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Wittgenstein’s Objects and the Theory of Names in the Tractatus
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Wittgenstein’s Objects and the Theory of Names in the Tractatus
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Journal Article
Wittgenstein’s Objects and the Theory of Names in the Tractatus
2021
Overview
La suposición de que el Tractatus de Wittgenstein propone una cierta metafísica ha dado lugar a una controversia sobre el estatus ontológico de los objetos tractarianos. Se ha debatido, por ejemplo, si estos objetos consisten sólo en particulares o tanto en particulares como en universales; si son entidades físicas, fenoménicas o fenomenológicas; y si corresponden a los objetos de conocimiento directo de Russell o a los fenómenos y la sustancia de Kant. En este ensayo, apoyo la opinión de Ishiguro de que estos objetos, al ser conceptos formales, son ontológicamente neutrales y, por lo tanto, que no son identificables con ningún tipo ontológico de entidades. Desarrollaré la coherencia de este punto de vista centrándome en la dependencia proposicional del significado de los nombres tractarianos. Después de mostrar por qué algunos argumentos en favor de atribuir una teoría russelliana del significado a estos nombres no funcionan, muestro por qué la explicación de Ishiguro de los objetos y nombres tractarianos proporciona una mejor explicación de la inalterabilidad de estos objetos.
The supposition that Wittgenstein’s Tractatus advances a certain metaphysics has given rise to a controversy over the ontological status of his Tractarian objects. It has been debated, for instance, whether these objects consist only of particulars or of both particulars and universals; whether they are physical, phenomenal, or phenomenological entities; and whether they correspond to Russell’s objects of acquaintance or Kant’s phenomena and substance. In this essay, I endorse Ishiguro’s view that these objects, being formal concepts, are ontologically neutral and thus are not identifiable with any ontological kind of entities. I elaborate on the coherence of this view with the propositional dependence of the meaning of Tractarian names. After showing why some arguments for ascribing a Russellian theory of meaning to these names do not work, I demonstrate why Ishiguro’s account of Tractarian objects and names provides a better explanation of the unalterability of these objects.
Publisher
KRK Ediciones, SL
Subject
