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Dreyfus is right: knowledge-that limits your skill
by
Cappuccio, Massimiliano L.
in
Education
/ Epistemology
/ Intellectualism
/ Knowledge
/ Logic
/ Metaphysics
/ Original Research
/ Philosophy
/ Philosophy of Language
/ Philosophy of Science
/ Schemas
2023
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Dreyfus is right: knowledge-that limits your skill
by
Cappuccio, Massimiliano L.
in
Education
/ Epistemology
/ Intellectualism
/ Knowledge
/ Logic
/ Metaphysics
/ Original Research
/ Philosophy
/ Philosophy of Language
/ Philosophy of Science
/ Schemas
2023
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Journal Article
Dreyfus is right: knowledge-that limits your skill
2023
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Overview
Skilful expertise is grounded in practical, performative knowledge-how, not in detached, spectatorial knowledge-that, and knowledge-how is embodied by habitual dispositions, not representation of facts and rules. Consequently, as action control is a key requirement for the intelligent selection, initiation, and regulation of skilful performance,
habitual
action control, i.e. the kind of action control based on habitual dispositions, is the true hallmark of skill and the only veridical criterion to evaluate expertise. Not only does this imply that knowledge-that does not make your actions more skilful, but it also implies that it makes them less skilful. This thesis, that I call Radical Habitualism, finds a precursor in Hubert Dreyfus. His approach is considered extreme by most philosophers of skill & expertise: an agent –says Dreyfus–
does not perform like an expert
when they lack the embodied dispositions necessary to control their action habitually or when they stop relying on such dispositions to control their actions. Thus, one cannot perform skilfully if their actions are guided by representations (isomorphic schemas, explicit rules, and contentful instructions), as the know-that that they convey disrupts or diminishes the agent’s habitual engagement with the task at hand. In defence of Radical Habitualism, I will argue that only the contentless know-how embedded in habitual dispositions fulfils (i) the genetic, (ii) the normative, and (iii) the epistemic requirements of skilful performance. I will examine the phenomenological premises supporting Dreyfus’ approach, clarify their significance for a satisfactory normative and explanatory account of skilful expertise, and rebut the most common objections raised by both intellectualists and conciliatory habitualists, concerning hybrid actions guided by a mix of habitual and representational forms of control. In revisiting Dreyfus anti-representationalist approach, I will particularly focus on its epistemological implications, de-emphasizing other considerations related to conscious awareness.
Publisher
Springer Netherlands,Springer Nature B.V
Subject
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