eBook

Barriers to Bioweapons

Ben Ouagrham-Gormley, Sonia

2015,2014

Overview

[ Barriers to Bioweapons ] is a must-read for nonproliferation experts and should be a standard text for understanding biological weapons development for some time to come. ―David W. Kearn, Perspectives on Politics In both the popular imagination and among lawmakers and national security experts, there exists the belief that with sufficient motivation and material resources, states or terrorist groups can produce bioweapons easily, cheaply, and successfully. In Barriers to Bioweapons , Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley challenges this perception by showing that bioweapons development is a difficult, protracted, and expensive endeavor, rarely achieving the expected results whatever the magnitude of investment. Her findings are based on extensive interviews she conducted with former U.S. and Soviet-era bioweapons scientists and on careful analysis of archival data and other historical documents related to various state and terrorist bioweapons programs. Bioweapons development relies on living organisms that are sensitive to their environment and handling conditions, and therefore behave unpredictably. These features place a greater premium on specialized knowledge. Ben Ouagrham-Gormley posits that lack of access to such intellectual capital constitutes the greatest barrier to the making of bioweapons. She integrates theories drawn from economics, the sociology of science, organization, and management with her empirical research. The resulting theoretical framework rests on the idea that the pace and success of a bioweapons development program can be measured by its ability to ensure the creation and transfer of scientific and technical knowledge. The specific organizational, managerial, social, political, and economic conditions necessary for success are difficult to achieve, particularly in covert programs where the need to prevent detection imposes managerial and organizational conditions that conflict with knowledge production. In both the popular imagination and among lawmakers and national security experts, there exists the belief that with sufficient motivation and material resources, states or terrorist groups can produce bioweapons easily, cheaply, and successfully. In Barriers to Bioweapons , Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley challenges this perception by showing that bioweapons development is a difficult, protracted, and expensive endeavor, rarely achieving the expected results whatever the magnitude of investment. Her findings are based on extensive interviews she conducted with former U.S. and Soviet-era bioweapons scientists and on careful analysis of archival data and other historical documents related to various state and terrorist bioweapons programs.Bioweapons development relies on living organisms that are sensitive to their environment and handling conditions, and therefore behave unpredictably. These features place a greater premium on specialized knowledge. Ben Ouagrham-Gormley posits that lack of access to such intellectual capital constitutes the greatest barrier to the making of bioweapons. She integrates theories drawn from economics, the sociology of science, organization, and management with her empirical research. The resulting theoretical framework rests on the idea that the pace and success of a bioweapons development program can be measured by its ability to ensure the creation and transfer of scientific and technical knowledge. The specific organizational, managerial, social, political, and economic conditions necessary for success are difficult to achieve, particularly in covert programs where the need to prevent detection imposes managerial and organizational conditions that conflict with knowledge production.

• Publisher: Cornell University Press
• Subject: american biological arms control / american bioweapons program / american war history / Arms Control / Arms control agreements / Arms control policy / Arms race / biodefense / biodefense research / Biological & Chemical Warfare / Biological agents / Biological arms control / Biological arms control -- Former Soviet republics / Biological arms control -- United States / Biological defense strategies / Biological disarmament / biological threats / biological warfare / biological warfare defense / biological warfare history / biological warfare military studies / biological warfare policy / biological warfare strategy / biological warfare studies / biological weapons / bioterrorism / bioweapon policy / bioweapon regulations / bioweaponry / bioweapons / bioweapons development / bioweapons issues / bioweapons proliferation / bioweapons research / bioweapons scientists / chemical warfare / Former Soviet republics / global studies / HISTORY / HISTORY / Military / Biological & Chemical Warfare / international affairs / international bioweapons / international regulations / International Relations / international security / international studies / Military / MILITARY HISTORY / Military Science / Military Studies / national security / national security studies / nonproliferation / Nonproliferation Studies / Peace & Conflict Studies / POLITICAL SCIENCE / POLITICAL SCIENCE / International Relations / Arms Control / POLITICAL SCIENCE / World / Russian & Former Soviet Union / political science issues / POLITICAL SCIENCE / Security (National & International) / preventing bioweapons / preventing bioweapons policy / public policy / Security (National & International) / Security Studies / Slavic Studies / soviet biological arms control / soviet bioweapons program / soviet bioweapons program history / soviet union history / Soviet-era bioweapons scientists / United States / Weapons Development
• ISBN: 9780801452888, 0801452880, 9780801471933, 0801471931