Asset Details
MbrlCatalogueTitleDetail
Do you wish to reserve the book?
Technical Note—Optimal Long-Term Supply Contracts with Asymmetric Demand Information
by
Lobel, Man
, Xiao, Wenqiang
in
Analysis
/ Contextual Areas
/ Contract manufacturing
/ Contracts
/ Demand
/ Demand analysis
/ dynamic contracting
/ dynamic mechanism design
/ Economic aspects
/ Economic forecasting
/ Inventory control
/ Manufacturing
/ Mechanism design (Economics)
/ Operations research
/ Producer prices
/ Vendors
/ Wholesaling
2017
Hey, we have placed the reservation for you!
By the way, why not check out events that you can attend while you pick your title.
You are currently in the queue to collect this book. You will be notified once it is your turn to collect the book.
Oops! Something went wrong.
Looks like we were not able to place the reservation. Kindly try again later.
Are you sure you want to remove the book from the shelf?
Technical Note—Optimal Long-Term Supply Contracts with Asymmetric Demand Information
by
Lobel, Man
, Xiao, Wenqiang
in
Analysis
/ Contextual Areas
/ Contract manufacturing
/ Contracts
/ Demand
/ Demand analysis
/ dynamic contracting
/ dynamic mechanism design
/ Economic aspects
/ Economic forecasting
/ Inventory control
/ Manufacturing
/ Mechanism design (Economics)
/ Operations research
/ Producer prices
/ Vendors
/ Wholesaling
2017
Oops! Something went wrong.
While trying to remove the title from your shelf something went wrong :( Kindly try again later!
Do you wish to request the book?
Technical Note—Optimal Long-Term Supply Contracts with Asymmetric Demand Information
by
Lobel, Man
, Xiao, Wenqiang
in
Analysis
/ Contextual Areas
/ Contract manufacturing
/ Contracts
/ Demand
/ Demand analysis
/ dynamic contracting
/ dynamic mechanism design
/ Economic aspects
/ Economic forecasting
/ Inventory control
/ Manufacturing
/ Mechanism design (Economics)
/ Operations research
/ Producer prices
/ Vendors
/ Wholesaling
2017
Please be aware that the book you have requested cannot be checked out. If you would like to checkout this book, you can reserve another copy
We have requested the book for you!
Your request is successful and it will be processed during the Library working hours. Please check the status of your request in My Requests.
Oops! Something went wrong.
Looks like we were not able to place your request. Kindly try again later.
Technical Note—Optimal Long-Term Supply Contracts with Asymmetric Demand Information
Journal Article
Technical Note—Optimal Long-Term Supply Contracts with Asymmetric Demand Information
2017
Request Book From Autostore
and Choose the Collection Method
Overview
We consider a manufacturer selling to a retailer with private demand information arising dynamically over an infinite time horizon. Under a backlogging model, we show that the manufacturer’s optimal dynamic long-term contract takes a simple form: in the first period, based on her private demand forecast, the retailer selects a wholesale price and pays an associated upfront fee, and, from then on, the two parties stick to a simple wholesale price contract with the retailer’s chosen price. Under a lost sales model, we show that the structure of the optimal long-term contract combines a menu of wholesale pricing contracts with an option that, if exercised by the retailer, reduces future wholesale prices in exchange for an immediate payment to the manufacturer.
The online appendix is available at
https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2017.1626
.
Publisher
INFORMS,Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences
Subject
This website uses cookies to ensure you get the best experience on our website.