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This study seeks to carry out a comparative examination of (1962) by J. G. Ballard and (2017) by K. S. Robinson, two examples of dystopian climate fiction, from an ecocritical standpoint. Both the former, written in the 20 century, and the latter, written in the 21 century, speculate on the 22 century from parallel angles and get involved in unparalleled dialogues with the Anthropocene, which makes it possible to delve into both relatively old and fairly new modes of understanding of the Anthropocene via an ecocritical lens. Despite their parallel points of departures from the severity of ongoing alterations in most spheres of the planet on unprecedented levels, coupled with their parallel subjects of the extirpation of human supremacy in an inundated London and a half-inundated New York, respectively, the comparative eco-spotlight is aimed at the ways in which they submerge the deep-rooted anthropocentrism and bring to light their unparalleled speculations on what emerges when it is submerged. Such a deep dive into the close-knit dialogues of both with the complexities of the Anthropocene is oriented towards unearthing the tangled eco-nets springing from their similarly-formed cores but weaving disparately-based eco-futures.

This paper intends to make an important contribution to the studies of religious utopianism by considering religions as comprehensive utopian systems which have an ontological and a social utopian mode. It argues that the ontological mode/utopia is related to human finality and that its fantastical content, abstractness and ontological Othering undermine the transformative powers of left religious social utopianism, while it encourages pernicious social Othering in religious fundamentalism. The article has four sections. In Section 1, it clarifies the definition of utopia on which the paper relies and the reasons for this particular choice. Section 2 discusses the religious ontological utopia and religions as utopian systems and utopian programs. Section 3 utilises E. Bloch’s considerations about concrete and abstract utopias to explain the reasons for the incapacity of politically left orientated religious utopianism to function as a revolutionary force. Finally, the Section 4 discusses the way religious fundamentalism employs social Othering as a way of defending the universality of its ontological vision against competing religious and pseudo-religious universals.

Much educational utopianism revolves around the “real versus blueprint utopia” dichotomy and the prescriptive normativity that utopian education involves. In this paper, I suggest that the “real and blueprint” distinction should not be dichotomized and that a richer set of normativities, apart from prescription, should operate in educational utopias. Ethico-politically and educationally, it is crucial to have affirmative rather than incriminatory utopias, regardless of their being real or blueprint. To argue this out, first I introduce the concepts of incriminatory and affirmative utopianism. Next, I sketch the educational-theoretical setting and discuss the current reliance on the “real versus blueprint utopia” dichotomy. Then I use the conceptual tool of incriminatory utopianism to show that risks of totalitarianism threaten all visions (even liberal anti-utopian ones) and not only blueprint utopianism. Therefore, we need not dichotomize real and blueprint utopias and embrace the former unconditionally. I conclude with some illustrations of why utopian thought involves multiple normativities rather than prescriptivism alone.

[...] it is the time of time that has passed: this strange idea of a vast army moving forward, preceded by the most daring innovators and thinkers, followed by a mass of slower and heavier crowds, while the rearguard of the most archaic, the most primitive, the most reactionary people trails behind-just like the Navis, trying hopelessly to slow down the inevitable charge forward. Why do I wish to reuse the oversized genre of the manifesto to explore this shift from future to prospect? Because in spite of the abyss of time, there is a tenuous relation between the Communist and the Compositionist Manifesto.

We are told, by Machiavelli and others, that political philosophy must not be utopian. I am sure there is wisdom in this, but there is also the danger of a chilling effect. Unless we get very clear about what kind of theorizing is appropriately proscribed, there is the risk that a broader set of possible projects will go unpursued, for no good reason. I take up just one part of this question. My thesis is that moral theories of social justice, political authority, political legitimacy, and many other moral-political concepts are not shown to have any defect in virtue of the fact, if it is one, that the alleged requirements or preconditions of these things are not likely ever to be met. If a theory of social justice is offered, and it is objected, \"But you and I both know people will never do that,\" I believe the right response is (as a starter), \"I never said they would.\"

This article represents a study of one of the most distinctive, yet neglected, utopian visions of the late 1960s and early 1970s in America. It examines the Black Nationalist struggle of that decade as an expression of utopia with special reference to one of its leaders, Amiri Baraka. The article shows how Baraka’s Black Nationalist works express a prophecy of creating a new reality for Blacks in America. Baraka’s ideal society, his utopia, it is shown, is reached by “breaking the continuity of history,” that is, by a total separation from what he views as the “rotten and hellish” white American society. Black Americans should create, instead, an alternative Black society through what Ashcroft calls “the myth of return,” reimaging the Black man’s glorious pre-slavery African past, that is, going back to his origins—the home of his ancestors (Africa). The article argues the reconstruction of a number of Eastern/African elements (ancient Africa, its traditions, culture, heritage, and language) that Baraka describes as “keys to a new black world.” The article concludes with a discussion of the reasons behind the collapse of Baraka’s Black Nationalist utopian project in 1974. As Baraka started to move toward the left due to the influence of Mao, Nkrumah, and Cabral in the mid-1970s, he realized the clash between his utopian ideals (equality, freedom, justice, self-determination...etc.) and the unidealistic foundation of his utopia. This new Barakan Socialist utopian vision remains untouched and is thus recommended for a profound examination in the future.

There is widespread anxiety about human rights ‘inflation’: positing too many human rights, it is said, will lead to their devaluation. This article seeks to disentangle the inflation objection from other concerns about rights expansionism and to critically assess it. It considers the scope and implications of the inflation objection by reference to several issues – e.g., which modes of human rights proliferation it covers and which restrictions follow from it – and argues that it is characterized by a formal emptiness since it lacks any specific criteria to indicate which human rights lead to inflation and which do not. The formal emptiness of the inflation objection does not, however, mean that it is politically neutral, for despite its inability to generate closure it does generate a sense of closure by drawing strict boundaries around the corpus of ‘proper’ human rights. This sense of closure, the article argues, entrenches currently dominant (neo)liberal understandings of human rights while generating suspicion of claims to far-reaching social transformation. In light of this, an alternative to the anti-inflation mindset is suggested: a mindset of wonder, which understands human rights claims outside of dominant understandings not as a threat, but as an opportunity to question the status quo.

This article seeks to reimagine the relationship between sustainability and financial performance in sustainable investing. Employing a utopian lens, I show how sustainability is constantly negotiated in a process of imagining and actualizing sustainable investing. For this purpose, I explore a fin-tech start-up’s endeavors to democratize sustainable investing through digitalization. Empirically, this article contributes a detailed account of the organizational process of––and the complexities involved in––establishing a sustainable investment organization, to this end focusing on the relationship between sustainability and financial performance. The article further provides a novel theoretical perspective (utopianism) on sustainable investing, one offering a processual approach that uses both external and internal factors in its understanding of the practice. I conclude that a utopian mindset of possibility paves the way for an experimentational attitude and future-oriented thinking. Such a mindset could generate new approaches to the relationship between sustainability and financial performance, thus shining a light on the new and innovative solutions needed to establish financial markets oriented to the common good.

Human rights developed in response to specific violations of human dignity, and can therefore be conceived as specifications of human dignity, their moral source. This internal relationship explains the moral content and moreover the distinguishing feature of human rights: they are designed for an effective implementation of the core moral values of an egalitarian universalism in terms of coercive law. This essay is an attempt to explain this moral-legal Janus face of human rights through the mediating role of the concept of human dignity. This concept is due to a remarkable generalization of the particularistic meanings of those \"dignities\" that once were attached to specific honorific functions and memberships. In spite of its abstract meaning, \"human dignity\" still retains from its particularistic precursor concepts the connotation of depending on the social recognition of a status—in this case, the status of democratic citizenship. Only membership in a constitutional political community can protect, by granting equal rights, the equal human dignity of everybody.