Asset Details
MbrlCatalogueTitleDetail
Do you wish to reserve the book?
Robust double auction mechanisms
by
Yoon, Kiho
in
Robustness
2022
Hey, we have placed the reservation for you!
By the way, why not check out events that you can attend while you pick your title.
You are currently in the queue to collect this book. You will be notified once it is your turn to collect the book.
Oops! Something went wrong.
Looks like we were not able to place the reservation. Kindly try again later.
Do you wish to request the book?
Robust double auction mechanisms
by
Yoon, Kiho
in
Robustness
2022
Please be aware that the book you have requested cannot be checked out. If you would like to checkout this book, you can reserve another copy
We have requested the book for you!
Your request is successful and it will be processed during the Library working hours. Please check the status of your request in My Requests.
Oops! Something went wrong.
Looks like we were not able to place your request. Kindly try again later.
Paper
Robust double auction mechanisms
2022
Request now
and choose the collection method
Overview
We study the robust double auction mechanisms, that is, the double auction mechanisms that satisfy dominant strategy incentive compatibility, ex-post individual rationality and ex-post budget balance. We first establish that the price in any robust mechanism does not depend on the valuations of the trading players. We next establish that, with a non-bossiness assumption, the price in any robust mechanism does not depend on players' valuations at all, whether trading or non-trading. Our main result is the characterization result that, with a non-bossy assumption along with other assumptions on the properties of the mechanism, the generalized posted mechanism in which a constant price is posted for each possible set of traders is the only robust double auction mechanism. We also show that, even without the non-bossiness assumption, it is quite difficult to find a reasonable robust double auction mechanism other than the generalized posted price mechanism.
Publisher
Cornell University Library, arXiv.org
Subject
MBRLCatalogueRelatedBooks
Related Items
Related Items
We currently cannot retrieve any items related to this title. Kindly check back at a later time.
This website uses cookies to ensure you get the best experience on our website.