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MILITARY SANCTIONS: THE WAR ON TERROR AND THE CASE OF UZBEKISTAN
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Journal Article
MILITARY SANCTIONS: THE WAR ON TERROR AND THE CASE OF UZBEKISTAN
2023
Overview
States frequently find themselves disbursing or receiving military aid, cooperation, and access to military products. Using foreign policy options like \"military sanctions\" (the suspension of military projects, aid, cooperation, and access) is a desirable, widely publicized way for one state to express its discontent to another while presumably influencing desired policy changes in the client state. However, the small amount of evidence on military sanctions indicates that they are ineffective, short-lived, and may even be counterproductive. This analysis attempted to elucidate this subject by advancing a theory stating that states will impose military sanctions in response to domestic audience pressures shortly after high-profile examples of undesirable behavior by client states. However, military sanctions will be eased as time progresses and public attention has waned. This analysis qualitatively examined Uzbekistan and its relationship with the US, finding support for this theory. It concluded that following high-profile incidents and periods of undesirable behavior by an aid-recipient state, military sanctions would likely be employed by the state providing the military aid and programs. Further, military sanctions are eased or scrapped as time moves from public incidents and attention involving human rights abuses.
Publisher
Institute for Research and European Studies - Bitola
Subject
/ Asylum, Refugees, Migration as Policy-fields
/ Government/Political systems
/ History and theory of political science
/ Human Rights and Humanitarian Law
/ International relations/trade
/ Law and Transitional Justice
/ Law, Constitution, Jurisprudence
/ Politics
/ Politics / Political Sciences
/ State
