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AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF AUCTIONS VERSUS GRANDFATHERING TO ASSIGN POLLUTION PERMITS
by
Holt, Charles A.
, Burtraw, Dallas
, Shobe, William
, Goeree, Jacob K.
, Palmer, Karen
in
Allocative efficiency
/ Auction markets
/ Auctions
/ Business orders
/ Consumer prices
/ Emissions trading
/ Environmental economics
/ Experimentation
/ Market power
/ Market prices
/ New Auction Mechanisms for Public Policy: Fighting the Financial Crisis, Mitigating Global Warming, and More
/ Pollution control
/ Product markets
/ Supply
2010
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AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF AUCTIONS VERSUS GRANDFATHERING TO ASSIGN POLLUTION PERMITS
by
Holt, Charles A.
, Burtraw, Dallas
, Shobe, William
, Goeree, Jacob K.
, Palmer, Karen
in
Allocative efficiency
/ Auction markets
/ Auctions
/ Business orders
/ Consumer prices
/ Emissions trading
/ Environmental economics
/ Experimentation
/ Market power
/ Market prices
/ New Auction Mechanisms for Public Policy: Fighting the Financial Crisis, Mitigating Global Warming, and More
/ Pollution control
/ Product markets
/ Supply
2010
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Do you wish to request the book?
AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF AUCTIONS VERSUS GRANDFATHERING TO ASSIGN POLLUTION PERMITS
by
Holt, Charles A.
, Burtraw, Dallas
, Shobe, William
, Goeree, Jacob K.
, Palmer, Karen
in
Allocative efficiency
/ Auction markets
/ Auctions
/ Business orders
/ Consumer prices
/ Emissions trading
/ Environmental economics
/ Experimentation
/ Market power
/ Market prices
/ New Auction Mechanisms for Public Policy: Fighting the Financial Crisis, Mitigating Global Warming, and More
/ Pollution control
/ Product markets
/ Supply
2010
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AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF AUCTIONS VERSUS GRANDFATHERING TO ASSIGN POLLUTION PERMITS
Journal Article
AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF AUCTIONS VERSUS GRANDFATHERING TO ASSIGN POLLUTION PERMITS
2010
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Overview
We experimentally study auctions versus grandfathering in the initial assignment of pollution permits that can be traded in a secondary spot market. Low and high emitters compete for permits in the auction, whereas permits are assigned for free under grandfathering. In theory, trading in the spot market should erase inefficiencies due to initial mis-allocations. In the experiment, high emitters exercise market power in the spot market, and permit holdings under grandfathering remain skewed towards high emitters. Furthermore, the opportunity costs of \"free\" permits are fully \"passed through.\" In the auction, the majority of permits are won by low emitters, reducing the need for spot-market trading. Auctions generate higher consumer surplus and slightly lower product prices in the laboratory markets. Moreover, auctions eliminate the large \"windfall profits\" that are observed in the treatment with free, grandfathered permit allocations.
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