Government Document

The Aerospace Defense Command in the Cuban Crisis, October - December 1962

1962

Overview

U.S. Air Force. Continental Air Defense Command Rules of engagement during Airborne alert specified that Air attacks using Conventional weapons could be authorized; Rules of engagement during Airborne alert authorized the use of non-nuclear [Nike-Ajax Missiles; Nike-Hercules Missiles] when the safety of surrounding areas is assured; Rules of engagement during the Airborne alert authorizes the pursuit and Air attacks on any Cuban [Naval vessels; Military aircraft]; Rules of engagement state that Air attacks on Cuban Military bases can only be authorized by U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff to protect the lives of American citizens; U.S. Air Force. Air Defense Command chronology of the U.S. Air Force. Continental Air Defense Command. 26th Air Division; U.S. Air Force. Air Defense Command recommends that strict compliance with U.S. Air Force Safety regulations for ferrying Nuclear weapons be applied in the future; North American Air Defense Command instructs all dispersed U.S. Air Force. Air Defense Command Military aircraft to \"return as soon as possible\" to home Military bases; Cuba states that it complies with the U.N. Charter and its prohibition of Intervention in other countries; U.S. Air Force. Air Defense Command Military aircraft equipped with Nuclear weapons were dispersed on 22 October 1962; Contingency plans for augmenting Air defense systems in Florida for protection against Cuban Air attacks were called Operation Southern Tip; Operation Southern Tip called for the Deployment of F-102 Aircraft at Key West Naval Air Station (Florida) for use as interceptors during Cuban Air attacks; Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Air Force Continental Air Defense Command authorizes rotations for U.S. Air Force. Air Defense Command participating in Airborne alert to exchange [Nuclear weapons; Flight crews; Aircraft]; Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Air Force Continental Air Defense Command instructions for tactical ferry of Nuclear weapons contradict U.S. Air Force Safety regulations; Ballistic Missile Early Warning System was damaged by high Winds and required that U.S. Air Force. Air Defense Command Military aircraft augment the coverage during repairs of Electronic equipment; U.S. Air Force. 15th Fighter Interceptor Squadron maintained its Aircraft on a 5 or 15 minutes Military alert status beginning with John F. Kennedy Speech Announcing Soviet Missile Deployment in Cuba (22 October 1962) and ending 3 November 1962; Defense readiness condition instructions and descriptions; Radar equipment used in Ballistic Missile Early Warning System was not operational when the Military alert was instituted on 22 October 1962

• Subject: Air attacks / Air defense systems / Airborne alert / Aircraft / American citizens / Ballistic Missile Early Warning System / Contingency plans / Conventional weapons / Cuba / Defense readiness condition / Deployment / Diltz, Theo R / Electronic equipment / F-102 Aircraft / Flight crews / Florida / Gerhart [Gen.] / Intervention / Kennedy, John F. Speech Announcing Soviet Missile Deployment in Cuba (22 October 1962) / Kenney, Paul H / Key West Naval Air Station (Florida) / Lee, Robert H / Military aircraft / Military alert / Military bases / Naval vessels / Nike-Ajax Missiles / Nike-Hercules Missiles / North American Air Defense Command / Nuclear weapons / Operation Southern Tip / Radar equipment / Rules of engagement / Safety regulations / Terrill, Robert H / United Nations. Charter / United States. Air Force / United States. Air Force. 15th Fighter Interceptor Squadron / United States. Air Force. Air Defense Command / United States. Air Force. Continental Air Defense Command / United States. Air Force. Continental Air Defense Command. 26th Air Division / United States. Air Force. Continental Air Defense Command. Commander-in-Chief / United States. Joint Chiefs of Staff / Viccellio, Henry / Weltman, John W / Winds