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In an attempt to reverse declining rates of voter participation, governments around the world are turning to electronic voting to improve the efficiency of vote counts, and increase the accessibility and equity of the voting process for electors who may face additional barriers. The Covid-19 pandemic has intensified this trend. Voting Online focuses on Canada, where the technology has been widely embraced by municipal governments with one of the highest rates of use in the world. In the age of cyber elections, Canada is the only country where governments offer fully remote electronic elections and where traditional paper voting is eliminated for entire electorates. Municipalities are the laboratories of electoral modernization when it comes to digital voting reform. We know conspicuously little about the effects of these changes, particularly the elimination of paper ballots. Relying on surveys of voters, non-voters, and candidates in twenty Ontario cities, and a survey of administrators across the province of Ontario, Voting Online provides a holistic view of electronic elections unavailable anywhere else.

Why do people vote? We design a field experiment to estimate a model of voting \"because others will ask\". The expectation of being asked motivates turnout if individuals derive pride from telling others that they voted, or feel shame from admitting that they did not vote, provided that lying is costly. In a door-to-door survey about election turnout, we experimentally vary (1) the informational content and use of a flyer pre-announcing the survey, (2) the duration and payment for the survey, and (3) the incentives to lie about past voting. The experimental results indicate significant social image concerns. For the 2010 Congressional election, we estimate a value of voting \"to tell others\" of about $15, contributing 2 percentage points to turnout. Finally, we evaluate a get-out-the-vote intervention in which we tell potential voters that we will ask if they voted.

While vote-buying is common, little is known about how politicians determine who to target. We argue that vote-buying can be sustained by an internalized norm of reciprocity. Receiving money engenders feelings of obligation. Combining survey data on vote-buying with an experiment-based measure of reciprocity, we show that politicians target reciprocal individuals. Overall, our findings highlight the importance of social preferences in determining political behavior.

The Single Transferable Vote, or STV, is often seen in very positive terms by electoral reformers, yet relatively little is known about its actual workings beyond one or two specific settings. This book gathers leading experts on STV from around the world to discuss the examples they know best, and represents the first systematic cross-national study of STV. Furthermore, the contributors collectively build an understanding of electoral systems as institutions embedded within a wider social and political context, and begins to explain the gap between analytical models and the actual practice of elections in Australia, Ireland, and Malta. Rather than seeing electoral institutions in purely mechanical terms, the collection of essays in this volume shows that the effects of electoral system may be contingent rather than automatic. On the basis of solid empirical evidence, the volume argues that the same political system can, in fact, have quite different effects under different conditions. Contributors to the volume are Shaun Bowler, David Farrell, Michael Gallagher, Bernard Grofman, Wolfgang Hirczy, Colin Hughes, J. Paul Johnston, Michael Laver, Malcom Mackerras, Michael Maley, Michael Marsh, Ian McAllister, and Ben Reilly. Shaun Bowler is Professor of Political Science, University of California, Riverside. Bernard Grofman is Professor of Political Science, University of California, Irvine.

We examine the determinants and consequences of voting outcomes in uncontested director elections. Exploiting a unique hand-collected data set of the rationale behind proxy advisors’ recommendations—the primary driver of voting outcomes—we document the director and board characteristics on which voting shareholders focus (as well as those that they neglect), their evolution over time, and their relative importance. Absent a negative recommendation, high votes withheld are infrequent, highlighting the agenda-setting role of proxy advisors. While high votes withheld rarely result in director turnover, our analyses show that firms often respond to an adverse vote by explicitly addressing the underlying concern. Overall, it appears that shareholders use their votes in uncontested director elections to get directors to address specific problems, rather than to vote them onto or off of the board, but they do so only on matters highlighted by the proxy advisors. The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2017.2760 . This paper was accepted by Suraj Srinivasan, accounting.

We demonstrate the importance of politician social networks for electoral outcomes. Using large-scale data on family networks from over 20 million individuals in 15,000 villages in the Philippines, we show that candidates for public office are disproportionately drawn from more central families and family network centrality contributes to higher vote shares during the elections. Consistent with our theory of political intermediation, we present evidence that family network centrality facilitates relationships of political exchange. Moreover, we show that family networks exercise an effect independent of wealth, historical elite status, or previous electoral success.

Although many studies of clientelism focus exclusively on vote buying, political machines often employ diverse portfolios of strategies. We provide a theoretical framework and formal model to explain how and why machines mix four clientelist strategies during elections: vote buying, turnout buying, abstention buying, and double persuasion. Machines tailor their portfolios to the political preferences and voting costs of the electorate. They also adapt their mix to at least five contextual factors: compulsory voting, ballot secrecy, political salience, machine support, and political polarization. Our analysis yields numerous insights, such as why the introduction of compulsory voting may increase vote buying, and why enhanced ballot secrecy may increase turnout buying and abstention buying. Evidence from various countries is consistent with our predictions and suggests the need for empirical studies to pay closer attention to the ways in which machines combine clientelist strategies.

Growing conventional wisdom holds that a chief driver of the populist vote is economic insecurity. I contend that this view overstates the role of economic insecurity as an explanation in several ways. First, it conflates the significance of economic insecurity in influencing the election outcome on the margin with its significance in explaining the overall populist vote. Empirical findings indicate that the share of populist support explained by economic insecurity is modest. Second, recent evidence indicates that voters' concern with immigration—a key issue for many populist parties—is only marginally shaped by its real or perceived repercussions on their economic standing. Third, economics-centric accounts of populism treat voters' cultural concerns as largely a by-product of experiencing adverse economic change. This approach underplays the reverse process, whereby disaffection from social and cultural change drives both economic discontent and support for populism.

This paper builds on the literature about mixed-member electoral systems, exploring how ballot design interacts with voter behavior. We present a theoretical model for vote decision-making in mixed-member systems that takes into account the interaction between both tiers. The model is grounded in a spatial model for vote decision-making under risk and inspired by the logic of portfolio diversification under risk. Accordingly, voters are modeled as risk-averse decision-makers who may prefer diversified vote packages (i.e. split-ticket) when party and candidate uncertainties are highly correlated. The risk diversification strategy abates when voters cast their votes sequentially. This finding provides a potential explanation for the impact of vote sequence in mixed-member systems, an under-investigated topic in the literature. It thus links the established literature on mixed-member systems with scholarship on ballot design and its effects. Additionally, the paper's analysis explores the implications of combining the proposed model with the well-established wasted vote model.

This article sheds new light on the long-run evolution of political cleavages in 21 Western democracies. We exploit a new database on the socioeconomic determinants of the vote, covering more than 300 elections held between 1948 and 2020. In the 1950s and 1960s, the vote for social democratic, socialist, and affiliated parties was associated with lower-educated and low-income voters. It has gradually become associated with higher-educated voters, giving rise in the 2010s to a disconnection between the effects of income and education on the vote: higher-educated voters now vote for the \"left,\" while high-income voters continue to vote for the \"right.\" This transition has been accelerated by the rise of green and anti-immigration movements, whose distinctive feature is to concentrate the votes of the higher-educated and lower-educated electorates. Combining our database with historical data on political parties' programs, we provide evidence that the reversal of the education cleavage is strongly linked to the emergence of a new \"sociocultural\" axis of political conflict.