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In this paper, I offer a solution to the Capacity/Equality Puzzle. The puzzle holds that an account of the franchise may adequately capture at most two of the following: (1) a political equality-based account of the franchise, (2) a capacity-based account of disenfranchising children, and (3) universal adult enfranchisement. To resolve the puzzle, I provide a complex liberal egalitarian justification of a moral to disenfranchise children. I show that disenfranchising children is permitted by both the proper political liberal and the proper political egalitarian understandings of the relationship between cognitive capacity and the franchise. Further, I argue, disenfranchising children is required by a minimalistic, procedural principle of collective competence in political decision-making. At the same time, I show that political equality requires the enfranchisement of all adults, regardless of cognitive capacities, and that the collective competence principle does not ground adult disenfranchisement. This justifies the progressive legal trend that holds the capacity-based disenfranchisement of adults to be incompatible with liberal democratic principles.

Background: Nowadays, controversy exists regarding the stage of cognitive decline and/or dementia where voting capacity is diminished. Aim: To evaluate whether general cognitive status in advancing age predicts voting capacity in its specific aspects. Methods: The study sample comprised 391 people: 88 cognitively healthy older adults (CH), 150 people with Mild Cognitive Impairment (MCI), and 153 people with Alzheimer’s disease dementia (ADD). The assessment included CAT-V for the voting capacity and Mini Mental State Examination (MMSE) for general cognitive ability. ANOVAs and ROC curves were the tools of statistical analysis towards (a) indicating under which MMSE rate participants are incapable of voting and (b) whether the CAT-V total score can discriminate people with dementia (PwADD) from people without dementia (PwtD). Results: Out of the six CAT-V questions, one question was associated with a low MMSE cutoff score (19.50), having excellent sensitivity (92.5%) and specificity (77.20%), whilst the other five questions presented a higher MMSE cutoff score, with a good sensitivity (78.4% to 87.6%) and specificity (75.3% to 81.7%), indicating that voting difficulties are associated with cognitive status. Secondarily, the total CAT-V score discriminates PwADD from PwtD of 51–65 years (sensitivity 93.2%/specificity 100%—excellent), PwADD from PwtD of 66–75 years (sensitivity 73.3%/specificity 97.1%—good), PwADD from PwtD of 76–85 years (sensitivity 92.2%/specificity 64.7%—good), whilst for 86–95 years, a cutoff of 9.5 resulted in perfect sensitivity and specificity (100%). Conclusion: According to MMSE, PwADD have no full voting competence, whilst PwtD seem to have intact voting capacity. The calculated cut-off scores indicate that only people who score more than 28 points on the MMSE have voting capacity.

The homes of firm owners are an important source of finance for ongoing businesses. We use UK microdata to show that a £1 increase in the value of the homes of a firm’s directors increases the firm’s investment by £0.03. This effect is concentrated among firms whose directors’ homes are valuable relative to the firm’s assets, that are financially constrained, and that have directors who are personally highly levered. An aggregation exercise shows that directors’ homes are as important as corporate property for collateral driven fluctuations in aggregate investment demand.

We document cycles in corporate investment corresponding with the timing of national elections around the world. During election years, firms reduce investment expenditures by an average of 4.8% relative to nonelection years, controlling for growth opportunities and economic conditions. The magnitude of the investment cycles varies with different country and election characteristics. We investigate several potential explanations and find evidence supporting the hypothesis that political uncertainty leads firms to reduce investment expenditures until the electoral uncertainty is resolved. These findings suggest that political uncertainty is an important channel through which the political process affects real economic outcomes.

We present evidence suggesting that chief executive officer (CEO) connections facilitate investments in corporate innovation. We find that firms with better-connected CEOs invest more in research and development and receive more and higher quality patents. Further tests suggest that this effect stems from two characteristics of personal networks that alleviate CEO risk aversion in investment decisions. First, personal connections increase the CEO’s access to relevant network information, which encourages innovation by helping to identify, evaluate, and exploit innovative ideas. Second, personal connections provide the CEO with labor market insurance that facilitates investments in risky innovation by mitigating the career concerns inherent in such investments.

The literature on managerial style posits a linear relation between a chief executive officer's (CEOs) past experiences and firm risk. We show that there is a nonmonotonic relation between the intensity of CEOs' early-life exposure to fatal disasters and corporate risk-taking. CEOs who experience fatal disasters without extremely negative consequences lead firms that behave more aggressively, whereas CEOs who witness the extreme downside of disasters behave more conservatively. These patterns manifest across various corporate policies including leverage, cash holdings, and acquisition activity. Ultimately, the link between CEOs' disaster experience and corporate policies has real economic consequences on firm riskiness and cost of capital.

This article considers the recent literature on firm markups in light of both new and classic work in the field of industrial organization. We detail the shortcomings of papers that rely on discredited approaches from the \"structure-conduct-performance\" literature. In contrast, papers based on production function estimation have made useful progress in measuring broad trends in markups. However, industries are so heterogeneous that careful industry-specific studies are also required, and sorely needed. Examples of such studies illustrate differing explanations for rising markups, including endogenous increases in fixed costs associated with lower marginal costs. In some industries there is evidence of price increases driven by mergers. To fully understand markups, we must eventually recover the key economic primitives of demand, marginal cost, and fixed and sunk costs. We end by discussing the various aspects of antitrust enforcement that may be of increasing importance regardless of the cause of increased markups.

In this paper, we explore the way the evolution of entrepreneurial ecosystems is shaped by different governance designs. We propose a theoretical framework in which we discuss what type of governance design would best fit the needs of an entrepreneurial ecosystem throughout its evolution. We also provide argumentations concerning the mechanisms that may explain the evolution through the different governance configurations. The conceptualization of a new framework has allowed us to specify a set of propositions, which we have tested on one single empirical setting, represented by Turin’s entrepreneurial ecosystem. The paper introduces some important policy implications. It highlights the need for a more complex relational form of governance for the growth of an entrepreneurial ecosystem, which could be obtained by means of a systemic and participative approach rooted in shared cooperative norms and informal routines.

We track the employment history of over 9,000 managers to study the effects of professional experiences on corporate policies. Our identification strategy exploits exogenous CEO turnovers and employment in other firms and in non-CEO roles. Firms run by CEOs who experienced distress have less debt, save more cash, and invest less than other firms, with stronger effects in poorly governed firms. Experience has a stronger influence when it is more recent or occurs during salient periods in a manager's career. We find similar effects for CFOs. The results suggest that policies vary with managers' experiences and throughout managers' careers.

We analyse the causal impact of competition on managerial quality and hospital performance. To address the endogeneity of market structure we analyse the English public hospital sector where entry and exit are controlled by the central government. Because closing hospitals in areas where the governing party is expecting a tight election race (\"marginals\") is rare due to the fear of electoral defeat, we can use political marginality as an instrumental variable for the number of hospitals in a geographical area. We find that higher competition results in higher management quality, measured using a new survey tool, and improved hospital performance. Adding a rival hospital increases management quality by 0.4 standard deviations and increases survival rates from emergency heart attacks by 9.7%. We confirm the robustness of our IV strategy to \"hidden policies\" that could be used in marginal districts to improve hospital management and to changes in capacity that may follow from hospital closure.