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III—On Principled Compromise
by
Murphy, Colleen
in
Compromise (Ethics)
/ Criticism and interpretation
/ Morality
/ Murphy, Colleen (American philosopher)
/ Philosophers
/ Speeches, lectures and essays
/ Transitional justice
2020
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III—On Principled Compromise
by
Murphy, Colleen
in
Compromise (Ethics)
/ Criticism and interpretation
/ Morality
/ Murphy, Colleen (American philosopher)
/ Philosophers
/ Speeches, lectures and essays
/ Transitional justice
2020
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Journal Article
III—On Principled Compromise
2020
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Overview
Processes of transitional justice (for instance, amnesty, truth commissions, reparations, trials) deal with large-scale wrongdoing committed during extended periods of conflict or repression. This paper discusses three common moral objections to processes of transitional justice, which I label shaking hands with the devil, selling victims short, and entrenching the status quo. Given the scale of wrongdoing and the context in which transitional justice processes are adopted, compromise is necessary. To respond to these objections, I argue, it is necessary to articulate the conditions that make a compromise principled. I defend three criteria that distinguish principled from unprincipled compromises.
Publisher
Oxford University Press
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