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The causes of a naval defeat, and why they were covered up
by
Miller, Nathan
in
Morison, Samuel Eliot
1993
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The causes of a naval defeat, and why they were covered up
by
Miller, Nathan
in
Morison, Samuel Eliot
1993
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The causes of a naval defeat, and why they were covered up
Newspaper Article
The causes of a naval defeat, and why they were covered up
1993
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Overview
The Japanese struck back quickly. Vice Admiral Gunichi Mikawa hastily assembled a task force of five heavy cruisers and two light cruisers and in broad daylight raced south from Rabaul on New Britain to attack the Allied ships in Savo Sound. He intended to strike at night, both to surprise the enemy and to capitalize on the training of his crews in night operations. Blunders on the part of the Allies assisted him. According to [Samuel Eliot Morison]'s account, the Japanese were sighted by a Royal Australian Air Force patrol plane on the morning of Aug. 8, but the pilot failed to break radio silence and the Allied ships were unprepared for an enemy attack. Adm. Frank J. Fletcher chose this time to withdraw his three carriers, claiming they were short of fuel, thus leaving the transports and beachhead without air cover. The debacle was rooted in the failure of the Allied commanders to credit the intelligence provided to them by the RAAF patrol plane and other sources. Even more important, according to the Warners, some Allied officers were contemptuous of the enemy and failed to appreciate the capacity of the Japanese. In essence, racism had as much to do with the defeat as anything else.
Publisher
Tribune Publishing Company, LLC
Subject
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