Journal Article

What is the Source of Our Knowledge of Modal Truths?

Lowe, E. J.

2012

Overview

There is currently intense interest in the question of the source of our presumed knowledge of truths concerning what is, or is not, metaphysically possible or necessary. Some philosophers locate this source in our capacities to conceive or imagine various actual or non-actual states of affairs, but this approach is open to certain familiar and seemingly powerful objections. A different and ostensibly more promising approach has been developed by Timothy Williamson, according to which our capacity for modal knowledge is just an extension, or by-product, of our general capacity to acquire knowledge of true counterfactual conditionals—a capacity that we deploy ubiquitously in everyday life. Williamson's account crucially involves a thesis to the effect that modal truths can be explained in terms of counterfactual truths. In this paper, I query Williamson's account on a number of points, including this thesis. My positive proposal, which owes a debt to the work of Kit Fine on modality and essence, appeals instead to our capacity to grasp essences, understood in a neo-Aristotelian fashion, according to which essences are expressed by 'real definitions'.

• Publisher: Oxford University Press,Oxford Publishing Limited (England)
• Subject: Bronzes / Circles / Contrafactuals / Credibility / Ellipses / Intuition / Knowledge / Logical truth / Metaphysics / Modal metaphysics / Ontological essence / Philosophers / Philosophy / Truth / Williamson, Timothy