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180 result(s) for "Blustein, Jeffrey"
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The Moral Demands of Memory
Despite an explosion of studies on memory in historical and cultural studies, there is relatively little in moral philosophy on this subject. In this book, Jeffrey Blustein provides a systematic and philosophically rigorous account of a morality of memory. Drawing on a broad range of philosophical and humanistic literatures, he offers a novel examination of memory and our relations to people and events from our past, the ways in which memory is preserved and transmitted, and the moral responsibilities associated with it. Blustein treats topics of responsibility for one's own past; historical injustice and the role of memory in doing justice to the past; the relationship of collective memory to history and identity; collective and individual obligations to remember those who have died, including those who are dear to us; and the moral significance of bearing witness.
Handbook for Health Care Ethics Committees
This guide remains an essential resource for all health care ethics committee and their members.
Childhood Interests: what they are and why it matters
This paper examines the concept and moral significance of “childhood interests.” This concept is important in medical decision-making for children and more broadly in the field of pediatric ethics. The authors argue that childhood interests are identifiable components of childhood well-being that carry moral weight. Parents have a special role in protecting and promoting these interests and special obligations to do so. These parental obligations are grounded by the independent interests of the child, as well as the good of society more generally. Because parents have these child-rearing obligations, they must also have the authority and wide discretion necessary to fulfill them. However, while parental discretion is wide, it is not unlimited, for it must be used to safeguard and advance childhood interests.
Doing the best for one’s child: satisficing versus optimizing parentalism
The maxim “parents should do what is in the best interests of their child” seems like an unassailable truth, and yet, as I argue here, there are serious problems with it when it is taken seriously. One problem concerns the sort of demands such a principle places on parents; the other concerns its larger social implications when conceived as part of a national policy for the rearing of children. The theory of parenting that creates these problems I call “optimizing parentalism.” To avoid them, I define and defend a new and more morally appealing theory, “satisficing parentalism.”
When Doctors Break the Rules
Suppose a primary care physician practicing in an underserved community orders a treatment for one of her indigent patients under the state’s Medicaid program.
FORGIVENESS, COMMEMORATION, AND RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: THE ROLE OF MORAL EMOTIONS
Forgiveness of wrongdoing in response to public apology and amends making seems, on the face of it, to leave little room for the continued commemoration of wrongdoing. This rests on a misunderstanding of forgiveness, however, and we can explain why there need be no incompatibility between them. To do this, I emphasize the role of what I call nonangry negative moral emotions in constituting memories of wrongdoing. Memories so constituted can persist after forgiveness and have important moral functions, and commemorations can elicit these emotions to preserve memories of this sort. Moreover, commemorations can be a restorative justice practice that promotes reconciliation, but only on condition that the memories they preserve are constituted by nonangry negative, not retributive, emotions.
When Doctors Break the Rules
Suppose a primary care physician practicing in an underserved community orders a treatment for one of her indigent patients under the state’s Medicaid program.
Care and commitment : taking the personal point of view
Despite the current popularity of what is commonly referred to as an “ethics of care”, no one has yet undertaken a systematic philosophical study of “care” itself. This book presents the first such study, offering a detailed exploration of human “care” in its various guises: concern for and commitment to individuals, ideals, and causes. The book focuses on the nature and value of personal integrity and intimacy, and on the questions they raise for traditional moral theory.
Reply to Ross's “Arguments against Respecting a Minor's Refusal of Efficacious Life-Saving Treatment Redux”
Third, Ross claims that adopting individualized assessment of adolescent decisional capacity rather than a single age of emancipation gives healthcare professionals too much discretion to impose their own values in deciding whether a child should be permitted to make his own healthcare decisions. But I did not argue that we should reject \"bright line\" cutoffs entirely. Jonathan Moreno and I stated our position on individualized assessments of decisional capacity for cases of treatment refusal in the article I mentioned in Part I of my reply to Ross (CQ 18, no. 3, July 2009).