inductively develop a typology of algorithmic harm based on the mechanisms involved in their emergence: (1) algorithmic errors, undesirable, or disturbing selections; (2) manipulation by users to achieve algorithmic outputs to harass other users or disrupt public discourse; (3) algorithmic reinforcement of pre-existing harms and inequalities in society; (4) enablement of harmful practices that are opaque and discriminatory; and (5) strengthening of platform power over users, markets, and society. Although the analysis emphasizes the role of algorithms as a cause of online harms, it also demonstrates that harms do not arise from the application of algorithms alone. Instead, harms can be best conceived of as socio-technical assemblages, composed of the use and design of algorithms, platform design, commercial interests, social practices, and context. The article concludes with reflections on possible governance interventions in response to identified socio-technical mechanisms of harm. Notably, while algorithmic errors may be fixed by platforms themselves, growing platform power calls for external oversight.

This paper models three stages of the union organizing drive, using a new dataset covering more than 22,000 drives that took place between 1999 and 2004. The correlated sequential model tracks drives through all of their potential stages: holding an election, winning an election, and reaching first contracts. Only one-seventh of organizing drives that filed an election petition with the NLRB managed to reach a first contract within a year of certification. The model, which controls for the endogeneity of unfair labor practice (ULP) charges, finds that a ULP charge was associated with a 30% smaller cumulative chance of reaching such a contract. ULP charges had less effect on the votes cast than on the decision to hold an election and the ability to reach a first contract. A sequential model such as this one could be extended to test between some competing theories about the determinants of union organizing.

Because regulation works alongside antitrust law to govern market structure and economic conduct in the United States, deregulatory cycles can create gaps in competition enforcement. Antitrust is sometimes portrayed as just another form of government intervention that a deregulatory administration should also diminish. This Feature argues that policy makers should resist that political logic. Instead, antitrust should become stronger as regulation becomes weaker. Antitrust as a countercyclical force to deregulation will most directly help to protect consumers from enforcement gaps that result as competition-related rules recede. But antitrust enforcement in deregulating markets can also help to demonstrate where antitrust can govern markets more effectively and efficiently than regulation; it can provide the federal courts with an opportunity to clarify recent Supreme Court decisions on the boundary between antitrust and regulation; and it can better inform ongoing policy debates about the effectiveness of antitrust by providing a more accurate view of what antitrust enforcement can accomplish with its existing legal and analytic framework. Not only is each of these benefits of countercyclical antitrust enforcement important in its own right, but together they can lead to better policy choices between antitrust and regulatory solutions as political cycles change over time.

Does racial diversity make forming a union harder? Case studies offer conflicting answers, and little large-scale research on the question exists. Most quantitative research on race and unionization has studied trends in membership rather than the outcome of specific organizing drives and has assumed that the main problem is mistrust between workers and unions, paying less attention, for example, to the role of employers. The author explores the role of racial and ethnic diversity in the outcomes of nearly 7,000 organizing drives launched between 1999 and 2008. By matching the National Labor Relations Board's information on union activity with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's surveys of large establishments, the author reconstructs the demographic composition of the work groups involved in each mobilization. The study finds that more diverse establishments are less likely to see successful organizing attempts. Little evidence is found, however, that this is because workers are less interested in voting for unions. Instead, the organizers of more diverse units are more likely to give up before such elections are held. Furthermore, this higher quit rate can be explained best by considering the other organizations involved in the organizing drive. In particular, employers are more likely to be charged with unfair labor practices when the unit in question is more racially diverse. This effect persists when the study controls for heterogeneity among industries, unions, and regions.

Two silent self-stabilizing asynchronous distributed algorithms are given for the leader election problem in a dynamic network with unique IDs. A leader is elected for each connected component of the network. A BFS DAG, rooted at the leader, is constructed in each component. The construction takes O(Diam) rounds, where Diam is the maximum diameter of any component. Both algorithms are self-stabilizing, silent, and work under the unfair daemon, but use one unbounded integer variable. Algorithm DLE selects an arbitrary process to be the leader of each component. Algorithm DLEND (Distributed Leader Election No Dithering) has the incumbency property and the no dithering property. If the configuration is legitimate and a topological fault occurs, each component will elect, if possible, an incumbent to be its leader, i.e., a process which was a leader before the fault. Furthermore, during this computation, no process will change its choice of leader more than once.

This article uses time-series data from 1900 to 2005 to explore the effects of rivalry between labor unions as a special case of inter-organizational competition. Holding constant economic and political factors that typically account for changes in union density, we investigate how competition from rival labor federations and from independent unions affect both union density and a measure for the density of the dominant federation (AFL/AFL-CIO), adjusted for membership changes from mergers and splits. We measure competition by the number of unions and the size of rivals. While much existing literature measures state regulation with categorical coding for specific periods, we measure the effect of state enforcement directly with counts of pro-labor and pro-management unfair labor practice cases adjudicated by the National Labor Relations Board. We assess the effect of left-wing political culture using the popular vote for socialist and communist candidates in presidential elections. Both the number of members in rival unions and the total number of rival unions positively impact the rate of change in overall union density and in AFL density. The size of independent unions has a negative impact on AFL/AFL-CIO density but no effect on overall union density. Unfair labor practices cases adjudicated for employers negatively affect union density but positively affect AFL/AFL-CIO density, while cases adjudicated for unions negatively affect AFL/AFL-CIO density.

One of the author's favorite Stephen Breyer opinions, emblematic of his sure touch as regards the fundamentals of administrative law, is his 1989 decision for the First Circuit in Shaw's Supermarkets Inc v. NLRB. Indeed, it -- rather than any Supreme Court opinion -- is the very first case presented in the chapter on \"Scope of Review of Administrative Action\" in the casebook on administrative law that he coedit. Judge Breyer cites and quotes many cases supporting the doctrine. But if you take his penultimate paragraph, speaking in his own voice, as stating the gist, the Board has to address its existing rulings because: Unless an agency either follows or consciously changes the rules developed in its precedent, those subject to the agency's authority cannot use its precedent as a guide for their conduct; nor will that precedent check arbitrary agency action.

\"10 When an individual seeks to improve terms and conditions of employment, the activity is concerted provided he/she intends to induce group activity or to act as a representative of at least one other employee.11 This intent that causes individual activity to qualify as \"concerted\" need not be expressly articulated, and discussions about terms and working conditions may qualify as \"concerted\" without expressly or clearly stating that the intent is to induce group action.12 For example, employees' discussion of a co-worker's discharge is concerted activity.13 As another example, concerted activity occurs when two truck drivers have a radio conversation about safety concerns.14 Under § 7, the \"mutual aid or protection\" element is satisfied when the concerted activities \"seek to improve the terms and conditions of employment or otherwise improve their lot as employees . . The evidence established that many employees who stepped through ceilings were not discharged. [...]the employer failed to sustain its burden, and the discharge was unlawful.