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Moral Hazard versus Liquidity and Optimal Unemployment Insurance
by
Chetty, Raj
in
Benefits
/ Economic theory
/ Households
/ Job hunting
/ Job loss
/ Labour economics
/ Liquidity
/ Marginal utility
/ Moral hazard
/ Mortgage loans
/ Payments
/ Political economy
/ Public assistance programs
/ Search theory
/ Severance pay
/ Severance payments
/ Studies
/ Unemployment
/ Unemployment insurance
/ Welfare
/ Welfare costs
2008
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Moral Hazard versus Liquidity and Optimal Unemployment Insurance
by
Chetty, Raj
in
Benefits
/ Economic theory
/ Households
/ Job hunting
/ Job loss
/ Labour economics
/ Liquidity
/ Marginal utility
/ Moral hazard
/ Mortgage loans
/ Payments
/ Political economy
/ Public assistance programs
/ Search theory
/ Severance pay
/ Severance payments
/ Studies
/ Unemployment
/ Unemployment insurance
/ Welfare
/ Welfare costs
2008
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While trying to remove the title from your shelf something went wrong :( Kindly try again later!
Do you wish to request the book?
Moral Hazard versus Liquidity and Optimal Unemployment Insurance
by
Chetty, Raj
in
Benefits
/ Economic theory
/ Households
/ Job hunting
/ Job loss
/ Labour economics
/ Liquidity
/ Marginal utility
/ Moral hazard
/ Mortgage loans
/ Payments
/ Political economy
/ Public assistance programs
/ Search theory
/ Severance pay
/ Severance payments
/ Studies
/ Unemployment
/ Unemployment insurance
/ Welfare
/ Welfare costs
2008
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Moral Hazard versus Liquidity and Optimal Unemployment Insurance
Journal Article
Moral Hazard versus Liquidity and Optimal Unemployment Insurance
2008
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Overview
This paper presents new evidence on why unemployment insurance (UI) benefits affect search behavior and develops a simple method of calculating the welfare gains from UI using this evidence. I show that 60 percent of the increase in unemployment durations caused by UI benefits is due to a “liquidity effect” rather than distortions on marginal incentives to search (“moral hazard”) by combining two empirical strategies. First, I find that increases in benefits have much larger effects on durations for liquidity‐constrained households. Second, lump‐sum severance payments increase durations substantially among constrained households. I derive a formula for the optimal benefit level that depends only on the reduced‐form liquidity and moral hazard elasticities. The formula implies that the optimal UI benefit level exceeds 50 percent of the wage. The “exact identification” approach to welfare analysis proposed here yields robust optimal policy results because it does not require structural estimation of primitives.
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