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Threat Equilibria and Fair Settlements in Cooperative Games
by
Myerson, Roger B
in
Axioms
/ Cooperation
/ Cooperative games
/ Economic theory
/ Final settlements
/ Game theory
/ Games
/ games in normal form
/ Mathematical analysis
/ Mathematical functions
/ Mathematical models
/ Mathematical theorems
/ Nash equilibrium
/ Operations research
/ partition function games
/ Return on investment
/ settlement functions
/ Shapley value
/ Threats
/ Utility functions
1978
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Threat Equilibria and Fair Settlements in Cooperative Games
by
Myerson, Roger B
in
Axioms
/ Cooperation
/ Cooperative games
/ Economic theory
/ Final settlements
/ Game theory
/ Games
/ games in normal form
/ Mathematical analysis
/ Mathematical functions
/ Mathematical models
/ Mathematical theorems
/ Nash equilibrium
/ Operations research
/ partition function games
/ Return on investment
/ settlement functions
/ Shapley value
/ Threats
/ Utility functions
1978
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Do you wish to request the book?
Threat Equilibria and Fair Settlements in Cooperative Games
by
Myerson, Roger B
in
Axioms
/ Cooperation
/ Cooperative games
/ Economic theory
/ Final settlements
/ Game theory
/ Games
/ games in normal form
/ Mathematical analysis
/ Mathematical functions
/ Mathematical models
/ Mathematical theorems
/ Nash equilibrium
/ Operations research
/ partition function games
/ Return on investment
/ settlement functions
/ Shapley value
/ Threats
/ Utility functions
1978
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Threat Equilibria and Fair Settlements in Cooperative Games
Journal Article
Threat Equilibria and Fair Settlements in Cooperative Games
1978
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Overview
The role of threats is studied in cooperative normal form games. A threats-game is constructed, in which every set of players selects a joint threat strategy and then a settlement function determines the final outcome. Threat equilibria and cooperative solutions are defined for any settlement function. Two axioms are introduced which determine a unique settlement function for games with transferable utility. This settlement function is closely related to the Shapley value, and has attractive Pareto-optimality and individual-rationality properties. A simple oligopoly problem is studied to illustrate these ideas.
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