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The Standard Picture and Statutory Interpretation
by
Graham, Aaron
in
Analysis
/ Atomism
/ Court decisions
/ Criminal law
/ Dworkin, Ronald
/ Greenberg, Mark
/ Judicial power
/ Judicial process
/ Legal positivism
/ Legislative bodies
/ Linguistics
/ Morality
/ Norms
2023
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Do you wish to request the book?
The Standard Picture and Statutory Interpretation
by
Graham, Aaron
in
Analysis
/ Atomism
/ Court decisions
/ Criminal law
/ Dworkin, Ronald
/ Greenberg, Mark
/ Judicial power
/ Judicial process
/ Legal positivism
/ Legislative bodies
/ Linguistics
/ Morality
/ Norms
2023
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Journal Article
The Standard Picture and Statutory Interpretation
2023
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Overview
The Standard Picture holds that the contribution to the law made by an authoritative legal pronouncement is directly explained by the linguistic content of that pronouncement. This essay defends the Standard Picture from Mark Greenberg’s purported counterexamples drawn from patterns of statutory interpretation in U.S. criminal law. Once relevant features of the U.S. rule of recognition are admitted into the analysis—namely, that it arranges sources of law hierarchically, and that judicial decisions are sources of valid law—Greenberg’s counterexamples are revealed as only apparent, not genuine. The legal norms that result from the patterns of interpretation he identifies can be directly explained in terms of the linguistic contents of authoritative pronouncements: judicial decisions. Furthermore, those norms can be understood as modifications of the valid norms contained in their originating statutes because judicial decisions are permitted ‘explanatory intermediaries’ of statutes by the rule of recognition.
Publisher
Cambridge University Press
Subject
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