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COMMENTARY AND DEBATE: MANAGEMENT CONTROL IN THE LARGE CORPORATION: COMMENT ON ZEITLIN
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COMMENTARY AND DEBATE: MANAGEMENT CONTROL IN THE LARGE CORPORATION: COMMENT ON ZEITLIN
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Journal Article
COMMENTARY AND DEBATE: MANAGEMENT CONTROL IN THE LARGE CORPORATION: COMMENT ON ZEITLIN
1976
Overview
ARGUMENTS & DATA FROM SEVERAL STUDIES ARE PRESENTED IN DISAGREEMENT WITH INTERPRETATIONS FOUND IN MAURICE ZEITLIN'S ARTICLE (SEE SA 22:5/74H0937). EMPIRICAL RESULTS DO SUPPORT THE THEORY OF THE SEPARATION OF OWNERSHIP & CONTROL IN LARGE CORPORATIONS; CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS HAVE CAUSED THE DISPERSION OF STOCK OWNERSHIP. FAMILY CONTROL IS ASSOCIATED WITH FEWER FINANCIAL & NONFINANCIAL CORPORATIVE LINKS & WITH A LARGER PROPORTION OF DIRECTORS DRAWN FROM MANAGEMENT. MANAGEMENT CONTROL OF FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS SEEMS MORE PREVALENT AMONG THE LARGER BANKS, AS IN THE CASE OF NONFINANCIAL CORPORATIONS. ALTHOUGH SENIOR MANAGEMENT OFFICIALS RECEIVE LARGE SALARIES & OWN STOCK IN THEIR COMPANIES, THE MAGNITUDE OF THEIR WEALTH & SE BACKGROUNDS IS DIFFERENT FROM THOSE OF THE PRINCIPAL STOCKHOLDERS; THEY DO NOT FORM A DISTINCT CLASS OF THEIR OWN NOR HAVE THEY BECOME INCORPORATED INTO THE CAPITALIST CLASS. VARIOUS MANAGEMENT STUDIES ARE INCONCLUSIVE AS TO WHETHER \"THE PROBLEM OF DIVERGENT ECONOMIC INTERESTS BETWEEN MANAGERS & OWNERS HAS BEEN EFFECTIVELY RESOLVED BY THE INCENTIVE SYSTEM OF THE LARGE CORPORATION.\" IN ON CLASS THEORY OF THE LARGE CORPORATION: RESPONSE TO ALLEN, MAURICE ZEITLIN (U WISCONSIN, MADISON) DEALS WITH THE FOLLOWING ISSUES RAISED BY ALLEN: (1) THE FACTUAL (EMPIRICAL) BASIS FOR MANAGEMENT CONTROL, (2) THE RELATION BETWEEN MANAGEMENT CONTROL & CORPORATE SIZE, (3) THE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN CORPORATE & FINANCIAL INTERLOCKING & TYPES OF CORPORATE CONTROL, (4) THE TYPE OF CONTROL FOUND IN FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS, & (5) DIFFERENCES BETWEEN MANAGEMENT-CONTROLLED & OWNER-CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS' PROFIT LEVELS. 4 TABLES. J. N. MAYER.
