Journal Article

Doing Something

Meibauer, Gustav

2015

Overview

Literature that deals with the 2011 Libyan intervention tends to ignore the practical means of the intervention, and instead focuses on its justifications. In particular, rational-actor and two-stage decision-making models often artificially differentiate between the choice to intervene and the choice of tools to do so. This paper argues that this differentiation ignores the interactive effects between these supposedly different choices, and that the perceived availability and attractiveness of particular tools may influence the choice to intervene. The paper probes this suggestion with a case study on the Libyan intervention. It argues that the suggestion of a no-fly zone majorly influenced the international decision-making process in the UN Security Council, and proved a “silver bullet” to compromise, because the no-fly zone appeared attractive both to supporters and critics of an intervention. To its proponents, the no-fly zone suggested a low-cost, low-risk alternative to more forceful measures while still signaling strong commitment and the will to “do something” against the Gaddafi regime. To opponents of intervention, previous uses of the nofly zone in Iraq and Bosnia supposedly made the tool a known concept that entailed its passiveness and strictly rule-bound character. The flaws in these assessments and the hasty process of mandating UN resolution 1973 already foreshadowed later dissent over the correct interpretation of the no-fly zone mandate. Continuing political differences in the international community were thus painted over, rather than resolved: this had consequences in Syria, where calls for a no-fly zone were refused with explicit reference to the Libyan experience.

• Publisher: St Antony’s International Review
• Subject: Diplomacy / Diplomatic history / International community / International cooperation / International sanctions / Military alliances / Military intervention / Military strategy / No fly zones / War