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Journal Article
Lies, More Lies and Still More Lies
2023
Overview
En una serie de trabajos, Grimaltos y Rosell (2017), 2021) han caracterizado dos tipos de mentiras, las mentiras ‘doxogénicas’ y las ‘falsificadoras’, y han utilizado esta distinción para defender dos interesantes afirmaciones: que un análisis correcto de la mentira engañosa tiene que incluir necesariamente las intenciones del hablante y que no se puede proporcionar una definición unificada de la mentira. El propósito de este artículo es doble: en primer lugar, reivindicaré la distinción de Grimaltos y Rosell entre diferentes tipos de mentiras y argumentaré que, de hecho, siguiendo su razonamiento se pueden identificar muchos más tipos de mentiras. En segundo lugar, y a pesar de este acuerdo, argumentaré que multiplicar los tipos de mentiras apelando a diferentes clases de intenciones no muestra que una definición unificada de la mentira sea inalcanzable.
In a series of works, Grimaltos and Rosell (2017, 2021) have characterized two different kinds of lies, ‘doxogenic’ and ‘falsifying’ lies, and have employed this distinction to defend two interesting claims: that a correct analysis of deceptive lying has to necessarily include the speaker’s intentions and that no unified definition of lying can be provided. The goal of this paper is twofold: first, I will vindicate Grimaltos and Rosell’s distinction between different kinds of deceptive lies and I will argue that, following their reasoning, one can actually identify many more types of lies. Second, despite this agreement, I will argue that multiplying the types of lies by appealing to different kinds of intentions does not show that a unified definition of lying is unattainable.
Publisher
KRK Ediciones, SL
Subject
