Asset Details
Do you wish to reserve the book?
Are Interlocked Directors Effective Monitors?
Hey, we have placed the reservation for you!
By the way, why not check out events that you can attend while you pick your title.
Oops! Something went wrong.
Looks like we were not able to place the reservation. Kindly try again later.
Are you sure you want to remove the book from the shelf?
Are Interlocked Directors Effective Monitors?
Do you wish to request the book?
Are Interlocked Directors Effective Monitors?
Please be aware that the book you have requested cannot be checked out. If you would like to checkout this book, you can reserve another copy
We have requested the book for you!
Your request is successful and it will be processed during the Library working hours. Please check the status of your request in My Requests.
Oops! Something went wrong.
Looks like we were not able to place your request. Kindly try again later.
Journal Article
Are Interlocked Directors Effective Monitors?
2009
Overview
This paper examines whether the presence of interlocked directors on a board is associated with weak governance. For a sample of 3,566 firm-years spanning 2001 to 2003, we find that firms with lower industry-adjusted firm performance are more likely to have interlocked directors. We document that shareholders react negatively to the formation of director interlocks and find that the presence of interlocked directors is associated with lower than optimal pay-performance sensitivity of CEO incentive compensation and reduced sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance. Collectively, our results suggest that the presence of interlocked directors is indicative of weak governance.
Publisher
Blackwell Publishing Asia,Wiley Subscription Services,Financial Management Association,Blackwell Publishing Ltd
Subject
