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Signaling Alliance Commitments: Hand-Tying and Sunk Costs in Extended Nuclear Deterrence
by
Fuhrmann, Matthew
, Sechser, Todd S.
in
Alliance
/ Alliances
/ Arms control & disarmament
/ Datasets
/ Deterrence
/ Intellectuals
/ International alliances
/ International Relations
/ Military alliances
/ Military defense
/ Nuclear deterrence
/ Nuclear strategy
/ Nuclear Weapons
/ Political alliances
/ Political science
/ Territory
/ Treaties
/ War
/ Weapons
2014
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Signaling Alliance Commitments: Hand-Tying and Sunk Costs in Extended Nuclear Deterrence
by
Fuhrmann, Matthew
, Sechser, Todd S.
in
Alliance
/ Alliances
/ Arms control & disarmament
/ Datasets
/ Deterrence
/ Intellectuals
/ International alliances
/ International Relations
/ Military alliances
/ Military defense
/ Nuclear deterrence
/ Nuclear strategy
/ Nuclear Weapons
/ Political alliances
/ Political science
/ Territory
/ Treaties
/ War
/ Weapons
2014
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Do you wish to request the book?
Signaling Alliance Commitments: Hand-Tying and Sunk Costs in Extended Nuclear Deterrence
by
Fuhrmann, Matthew
, Sechser, Todd S.
in
Alliance
/ Alliances
/ Arms control & disarmament
/ Datasets
/ Deterrence
/ Intellectuals
/ International alliances
/ International Relations
/ Military alliances
/ Military defense
/ Nuclear deterrence
/ Nuclear strategy
/ Nuclear Weapons
/ Political alliances
/ Political science
/ Territory
/ Treaties
/ War
/ Weapons
2014
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Signaling Alliance Commitments: Hand-Tying and Sunk Costs in Extended Nuclear Deterrence
Journal Article
Signaling Alliance Commitments: Hand-Tying and Sunk Costs in Extended Nuclear Deterrence
2014
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Overview
How can states signal their alliance commitments? Although scholars have developed sophisticated theoretical models of costly signaling in international relations, we know little about which specific policies leaders can implement to signal their commitments. This article addresses this question with respect to the extended deterrent effects of nuclear weapons. Can nuclear states deter attacks against their friends by simply announcing their defense commitments? Or must they deploy nuclear weapons on a protégé's territory before an alliance is seen as credible? Using a new dataset on foreign nuclear deployments from 1950 to 2000, our analysis reveals two main findings. First, formal alliances with nuclear states appear to carry significant deterrence benefits. Second, however, stationing nuclear weapons on a protégé's territory does not bolster these effects. The analysis yields new insights about the dynamics of \"hand-tying\" and \"sunk cost\" signals in international politics.
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