Asset Details
MbrlCatalogueTitleDetail
Do you wish to reserve the book?
Do Capital Requirements Make Banks Safer? Evidence From a Quasinatural Experiment
by
Irresberger, Felix
, Juelsrud, Ragnar E.
, Weiß, Gregor
, Bostandzic, Denefa
in
Banking
/ Banking industry
/ Capital requirements
/ Deterioration
/ Equity
/ Market value
/ Profitability
/ Solvency
2022
Hey, we have placed the reservation for you!
By the way, why not check out events that you can attend while you pick your title.
You are currently in the queue to collect this book. You will be notified once it is your turn to collect the book.
Oops! Something went wrong.
Looks like we were not able to place the reservation. Kindly try again later.
Are you sure you want to remove the book from the shelf?
Oops! Something went wrong.
While trying to remove the title from your shelf something went wrong :( Kindly try again later!
Do you wish to request the book?
Do Capital Requirements Make Banks Safer? Evidence From a Quasinatural Experiment
by
Irresberger, Felix
, Juelsrud, Ragnar E.
, Weiß, Gregor
, Bostandzic, Denefa
in
Banking
/ Banking industry
/ Capital requirements
/ Deterioration
/ Equity
/ Market value
/ Profitability
/ Solvency
2022
Please be aware that the book you have requested cannot be checked out. If you would like to checkout this book, you can reserve another copy
We have requested the book for you!
Your request is successful and it will be processed during the Library working hours. Please check the status of your request in My Requests.
Oops! Something went wrong.
Looks like we were not able to place your request. Kindly try again later.
Do Capital Requirements Make Banks Safer? Evidence From a Quasinatural Experiment
Journal Article
Do Capital Requirements Make Banks Safer? Evidence From a Quasinatural Experiment
2022
Request Book From Autostore
and Choose the Collection Method
Overview
We use the EBA capital exercise of 2011 as a quasinatural experiment to investigate how capital requirements affect various measures of bank solvency risk. We show that, while regulatory measures of solvency improve, nonregulatory measures indicate a deterioration in bank solvency in response to higher capital requirements. The decline in bank solvency is driven by a permanent reduction in banks’ market value of equity. This finding is consistent with a reduction in bank profitability, rather than a repricing of bank equity due to a reduction of implicit and explicit too-big-too-fail guarantees. We then discuss alternative policies to improve bank solvency.
Publisher
Cambridge University Press
Subject
This website uses cookies to ensure you get the best experience on our website.