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على أصداء الاندحار الإسرائيلي من قطاع غزة
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اتفاق أوسلو
/ احداث 11 سبتمبر 2001
/ الانتفاضة الفلسطينية
/ الانسحاب الاسرائيلي
/ الصراع العربي الإسرائيلي
/ المقاومة الفلسطينية
/ انتفاضة الأقصى
/ غزة
2005
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على أصداء الاندحار الإسرائيلي من قطاع غزة
in
اتفاق أوسلو
/ احداث 11 سبتمبر 2001
/ الانتفاضة الفلسطينية
/ الانسحاب الاسرائيلي
/ الصراع العربي الإسرائيلي
/ المقاومة الفلسطينية
/ انتفاضة الأقصى
/ غزة
2005
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Journal Article
على أصداء الاندحار الإسرائيلي من قطاع غزة
2005
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Overview
By just looking at the machinations of the Arab-Israeli conflict, it can be argued that there are two competing Arab programs with regards to finding a just solution to the Palestinian problem. The first is based on confrontation with the Israeli occupation on the military, political and media levels, including economic sanctions and boycott of the Zionist entity. The second is based on finding a political solution and requiring negotiations, which is also dependent on the good deeds and intentions of the Israelis. It requires a political track strategy for the settling of the conflict and the giving up of the military option. The political settlement approach dominated Fatah and PLO thinking and began to materialize during the first Intifada that began from 1987 till 1993. These groups made a strategic decision to reach a deal with the Israelis, first unveiled on 31st August 1993 and become known as the Oslo Declaration, and officially signed in Washington on 13 September 1993. The Declaration represented serious political concessions by both the Palestinian and Israeli sides. The last five years of the second intifada (2000-2005) revitalized the rivalry between those who wanted a political solution and those who stated Palestinian aims could only be achieved through armed struggle. Hence, the military wings of the Palestinian factions escalated their operations against the occupation forces. However, the September 11th 2001 attacks on New York and Washington obstructed the developing dynamics of Palestinian resistance. The Israelis used the new deteriorating international political and security situation to put the Palestinian resistance groups on a terror list that was being formed. And hence the main Palestinian factions were classified as terrorist organizations by the United States and the European Union. The other program based on a political settlement breathed freely but heavily during the last five years of the Intifada despite the brutal and terroristic behavior of Israeli soldiers against the Palestinian people and overshadowed the peace overtures of the Palestinian leadership. The Israelis for instance put the late PLO leader Yasser Arafat under house arrest and struck heavily against the Arab comprehensive initiative that offered peace and normalization. Instead Israel, continued to launch deadly incursions on Palestinian cities and killing and wounding hundreds of innocent people including children and women. It was plain for all to see. Arab public opinion concluded that Israel was not nor is willing to have any sort of peace despite the critical concessions made by Arab leaders. The normalization process, the signing of peace agreements and the advocating against the military option in the conflict couldn't achieve more important strategic developments in regards to the occupation. However, today many Arab and Palestinian observers believe that had the two intifadas continued for just three more years it would have created enough pressure to force the occupation army to leave the Palestinian territories.
Publisher
مركز دراسات الشرق الاوسط
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