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Incentive Mechanism in Port Logistics Service Supply Chain Based on Blockchain and Contract Optimization
by
Hu, Jing
, Zuo, Yonggang
in
Blockchain
/ Contracts
/ Coordination
/ Logistics
/ Optimization
/ Supply chains
2025
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Incentive Mechanism in Port Logistics Service Supply Chain Based on Blockchain and Contract Optimization
by
Hu, Jing
, Zuo, Yonggang
in
Blockchain
/ Contracts
/ Coordination
/ Logistics
/ Optimization
/ Supply chains
2025
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Incentive Mechanism in Port Logistics Service Supply Chain Based on Blockchain and Contract Optimization
Journal Article
Incentive Mechanism in Port Logistics Service Supply Chain Based on Blockchain and Contract Optimization
2025
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Overview
The research findings indicate that the blockchain-induced optimization coefficient of logistics costs is positively associated with the wholesale prices of logistics capabilities. Conversely, it is negatively correlated with the unit service cost of carrier enterprises, as well as the profit of the port logistics service supply chain (LSSC). Both revenue-sharing contracts and quantity-flexibility contracts are capable of achieving the coordination of the port LSSC. The coordination condition is that the wholesale price of logistics capacity equals the unit service cost of carrier enterprises after blockchain-based optimization. These contracts enable flexible profit distribution within the port LSSC, thereby enhancing its overall coordination.
Publisher
IGI Global
Subject
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