Journal Article

Justice, utility, and interpersonal comparisons

Becker, Edward F.

1975

Overview

One of the most common objections against utilitarianism is that it cannot account for the claims of distributive justice. This objection can be answered by appeal to the principle of Diminishing Marginal Utility (DMU), which says that the value of a given portion of a commodity tends to increase as a person's supply of the commodity decreases. Several points regarding the principle of DMU are commented upon: (1) the principle is a \"generality rather than a generalization,\" (2) DMU is a \"normative principle, not a psychological one,\" & (3) although DMU's explicit formulation is associated with welfare economics, \"the priciple is firmly grounded in common sense conceptions of value.\" DMU implies that--other things equal--the way to maximize the value of a commodity is to distribute it equally. Some economists have objected to DMU on the ground that it presupposes interpersonal comparisons of utility, but the position taken here is that the arguments they have advanced against the objectivity of such comparisons are unsound. The interpersonal comparisons presupposed by DMU are ordinal, rather than cardinal, & there are reasons to believe that ordinal comparisons, at least, do have an objective basis. Comments are offered on how this relates to the issue of establishing scales for measuring desire, satisfaction, or utility. Modified HA.

• Subject: Comparison/Comparisons/Comparative/Comparability / Interpersonal/Interpersonalism / Justice / Utilitarian/Utilitarians/ Utilitarianism