Asset Details
MbrlCatalogueTitleDetail
Do you wish to reserve the book?
Corporate Control around the World
by
AMINADAV, GUR
, PAPAIOANNOU, ELIAS
in
Civil law
/ Common law
/ Companies
/ Contracts
/ Economic development
/ Employment
/ Employment contracts
/ Formalism
/ Law
/ Political philosophy
/ Small business
/ Stockholders
2020
Hey, we have placed the reservation for you!
By the way, why not check out events that you can attend while you pick your title.
You are currently in the queue to collect this book. You will be notified once it is your turn to collect the book.
Oops! Something went wrong.
Looks like we were not able to place the reservation. Kindly try again later.
Are you sure you want to remove the book from the shelf?
Oops! Something went wrong.
While trying to remove the title from your shelf something went wrong :( Kindly try again later!
Do you wish to request the book?
Corporate Control around the World
by
AMINADAV, GUR
, PAPAIOANNOU, ELIAS
in
Civil law
/ Common law
/ Companies
/ Contracts
/ Economic development
/ Employment
/ Employment contracts
/ Formalism
/ Law
/ Political philosophy
/ Small business
/ Stockholders
2020
Please be aware that the book you have requested cannot be checked out. If you would like to checkout this book, you can reserve another copy
We have requested the book for you!
Your request is successful and it will be processed during the Library working hours. Please check the status of your request in My Requests.
Oops! Something went wrong.
Looks like we were not able to place your request. Kindly try again later.
Journal Article
Corporate Control around the World
2020
Request Book From Autostore
and Choose the Collection Method
Overview
We study corporate control tracing controlling shareholders for thousands of listed firms from 127 countries over 2004 to 2012. Government and family control is pervasive in civil-law countries. Blocks are commonplace, but less so in common-law countries. These patterns apply to large, medium, and small firms. In contrast, the development-control nexus is heterogeneous; strong for large but absent for small firms. Control correlates strongly with shareholder protection, the stringency of employment contracts and unions power. Conversely, the correlations with creditor rights, legal formalism, and entry regulation appear weak. These patterns support both legal origin and political theories of financial development.
Publisher
Wiley Periodicals, Inc,Blackwell Publishers Inc
Subject
MBRLCatalogueRelatedBooks
Related Items
Related Items
This website uses cookies to ensure you get the best experience on our website.