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Choice and performance of governance mechanisms: matching alliance governance to asset type
by
Hoetker, Glenn
, Mellewigt, Thomas
in
Alliances
/ Assets
/ Business networks
/ Business structures
/ Corporate governance
/ Corporate strategies
/ Economic resources
/ formal governance
/ Germany
/ Governance
/ Government performance
/ International alliances
/ Job performance
/ Management science
/ Marketing
/ Opportunistic behavior
/ relational governance
/ Resource allocation
/ Strategic management
/ Studies
/ Telecommunications
/ Telecommunications industries
/ Telecommunications industry
/ Transaction costs
2009
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Choice and performance of governance mechanisms: matching alliance governance to asset type
by
Hoetker, Glenn
, Mellewigt, Thomas
in
Alliances
/ Assets
/ Business networks
/ Business structures
/ Corporate governance
/ Corporate strategies
/ Economic resources
/ formal governance
/ Germany
/ Governance
/ Government performance
/ International alliances
/ Job performance
/ Management science
/ Marketing
/ Opportunistic behavior
/ relational governance
/ Resource allocation
/ Strategic management
/ Studies
/ Telecommunications
/ Telecommunications industries
/ Telecommunications industry
/ Transaction costs
2009
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While trying to remove the title from your shelf something went wrong :( Kindly try again later!
Do you wish to request the book?
Choice and performance of governance mechanisms: matching alliance governance to asset type
by
Hoetker, Glenn
, Mellewigt, Thomas
in
Alliances
/ Assets
/ Business networks
/ Business structures
/ Corporate governance
/ Corporate strategies
/ Economic resources
/ formal governance
/ Germany
/ Governance
/ Government performance
/ International alliances
/ Job performance
/ Management science
/ Marketing
/ Opportunistic behavior
/ relational governance
/ Resource allocation
/ Strategic management
/ Studies
/ Telecommunications
/ Telecommunications industries
/ Telecommunications industry
/ Transaction costs
2009
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Choice and performance of governance mechanisms: matching alliance governance to asset type
Journal Article
Choice and performance of governance mechanisms: matching alliance governance to asset type
2009
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Overview
Formal and relational governance mechanisms are used in strategic alliances to coordinate resources and mitigate the risk of opportunistic behavior. While recent work has shown that these approaches are not mutually exclusive, we understand little about when one approach is superior to the other. Using data on the governance choices and subsequent performance of alliances in the German telecommunications industry, we find that the optimal configuration of formal and relational governance mechanisms depends on the assets involved in an alliance, with formal mechanisms best suited to property-based assets and relational governance best suited to knowledge-based assets. Furthermore, a mismatch between governance mechanisms and asset type can harm the performance of the alliance. Our findings contribute to transaction cost economics, the literature on relational governance, and recent work studying their interaction.
Publisher
John Wiley & Sons, Ltd,John Wiley & Sons,Wiley Periodicals Inc
Subject
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