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Second-degree price discrimination, that is, vertical differentiation, is widely practiced by firms selling physical goods to consumers with heterogeneous valuations. This strategy leads to market segmentation and has been shown to be optimal by many researchers. On the other hand, researchers have also demonstrated, under certain restrictive conditions, that vertical differentiation may not be optimal for information goods. We analyze vertical differentiation for a monopolist, continuing the practice of modeling consumer valuation as a linear function of product quality and consumer type but generalizing assumptions about marginal costs and consumer distributions. We show that the firm's optimal product line depends on the benefit-to-cost ratio of qualities in the choice vector. We find that a vertical differentiation strategy is not optimal when the highest quality product has the best benefitto-cost ratio. Many information goods satisfy this property.

In a two-period vertical duopoly, we examine how behavior-based price discrimination (BPD) affects the firms’ endogenous quality differentiation and profits. The firms’ relative production efficiency , defined as the ratio between their unit cost difference and quality difference, plays a crucial role. With exogenous product qualities, BPD always decreases the profits of the more efficient firm, but increases those of the sufficiently less efficient firm. Anticipating its period 2 disadvantage in price discrimination, the less efficient firm competes more vigorously and also gains more in period 1 than its competitor. For the sufficiently less efficient firm, its period 1 gain dominates its period 2 loss, and its total profits increase. With endogenous quality choices, BPD does not alter the low-end quality (at the lower bound of the quality space), but increases the high-end quality, enlarging quality differentiation. This is because under BPD, each firm’s profit gain decreases (or its profit loss increases) in its relative production efficiency. Interestingly, BPD may increase both firms’ profits under endogenous quality differentiation. Aside from causing mismatch between consumers and products, we further show that BPD lowers social welfare through inducing excessive quality differentiation. This paper was accepted by J. Miguel Villas-Boas, marketing .

[Display omitted] •We study coupon strategy in competition between brand name and generic products.•We find both horizontal and vertical differentiation affect coupon strategies.•With large HD, brand name products get a large manufacturer coupon.•With large VD, manufacturer coupon are high and retailer brand name coupons low.•Private label coupon is only impacted by difference in consumer willingness to pay. This paper explores the couponing strategies when a national brand competes with a store brand by discussing three different kinds of coupons: manufacturers’ coupons, retailers’ national brand coupons, and retailers’ private label coupons. We show that the positioning of the private label product in terms of quality and feature differentiation from the national brand play an important role in determining the face value of the manufacturer's coupon and retailer's national brand coupon. In particular, a larger degree of feature differentiation drives the manufacturer to increase its coupon value, and the retailer responds by decreasing the value of its own coupon for the brand name product. In contrast, with an increase in private label quality, the couponing strategies taken by the manufacturer and the retailer depend on which segment of consumers is in the market for the private label product. Additionally, the retailer's private label coupon value is only impacted by the difference in consumers’ willingness to pay but not by private label positioning. Empirical results on the effect of feature differentiation on national brand and private label coupon values are consistent with our theoretical predictions.

We analyze trading speed and fragmentation in asset markets. In our model, trading venues make technological investments and compete for investors who choose where and how much to trade. Faster venues charge higher fees and attract speed-sensitive investors. Competition among venues increases investor participation, trading volume, and allocative efficiency, but entry and fragmentation can be excessive, and speeds are generically inefficient. Regulations that protect transaction prices (e.g., Securities and Exchange Commission trade-through rule) lead to greater fragmentation. Our model sheds light on the experience of European and U.S. markets since the implementation of Markets in Financial Instruments Directive and Regulation National Markets System.

We study the effect of user privacy concerns on competition between online advertising platforms. Online platforms attract advertisers by offering capabilities to reach audiences likely to be receptive to their ads in a timely and accurate manner. However, the collection and processing of user information required for targeting of ads may lead to privacy concerns. We model the competition between two platforms as a two-stage game where platforms announce their targeting capabilities in the first stage and advertising fees in the second stage. The presence of heterogeneity in the user and the advertiser populations with respect to their preferences for targeting leads to differentiation between platforms. While one platform offers the minimum level of targeting feasible, the other platform offers a strictly higher level of targeting. The extent of differentiation in targeting levels depends on the intensity of competition between the platforms on the user side. When competition on the user side is relatively low, the extent of differentiation is higher. Such competition for users may decline, when users are less concerned about loss of privacy or when they choose to double home. Higher targeting differentiation allows platforms to charge higher advertising fees and earn higher profits. We also consider the case where platforms can reduce the privacy concerns of users by offering them greater control over their personal information. We demonstrate that awarding user control leads to reduced targeting differentiation between platforms and lower advertising fees. Last, we derive the equilibrium targeting levels for platforms that use a subscription-based business model instead of an advertising-based business model. The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/isre.2017.0730 .

We consider dynamic pricing competition between two firms offering vertically differentiated products to strategic customers who are intertemporal utility maximizers. We show that price skimming arises as the unique pure-strategy Markov perfect equilibrium in the game under a simple condition. Our results highlight the asymmetric effect of strategic customer behavior on quality-differentiated firms. Even though the profit of either firm decreases as customers become more strategic, the low-quality firm suffers substantially more than the high-quality firm. Furthermore, we show that unilateral commitment to static pricing by either firm generally improves profits of both firms. Interestingly, both firms enjoy higher profit lifts when the high-quality firm commits rather than when the low-quality firm commits. This paper was accepted by Yossi Aviv, operations management.

In this paper, we untangle the searchable and experiential dimensions of quality responses to entry by counterfeiters in emerging markets with weak intellectual property rights. Our theoretical framework analyzes market equilibria under competition from counterfeiting as well as under monopoly branding. A key theoretical prediction is that emerging markets can be self-corrective with respect to counterfeiting issues in the following sense: First, counterfeiters can earn positive profits by pooling with authentic brands only when consumers have good faith in the market (i.e., they believe there is low probability that any product is a counterfeit). When the proportion of counterfeits in the market exceeds a cutoff value, brands invest in self-differentiation from the competitive-fringe counterfeiters. Second, to attain a separating equilibrium with counterfeiters, branded incumbents upgrade the searchable quality (e.g., appearance) of their products more and improve the experiential quality (e.g., functionality) less compared with monopoly equilibrium. However, in the pooling equilibrium with sporadic counterfeits, authentic firms instead may invest in experiential quality to attract more of the expert consumers who are well versed in quality. This prediction uncovers the nature of product differentiation in the searchable dimension and helps with analyzing real-world innovation strategies employed by authentic firms in response to entries by counterfeit entities. In addition, welfare analysis hints at a nonlinear relationship between social welfare and intellectual property enforcement.

While the forests on Mount Taishan are predominantly man-made, there is a notable vertical variation in vegetation. This study employs the method of cloud model, quantifying uncertainty (fuzziness and randomness) of things. Utilizing digital elevation model (DEM) and vegetation distribution data, we constructed elevation cloud models for Mount Taishan’s deciduous broad-leaved, temperate coniferous, and mixed coniferous-broadleaved forests. Using three numerical features of the cloud model—Expectation (EX), Entropy (EN), and Hyper-entropy (HE)—we quantitatively analyzed the macro regularity and local heterogeneity of Mount Taishan’s forests vertical distribution from the perspective of uncertainty theory. The results indicate: (1) The EX of the core zone elevation of deciduous broad-leaved forest is 716.65 m, temperate coniferous forest is 1053.51 m, and mixed coniferous-broadleaved forest is 1384.09 m. The variation range of the core zone distribution height is smaller in the mixed coniferous-broadleaved forest (EN: 53.74 m) compared to deciduous broad-leaved forest (EN: 99.63 m) and temperate coniferous forest (EN: 121.70 m). (2) The fuzziness and randomness of the distribution height of the lower extension zones of deciduous broad-leaved forest and temperate coniferous forest (EN: 75.15 m, 184.56 m; HE: 24.09 m, 63.54 m) are greater than those of the upper extension zones (EN: 44.75 m, 42.49 m; HE: 14.48 m, 13.23 m). (3) The distribution fuzziness and randomness within temperate coniferous forests exceed those of deciduous broad-leaved forests. Within the core zones, the uncertainty regarding the vertical distribution of vegetation across different aspects remains consistent, which retains the characteristic of man-made forests. However, in transition areas, there is significant disparity, reflecting the adaptive relationship between vegetation and its environment to some extent. In the upper and lower extension zones of deciduous broad-leaved forests, the EX values for the vertical distribution height of mixed coniferous and broad-leaved forests differ significantly from those of deciduous broad-leaved forests (the difference is 22.82–39.15 m), yet closely resemble those of temperate coniferous forests (the difference is 4.79–7.94 m). This suggests a trend wherein deciduous broad-leaved tree species exhibit a proclivity to encroach upon coniferous forest habitats. The elevation cloud model of vertical vegetation zones provides a novel perspective and method for the detailed analysis of Mount Taishan’s vegetation vertical differentiation.

Empirical investigation of the quality interpretation of the Melitz (2003) model of firm heterogeneity and trade has been limited by the lack of direct data on quality. This paper matches firm-level export data with expert assessments of the quality of champagne producers to estimate the key parameters of that model. Quality monotonically increases firm-level prices, the probability of market entry, and export values. The estimated model—which calibrates the relative importance of firm-level quality and idiosyncratic demand—accurately predicts the average quality exported to each country. Simulations show that the data reject the polar alternatives where outcomes are based entirely on either quality or randomness.

Purpose The purpose of this study is to analyze the problem of optimal product line design in marketing channels where consumers are heterogeneous in both horizontal and vertical dimensions. Design/methodology/approach This paper develops a model to evaluate when it is preferable for a firm to extend the product line in a vertical or horizontal direction. Consumers are modeled as being vertically heterogeneous with respect to their valuation of quality and horizontally heterogeneous with respect to their preference on the esthetic component of the product. These model characteristics allow us to consider a broader set of product line extension strategies. By considering both a vertically integrated channel and a decentralized channel, this study investigates how channel structure influences optimal product line design. The problem with supplemental numerical analyses is mathematically analyzed. Findings The analysis shows that a horizontal product line extension strategy that offers the customized product can be used as an alternative to a vertical product line extension strategy. If the fixed cost is not too high, offering the customized product with low quality may be preferred to the quality-based segmentation strategy. Furthermore, the analysis shows that the channel structure is influential as the preference for the horizontal product line extension strategy is more pronounced in the decentralized channel than in the centralized channel. Research limitations/implications The analysis presented in this paper is limited by the consideration of full market coverage. Further research is needed to see how the results can be generalized to the case with partial market coverage. Practical implications The analysis suggests that a firm may consider product customization as part of its product line strategy. Information regarding market characteristics and channel structure is important when deciding on the optimal product line design. Originality/value The model reflects a more realistic marketing strategy and channel structure than previous studies that typically consider product line extension in only one direction and focus on the centralized distribution channel. Combining the standard product line extension and customization strategies also represents an important contribution to the literature. These extensions produce interesting new results and insights into a firm’s optimal product line design strategy.