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Journal Article
“A Transcendental Approach to Dream Skepticism” Appointed
2024
Overview
How can we know we are not dreaming? In this essay, I tackle this and related
questions from a transcendental standpoint, by building a philosophical narrative centred
upon three “giants”: Descartes, Kant, and Putnam. From each, I take some ideas and
discard some others, with the aim of developing a historically informed, yet original,
transcendental approach to dream scepticism. I argue that dreams can be distinguished
from objective cognitions, since they do not regularly fulfil the transcendental conditions
of such cognitions, e.g. the conditions of linguistic reference. Indeed, drawing on some
insights by G. E. Moore and Wittgenstein, I further argue that the formulations of dream
skepticism prove nonsensical: they cannot be linguistically understood. However, reflection
on these skeptical formulations may lead us to a clear aesthetic understanding of the transcendental
conditions of sense, as well as of the meaning of philosophically problematic
words like “dream,” “perception,” and “reality.”
¿Cómo podemos saber que no estamos soñando? En este ensayo, abordo ésta y
otras cuestiones relacionadas desde un punto de vista trascendental, construyendo una
narrativa filosófica centrada en tres “gigantes”: Descartes, Kant y Putnam. De cada uno
de ellos tomo algunas ideas y descarto otras, con el fin de desarrollar un enfoque trascendental
históricamente informado, aunque original, del escepticismo sobre los sueños. Sostengo
que estos pueden distinguirse de las cogniciones objetivas, ya que no suelen
cumplir las condiciones trascendentales de tales cogniciones, por ejemplo, las condiciones
de la referencia lingüística. De hecho, basándome en algunas ideas de G. E. Moore y
Wittgenstein, sostengo además que las formulaciones del escepticismo onírico resultan
carentes de sentido: no pueden comprenderse lingüísticamente. Sin embargo, la reflexión
sobre estas formulaciones escépticas puede llevarnos a una clara comprensión estética de
las condiciones trascendentales del sentido, así como del significado de palabras filosóficamente
problemáticas como “sueño”, “percepción” y “realidad”.
