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This study addresses an apparent disconnect between two views of strategic action: the 'economic view,' which contends that industry structure is the primary influence on strategic action, and the 'cognitive view,' which suggests that managerial cognition drives strategic action. We argue that this disconnect has created artificial boundaries between the two perspectives and has limited our ability to develop holistic explanations of strategic action. In response, we develop an integrated model that answers two questions: 1) Does industry context affect managerial cognition? 2) Does managerial cognition mediate the relationship between industry context and strategic responses to environmental changes? To examine these questions, we study the relationship between industry velocity, the structure of top management's cognitive representation of the environment, and the speed of response to environmental events. We find that industry velocity influences the structure of cognitive representations, which in turn influence the speed of response to environmental events. These results support our contention that both industry and cognition variables are critical in developing explanations of strategic actions. These results have implications for our understanding of the development of top managers' beliefs, the relationship between beliefs and action, and the nature of the complex relationship between industry context, managerial cognition, and strategic action.

Prior competitive dynamics research has drawn on theories of information processing to model the subjective antecedents of executives' retaliation choices. This prior work has made great progress in developing our understanding of the retaliation choices most firms will make to a given type of attack. What the information processing perspective has not been able to do is explain firm-specific behavior to predict which competitive moves individual firms will challenge, or explain why individual firms differ in the types of actions that they are most likely to challenge. The goal of this paper is to sharpen the theoretical and empirical focus on predicting firm-level retaliation proclivities. We leverage managerial cognition research to examine the relationship between firm-level differences in the cognitive frameworks that executives possess, and firmlevel differences in whether and how quickly firms challenge a market move. Results from a longitudinal study of the airline industry suggest that the addition of a cognitive perspective provides important insights into competitive retaliation.

Substantial gains can be made by individuals and organizations adept at detecting new opportunities. But how do business leaders do that concretely? Organization research shows that managers are more inclined to identify threats than opportunities, but it is still not clear why this is the case. Likewise, research points to several factors that may facilitate the recognition of opportunities. Yet empirical observations have been limited by retrospective biases and other conceptual challenges. As a result, key questions remain not only about what factors facilitate the recognition of opportunities, but also about why these factors play such a role. To further understanding of these issues, we study the reasoning strategies that individuals mobilize for recognizing opportunities. We develop a model of opportunity recognition as a cognitive process of structural alignment, and analyze the think-aloud verbalizations of executive entrepreneurs as they try to recognize opportunities for new technologies. In contrast to prior research, the qualitative and quantitative data do not provide evidence that individuals use prototypes to recognize opportunities. Instead, we find that different kinds of mental connections play different roles in the process of recognizing opportunities, with different consequences. We also document why and how prior knowledge may facilitate this process. By drawing attention to the cognitive underpinnings of opportunity recognition, we cast light on why it constitutes such a challenging task for individuals and organizations. In turn, this provides a useful basis for exploring the factors that explain why some individuals/organizations are able to recognize opportunities that others simply fail to see.

We investigate cultural variations in the strategic issue labels of threats and opportunities. In a survey of 276 American and international respondents, we investigate the sensitivity of issue atributes that discriminate between threat and opportunity. We find that the cultural value of uncertainty avoidance (UA) had a significant effect: Compared to low UA cultures, individuals from high UA cultures were significantly more sensitive to controllability in perceiving strategic issues. However, other cultural value dimensions (individualism, masculinity, power distance) did not have similar effects. Our results point to the need to link specific cultural dimensions to specific aspects of strategic issue analysis.

This paper begins to answer the call to broaden current theories of individual decision-making by including in them the effects of human mood. Grounding our arguments in psychological literature on the effects of mood on information processing, motivation, and decision heuristics, we develop hypotheses about how mood can significantly affect individuals' use of structured decision protocols. In support of our hypotheses, results from an experimental study of complex decision-making suggest that, in situations where a structured decision protocol is the usual method of decision-making, individuals in moderately negative moods are significantly more likely than those in moderately positive moods to: (1) carefully execute all the steps of a structured decision protocol, (2) execute the steps of a structured decision protocol in the correct order, and (3) rely on the outcome of the structured decision protocol as the primary basis for the decision. We discuss these findings in terms of their implications for both organizational decision models and psychological models of mood and decision-making. In general, our findings help establish mood as an important variable in models of organizational decision-making and help shed light on often conflicting findings about the benefits of positive vs. negative mood for individual decision-making.

Using the established definition of situated cognition in organizations as \"the interaction of cognitive schemas and organizational context\" (Lant 2002), we examine empirical case studies from the last 15 years to illustrate what situated cognitions in organizations might actually look like. Grounded in this research, we develop a framework that identifies how some specific forms of cognitive schemas (i.e., rule schemas, event schemas, person schemas) and specific contexts (e.g., physical contexts, institutional contexts) interact during sensemaking processes to give rise to momentary perceptions that we call situated cognitions. We present evidence that common patterns of interaction between schemas and context may occur during sensemaking in organizations. In terms of theoretical implications, our framework focuses attention on the specific interactions between context and cognition (rather than on context or cognition alone) that comprise situated cognitions, and helps to more concretely define situated cognitions as momentary or temporally bounded perceptions. We offer several practical implications of this framework for managers and suggest avenues for further elaboration on our ideas through research.

We adoptan information processing perspective to investigate how the interplay of belief structures and industry context shapes new venture strategic adaptation in a sample of 104 publicly traded new ventures founded between 1996 and 2006 in several technology-intensive industries. Results highlight that distinct espoused belief structures attributes (complexity, centrality, proactive causal logics) and industry growth combinations predict diversity, frequency, and speed of new venture strategic actions. We contribute to prior literature on early firm strategic adaptation by providing an elaborated understanding of the role of espoused belief structures in interpreting and translating industry signals into new venture strategic action. Further, we highlight the role of belief structures in facilitating the fast, diverse, and frequent organizational actions typically associated with continuous adaptation.

This paper argues that a key component in a firm's strategic response to unfamiliar environmental events is the interpretations managers develop about the event itself and about key dimensions of their strategy. Using historical data from the pharmaceutical industry, the revealed interpretations of top management from six firms over a ten-year period are analyzed and are compared to the timing and content of the changes in strategy each firm undertook following a significant change in regulation. The results reveal two distinct patterns of interpretation development that appear to be linked to whether or not the target of interpretation is familiar. Further, interpretations appear to be linked both temporally and in terms of content to the strategic change undertaken by each firm. Both sets of results suggest that the interpretations of managers are linked to organizational actions.

This paper explores the cognitive aspects underlying industries in hypercompetitive environments. Hypercompetition represents a state of competition with rapidly escalating levels of competition and reduced periods of competitive advantage for firms. In hypercompetitive industries member firms act boldly and aggressively to create a state of competitive disequilibrium. In this paper we explore the particular conditions that managers encounter in making sense of hypercompetitive industries and argue that the nature of these conditions is such that conventional sensemaking frameworks will not work. We then describe the \"adaptive sensemaking\" practices established in the literature for dealing with temporary turbulence and suggest that in hypercompetition those processes continue indefinitely. We argue that these processes can become institutionalized as standard operating procedures within firms, and as shared recipes within industries, which in turn perpetuates hyperturbulent conditions.

Organizational renewal requires that a firm's top managers make timely adjustments in their mental models following significant changes in the environment. Our initial propositions about the difference between renewal and decline focused on whether similar organizations in similar contexts differ in their ability to recognize significant changes in their environments. Analysis of longitudinal data from a matched pair of U.S. railroads suggested, however, that renewal hinges not so much on noticing new conditions, but on being able to link environmental change to corporate strategy and to modify that linkage over time. In the successful company we studied organizational renewal is a continuous process of first and second order changes in cognitive maps.