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Monitoring Intensity and Technology Choice in a Model of Unemployment
by
Zhou, Haiwen
in
Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods
/ Economics
/ Economics and Finance
/ ORIGINAL ARTICLE
/ Wage rates
2020
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Do you wish to request the book?
Monitoring Intensity and Technology Choice in a Model of Unemployment
by
Zhou, Haiwen
in
Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods
/ Economics
/ Economics and Finance
/ ORIGINAL ARTICLE
/ Wage rates
2020
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Monitoring Intensity and Technology Choice in a Model of Unemployment
Journal Article
Monitoring Intensity and Technology Choice in a Model of Unemployment
2020
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Overview
The interaction among a firm’s choices of output, technology, and monitoring intensity is studied in a general equilibrium model. Firms engage in oligopolistic competition, and unemployment is a result of the existence of efficiency wages. The following results are derived analytically. First, an increase in the cost of exerting effort leads a firm to choose a more advanced technology and a lower level of monitoring intensity. Second, an increase in the discount rate does not change a firm’s choices of technology and monitoring intensity. Third, an increase in the elasticity of substitution among goods leads a firm to choose higher levels of monitoring intensity and technology. In a model in which the level of monitoring is exogenously given, there is a negative relationship between the wage rate and the monitoring intensity. In this model with endogenously chosen monitoring intensity, the wage rate and the monitoring intensity can move either in the same direction or in opposite directions.
Publisher
Springer Science + Business Media,Palgrave Macmillan UK,Palgrave Macmillan
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