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Die Aufsichtsräte der deutschen Aktiengesellschaften in den zwanziger Jahren. Eine empirische Untersuchung zum Problem der «Bankenmacht»
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Die Aufsichtsräte der deutschen Aktiengesellschaften in den zwanziger Jahren. Eine empirische Untersuchung zum Problem der «Bankenmacht»
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Die Aufsichtsräte der deutschen Aktiengesellschaften in den zwanziger Jahren. Eine empirische Untersuchung zum Problem der «Bankenmacht»
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Journal Article
Die Aufsichtsräte der deutschen Aktiengesellschaften in den zwanziger Jahren. Eine empirische Untersuchung zum Problem der «Bankenmacht»
1998
Overview
Bank representatives sitting on supervisory boards of German non-bank corporations are often seen as a proof of the banks' dominance over industry. This article examines the composition of German supervisory boards in 1927, that is, before restrictions on the composition of boards were imposed. The study is based on a data bank consisting of all German joint stock companies with a shareholders' capital of not less than nom. 500,000 RM.From this basis six company samples are made up, representing < old> as well as < new> and more as well as less capital intensive industries. Although the number of bank representatives is indeed very large both in the aggregate and in all company samples — on average one out of three seats is occupied by bankers -it is argued that this must not be interpreted as an empirical proof of the bank dominance thesis.Instead, since in only very few cases only one bank was represented, the large number of competing banks on the boards is seen as evidence that the management of the majority of non-bank enterprises were able to secure injections of funds in case of need without damaging their entrepreneurial autonomy.
Publisher
C.H. Beck
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