Asset Details
Do you wish to reserve the book?
On the Nash equilibria of a duel with terminal payoffs
Hey, we have placed the reservation for you!
By the way, why not check out events that you can attend while you pick your title.
Oops! Something went wrong.
Looks like we were not able to place the reservation. Kindly try again later.
Are you sure you want to remove the book from the shelf?
On the Nash equilibria of a duel with terminal payoffs
Do you wish to request the book?
On the Nash equilibria of a duel with terminal payoffs
Please be aware that the book you have requested cannot be checked out. If you would like to checkout this book, you can reserve another copy
We have requested the book for you!
Your request is successful and it will be processed during the Library working hours. Please check the status of your request in My Requests.
Oops! Something went wrong.
Looks like we were not able to place your request. Kindly try again later.
Journal Article
On the Nash equilibria of a duel with terminal payoffs
2023
Overview
We formulate and study a two-player duel game as a terminal payoffs stochastic game. Players 𝑃1,𝑃2 are standing in place and, in every turn, each may shoot at the other (in other words, abstention is allowed). If 𝑃𝑛 shoots 𝑃𝑚 (𝑚≠𝑛), either they hit and kill them (with probability 𝑝𝑛) or they miss and 𝑃𝑚 is unaffected (with probability 1−𝑝𝑛). The process continues until at least one player dies; if no player ever dies, the game lasts an infinite number of turns. Each player receives a positive payoff upon killing their opponent and a negative payoff upon being killed. We show that the unique stationary equilibrium is for both players to always shoot at each other. In addition, we show that the game also possesses 'cooperative' (i.e., non-shooting) non-stationary equilibria. We also discuss a certain similarity that the duel has to the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma.
