Catalogue Search | MBRL
Are you sure you want to remove the book from the shelf?
{{itemTitle}}
156
result(s) for
"Cass, Ronald A"
Sort by:
TRADE AND SOVEREIGNTY: WHAT YOU CAN SEE BY LOOKING
Cass examines the meaning of sovereignty, the basics of international trade and trade policy, and the relation of considerations relevant to the two topics. In particular, he discusses the role that open trade plays in both protecting and potentially undermining national security and the impact of trade--related agreements and institutions on national sovereignty. Furthermore, he talks about relative risks posed by particular forms of cooperation and with cautions for policymakers in the trade arena.
Journal Article
Delegation reconsidered: a delegation doctrine for the modern administrative state
The American Constitution designed structures intended to limit discretionary government power, checking assignments of discretionary power necessary for effective government (something the new Constitution was supposed to improve) by dividing them among different entities and different officials. The national government was granted limited powers;2 the states retained plenary powers not at odds with national powers; 3 and the vesting clauses of Articles I, II, and III grant the entirety of the legislative, executive, and judicial powers of the national government to specific bodies and officers. That set of assignments long has been understood to preclude reassignment of those powers to others. The central feature of the US Constitution -- what the Constitution's framers thought provided the most important bulwark of liberty -- is the division of power among different branches. Although federal courts, including the Supreme Court, have been zealous in policing some aspects of constitutional separation of power, they have been notoriously reluctant to enforce the limitation of the legislative power to Congress.
Journal Article
THE UMPIRE STRIKES BACK
Judges’ work often is analogized to that of umpires, enforcing the rules of the game neutrally and impartially—most famously by John Roberts in his confirmation hearing to become Chief Justice of the United States. Just as often, commentators disparage the analogy as inapt, because it fails to capture the influence of factors apart from law-as-written on judicial decisions. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s much earlier aphorism about great cases and hard cases draws attention to what might be termed the backside of the judge as umpire metaphor, singling out considerations often associated with divergence from predictable decisionmaking based on principles inherent in previously adopted rules.
Three notable recent decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court respecting judicial review of administrative actions—Kisor v. Wilkie, Department of Commerce v. New York, and Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of University of California—provide examples of the gap between aspiration and actuality for the judge as umpire metaphor. And in all three, the deciding vote was cast by Chief Justice Roberts.
This Article explores the decisions of the Court in Kisor, Department of Commerce, and Homeland Security, and ways in which those decisions depart from prior law on judicial review and create additional discretion for the courts at the expense of other branches of government. The Article also explores reasons for the attraction of the judge as umpire metaphor and flaws in arguments against it—even though the legal system still leaves room for the umpire to strike back.
Journal Article
Quality and quantity in constitutional interpretation: the quest for analytic essentials in law
Henry Manne wrote about many topics central to the law-and-economics canon but also over a period of more than a decade later in life worked on a theory of constitutional interpretation, producing a paper and lectures on this subject. His goal was to use insights from economics to improve constitutional analysis, in particular seeking to ground constitutional interpretation in quantitative assessments he hoped would be both true to the primary goal of constitution-makers and capable of providing guidance to judges in ways less subject to the pull of political preferences. Despite his concerns with controlling constitutional interpretation in practice, the instincts Manne brought to this endeavor ran more to matters of theory than to its implementation by judges, identifying important propositions for interpretation but failing (by his own admission) to produce a test that fulfilled his aspirations. The strengths and weaknesses of this work provide an intriguing contrast with writings from Antonin Scalia, the American jurist and scholar whose approaches to both constitutional and statutory interpretation had a profound impact on jurisprudence over the past three decades. Like Manne, Scalia highly valued more determinate methods of analysis and was deeply concerned with the architecture of constitutional creation and effectuation. His focus, however, was more on the practical question of what happens when a particular sort of official has the power to implement a highly indeterminate test and what test best constrains interpretation in ways faithful to the interpretive task. Those goals undergird Scalia’s commitments to textualism and originalism. Manne’s and Scalia’s approaches to constitutional interpretation are instructive on the purposes served by analytical tools in disparate settings. In particular, they offer contrasting and complementary visions, providing insights about the domains of law-and-economics, legal analysis, practical judgment, and perspective.
Journal Article
STAYING AGENCY RULES: CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND RULE OF LAW IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
Today, administrative rules are far more numerous than the laws enacted by Congress, cover far more pages in the relevant legal codes, account for far more regulatory commands, and have profound effects on American economy and society. Although administrative rules can provide substantial public benefit, legal constraints on the scope of administrative authority and on the processes by which it is employed provide critical protections. Courts, when asked, can review the legality of these rules; courts also can stay rules' effectiveness pending review, both preserving the status quo and reducing costs entailed by rules of questionable legality. Holding rules in abeyance until they can be reviewed often is the best—and at times the only—vehicle for guaranteeing a meaningful review. Canons of deference to both administrative and judicial discretion should be revisited in light of the vast reach of federal administrative regulation, the concentrated impact regulations often have on specific individuals and entities, and the frequent experience that staying rules' effects is critical to limiting administrative adventurism and avoiding irreparable harm. Greater attention to the harm from failure to stay questionable rules can protect rule-of law values, preserve liberties that were cental to our constitutional design, and provide space for serious evaluation of the rules' consistency with law.
Journal Article
Laws of creation : property rights in the world of ideas
Cass and Hylton explain how technological advances strengthen the case for intellectual property laws, and argue convincingly that IP laws help create a wealthier, more successful, more innovative society than alternative legal systems. Ignoring the social value of IP rights and making what others create \"free\" would be a costly mistake indeed.
eBook
Laws of Creation
Cass and Hylton explain how technological advances strengthen the case for intellectual property laws, and argue convincingly that IP laws help create a wealthier, more successful, more innovative society than alternative legal systems. Ignoring the social value of IP rights and making what others create “free\" would be a costly mistake indeed.
eBook
The How and Why of Law School Accreditation
This paper argues that current practices in law school accreditation do not address or reflect its stated purposes. Instead, the system is exclusionary, ignores content of instruction, increases the expense of legal education, allows too much faculty control, retards change, and limits competition. It does not primarily inform or protect the public as it should. (MSE)
Journal Article