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Despite the absence of responsiveness during anesthesia, conscious experience may persist. However, reliable, easily acquirable and interpretable neurophysiological markers of the presence of consciousness in unresponsive states are still missing. A promising marker is based on the decay-rate of the power spectral density (PSD) of the resting EEG. We acquired resting electroencephalogram (EEG) in three groups of healthy participants (n = 5 each), before and during anesthesia induced by either xenon, propofol or ketamine. Dosage of each anesthetic agent was tailored to yield unresponsiveness (Ramsay score = 6). Delayed subjective reports assessed whether conscious experience was present (‘Conscious report’) or absent/inaccessible to recall (‘No Report’). We estimated the decay of the PSD of the resting EEG—after removing oscillatory peaks—via the spectral exponent β, for a broad band (1–40 Hz) and narrower sub-bands (1–20 Hz, 20–40 Hz). Within-subject anesthetic changes in β were assessed. Furthermore, based on β, ‘Conscious report’ states were discriminated against ‘no report’ states. Finally, we evaluated the correlation of the resting spectral exponent with a recently proposed index of consciousness, the Perturbational Complexity Index (PCI), derived from a previous TMS-EEG study. The spectral exponent of the resting EEG discriminated states in which consciousness was present (wakefulness, ketamine) from states where consciousness was reduced or abolished (xenon, propofol). Loss of consciousness substantially decreased the (negative) broad-band spectral exponent in each subject undergoing xenon or propofol anesthesia—indexing an overall steeper PSD decay. Conversely, ketamine displayed an overall PSD decay similar to that of wakefulness—consistent with the preservation of consciousness—yet it showed a flattening of the decay in the high-frequencies (20–40 Hz)—consistent with its specific mechanism of action. The spectral exponent was highly correlated to PCI, corroborating its interpretation as a marker of the presence of consciousness. A steeper PSD of the resting EEG reliably indexed unconsciousness in anesthesia, beyond sheer unresponsiveness. •Unconsciousness does not imply unresponsiveness.•Consciousness is abolished during xenon and propofol, yet preserved during ketamine.•EEG Spectral exponent indexes the 1/f-like decay of non-oscillatory PSD background.•Xenon and propofol steepen broad-band decay; ketamine flattens high-frequency decay.•Spectral exponent separates un/consciousness in anesthesia-induced unresponsiveness.

Frontoparietal cortex is involved in the explicit processing (awareness) of stimuli. Frontoparietal activation has also been found in studies of subliminal stimulus processing. We hypothesized that an impairment of top-down processes, involved in recurrent neuronal message-passing and the generation of long-latency electrophysiological responses, might provide a more reliable correlate of consciousness in severely brain-damaged patients, than frontoparietal responses. We measured effective connectivity during a mismatch negativity paradigm and found that the only significant difference between patients in a vegetative state and controls was an impairment of backward connectivity from frontal to temporal cortices. This result emphasizes the importance of top-down projections in recurrent processing that involve high-order associative cortices for conscious perception.

Consciousness has been related to the amount of integrated information that the brain is able to generate. In this paper, we tested the hypothesis that the loss of consciousness caused by propofol anesthesia is associated with a significant reduction in the capacity of the brain to integrate information. To assess the functional structure of the whole brain, functional integration and partial correlations were computed from fMRI data acquired from 18 healthy volunteers during resting wakefulness and propofol-induced deep sedation. Total integration was significantly reduced from wakefulness to deep sedation in the whole brain as well as within and between its constituent networks (or systems). Integration was systematically reduced within each system (i.e., brain or networks), as well as between networks. However, the ventral attentional network maintained interactions with most other networks during deep sedation. Partial correlations further suggested that functional connectivity was particularly affected between parietal areas and frontal or temporal regions during deep sedation. Our findings suggest that the breakdown in brain integration is the neural correlate of the loss of consciousness induced by propofol. They stress the important role played by parietal and frontal areas in the generation of consciousness. ► Detection of low frequency fMRI group networks using sICA and clustering. ► Objective, automatic methods to quantify interactions between networks. ► Comparison of resting wakefulness and propofol-induced anesthesia using integration. ► Significant decreases in within- and between-network integration at the brain scale. ► Fronto-parietal segregation of networks during sedation.

Recent studies have been shown that functional connectivity of cerebral areas is not a static phenomenon, but exhibits spontaneous fluctuations over time. There is evidence that fluctuating connectivity is an intrinsic phenomenon of brain dynamics that persists during anesthesia. Lately, point process analysis applied on functional data has revealed that much of the information regarding brain connectivity is contained in a fraction of critical time points of a resting state dataset. In the present study we want to extend this methodology for the investigation of resting state fMRI spatial pattern changes during propofol-induced modulation of consciousness, with the aim of extracting new insights on brain networks consciousness-dependent fluctuations. Resting-state fMRI volumes on 18 healthy subjects were acquired in four clinical states during propofol injection: wakefulness, sedation, unconsciousness, and recovery. The dataset was reduced to a spatio-temporal point process by selecting time points in the Posterior Cingulate Cortex (PCC) at which the signal is higher than a given threshold (i.e., BOLD intensity above 1 standard deviation). Spatial clustering on the PCC time frames extracted was then performed (number of clusters = 8), to obtain 8 different PCC co-activation patterns (CAPs) for each level of consciousness. The current analysis shows that the core of the PCC-CAPs throughout consciousness modulation seems to be preserved. Nonetheless, this methodology enables to differentiate region-specific propofol-induced reductions in PCC-CAPs, some of them already present in the functional connectivity literature (e.g., disconnections of the prefrontal cortex, thalamus, auditory cortex), some others new (e.g., reduced co-activation in motor cortex and visual area). In conclusion, our results indicate that the employed methodology can help in improving and refining the characterization of local functional changes in the brain associated to propofol-induced modulation of consciousness.

Whether unique to humans or not, consciousness is a central aspect of our experience of the world. The neural fingerprint of this experience, however, remains one of the least understood aspects of the human brain. In this paper we employ graph-theoretic measures and support vector machine classification to assess, in 12 healthy volunteers, the dynamic reconfiguration of functional connectivity during wakefulness, propofol-induced sedation and loss of consciousness, and the recovery of wakefulness. Our main findings, based on resting-state fMRI, are three-fold. First, we find that propofol-induced anesthesia does not bear differently on long-range versus short-range connections. Second, our multi-stage design dissociated an initial phase of thalamo-cortical and cortico-cortical hyperconnectivity, present during sedation, from a phase of cortico-cortical hypoconnectivity, apparent during loss of consciousness. Finally, we show that while clustering is increased during loss of consciousness, as recently suggested, it also remains significantly elevated during wakefulness recovery. Conversely, the characteristic path length of brain networks (i.e., the average functional distance between any two regions of the brain) appears significantly increased only during loss of consciousness, marking a decrease of global information-processing efficiency uniquely associated with unconsciousness. These findings suggest that propofol-induced loss of consciousness is mainly tied to cortico-cortical and not thalamo-cortical mechanisms, and that decreased efficiency of information flow is the main feature differentiating the conscious from the unconscious brain.

In this functional magnetic resonance imaging study, we examined the effect of mild propofol sedation and propofol-induced unconsciousness on resting state brain connectivity, using graph analysis based on independent component analysis and a classical seed-based analysis. Contrary to previous propofol research, which mainly emphasized the importance of connectivity in the default mode network (DMN) and external control network (ECN), we focused on the salience network, thalamus, and brainstem. The importance of these brain regions in brain arousal and organization merits a more detailed examination of their connectivity response to propofol. We found that the salience network disintegrated during propofol-induced unconsciousness. The thalamus decreased connectivity with the DMN, ECN, and salience network, while increasing connectivity with sensorimotor and auditory/insular cortices. Brainstem regions disconnected from the DMN with unconsciousness, while the pontine tegmental area increased connectivity with the insulae during mild sedation. These findings illustrate that loss of consciousness is associated with a wide variety of decreases and increases of both cortical and subcortical connectivity. It furthermore stresses the necessity of also examining resting state connectivity in networks representing arousal, not only those associated with awareness.

Mechanisms of propofol-induced loss of consciousness remain poorly understood. Recent fMRI studies have shown decreases in functional connectivity during unconsciousness induced by this anesthetic agent. Functional connectivity does not provide information of directional changes in the dynamics observed during unconsciousness. The aim of the present study was to investigate, in healthy humans during an auditory task, the changes in effective connectivity resulting from propofol induced loss of consciousness. We used Dynamic Causal Modeling for fMRI (fMRI-DCM) to assess how causal connectivity is influenced by the anesthetic agent in the auditory system. Our results suggest that the dynamic observed in the auditory system during unconsciousness induced by propofol, can result in a mixture of two effects: a local inhibitory connectivity increase and a decrease in the effective connectivity in sensory cortices.

Propofol is one of the most commonly used anesthetics in the world, but much remains unknown about the mechanisms by which it induces loss of consciousness. In this resting-state functional magnetic resonance imaging study, we examined qualitative and quantitative changes of resting-state networks (RSNs), total brain connectivity, and mean oscillation frequencies of the regional blood oxygenation level-dependent (BOLD) signal, associated with propofol-induced mild sedation and loss of responsiveness in healthy subjects. We found that detectability of RSNs diminished significantly with loss of responsiveness, and total brain connectivity decreased strongly in the frontal cortex, which was associated with increased mean oscillation frequencies of the BOLD signal. Our results suggest a pivotal role of the frontal cortex in propofol-induced loss of responsiveness.

King et al . raise some technical issues about our recent study showing impaired top-down processes in the vegetative state. We welcome the opportunity to provide more details about our methods and results and to resolve their concerns. We substantiate our interpretation of the results and provide a point-by-point response to the issues raised.

Patients in a minimally conscious state (MCS) show restricted signs of awareness but are unable to communicate. We assessed cerebral glucose metabolism in MCS patients and tested the hypothesis that this entity can be subcategorized into MCS− (i.e., patients only showing nonreflex behavior such as visual pursuit, localization of noxious stimulation and/or contingent behavior) and MCS+ (i.e., patients showing command following). Patterns of cerebral glucose metabolism were studied using [ 18 F]-fluorodeoxyglucose-PET in 39 healthy volunteers (aged 46 ± 18 years) and 27 MCS patients of whom 13 were MCS− (aged 49 ± 19 years; 4 traumatic; 21 ± 23 months post injury) and 14 MCS+ (aged 43 ± 19 years; 5 traumatic; 19 ± 26 months post injury). Results were thresholded for significance at false discovery rate corrected p  < 0.05. We observed a metabolic impairment in a bilateral subcortical (thalamus and caudate) and cortical (fronto-temporo-parietal) network in nontraumatic and traumatic MCS patients. Compared to MCS−, patients in MCS+ showed higher cerebral metabolism in left-sided cortical areas encompassing the language network, premotor, presupplementary motor, and sensorimotor cortices. A functional connectivity study showed that Broca’s region was disconnected from the rest of the language network, mesiofrontal and cerebellar areas in MCS− as compared to MCS+ patients. The proposed subcategorization of MCS based on the presence or absence of command following showed a different functional neuroanatomy. MCS− is characterized by preserved right hemispheric cortical metabolism interpreted as evidence of residual sensory consciousness. MCS+ patients showed preserved metabolism and functional connectivity in language networks arguably reflecting some additional higher order or extended consciousness albeit devoid of clinical verbal or nonverbal expression.