Asset Details
Do you wish to reserve the book?
Overlapping Ownership, R&D Spillovers, and Antitrust Policy
Hey, we have placed the reservation for you!
By the way, why not check out events that you can attend while you pick your title.
Oops! Something went wrong.
Looks like we were not able to place the reservation. Kindly try again later.
Are you sure you want to remove the book from the shelf?
Overlapping Ownership, R&D Spillovers, and Antitrust Policy
Do you wish to request the book?
Overlapping Ownership, R&D Spillovers, and Antitrust Policy
Please be aware that the book you have requested cannot be checked out. If you would like to checkout this book, you can reserve another copy
We have requested the book for you!
Your request is successful and it will be processed during the Library working hours. Please check the status of your request in My Requests.
Oops! Something went wrong.
Looks like we were not able to place your request. Kindly try again later.
Journal Article
Overlapping Ownership, R&D Spillovers, and Antitrust Policy
2019
Overview
This paper considers cost-reducing R&D investment with spillovers in a Cournot oligopoly with overlapping ownership. We show that overlapping ownership leads to internalization of rivals’ profits by firms and find that, for demand not too convex, increases in overlapping ownership increase (decrease) R&D and output for high (low) enough spillovers while they increase R&D but decrease output for intermediate levels of spillovers. There is scope for overlapping ownership to improve welfare and consumer surplus, provided that spillovers are sufficiently large. The results obtained are robust when R&D has commitment value and in a Bertrand oligopoly model with product differentiation.
Publisher
University of Chicago Press,The University of Chicago Press,University of Chicago, acting through its Press
Subject
We currently cannot retrieve any items related to this title. Kindly check back at a later time.